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Precis of Vaulting Ambition:
Sociobiology and the Quest for
Human Nature
Philip Kitcher
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla,
Calif. 92093

Abstract: The debate about the credentials of sociobiology has persisted because scholars have failed to distinguish the varieties of
sociobiology and because too little attention has been paid to the details of the arguments that are supposed to support the provocative
claims about human soeial behavior. I seek to remedy both dcfieieneies. After analysis of the relationships among different kinds of
sociobiology and contemporary evolutionary theory, I attempt to show how some of the studies of the behavior of nonhuman animals
meet the methodological standards appropriate to evolutionary research. I contend that the efforts of E. O. Wilson, Richard
Alexander, Charles Lumsden, and others to generate conclusions about human nature are flawed, both because they apply
evolutionary ideas in an un rigorous fashion and because they use dubious assumptions to connect their evolutionary analyses with
their conclusions. This contention rests on analyses of many of the major sociobiological proposals about human social behavior,
including: differences in sex roles, racial hostility, homosexuality, conflict between parents and adolescent offspring, incest
avoidance, the avunculate, alliances in combat, female infanticide, and gene-culture coevolution. Vaulting Ambition thus seeks to
identify what is good in sociobiology, to expose the errors of premature speculations about human nature, and to prepare the way for
serious study of the evolution of human social behavior.
Keywords: behavior; culture; environment; evolution; genes; genetics; heredity; human nature; sociobiology

The sociobiology debate
The chief aim of Vaulting Ambition (henceforth Ambition)
is to end a debate that has occupied biologists, social
scientists, and humanists for the last decade. I claim that
the credentials of sociobiology cannot be properly assessed until we make some important distinctions. First,
there are some exciting developments in recent evolutionary thcory that have been used to illuminate some
aspects of the behavior of nonhuman animals. Second,
there is a potential science that studies the evolution of
human social behavior. Third, there are some particular
provocative theses about human nature and the inevitability of human social institutions. I hope to explain the
success of the first kind of sociobiology, to expose the
pretensions of the last, and to prepare the way for the
serious pursuit of the second.
Human sociobiology has been portrayed by its critics as
a doctrine that perpetuates inequities on the basis of sex,
class, and race. Although the political import of the
conclusions advanced by some sociobiologists has to be
acknowledged, the debate is not ultimately a political
one. We need to know whether the provocative conclusions are well supported by the available evidence. Politics intrudes on the scene onlv because the costs of error
may be grave, so that we a;e ill-advised to lower our
epistemological standards.
I believe that the sociobiology debate has generated so
much heat because the participants have neglected cru-
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cial distinctions and because they have not scrutinized
the arguments that are supposed to support the provocative theses. Ambition uses the philosopher's favorite
tactics. I draw distinctions and I analyze arguments.
C

Varieties of sociobiology
There is a very broad discipline that is "the systematic
study of the biological basis of all social behavior" (Wilson
1975, p. 2) and that addresses questions about the mechanisms, development, function, and evolution of social
behavior. In effect, this discipline, broad sociobiology, is
approximately the field defined by Tinbergen in his
account of the four "whys" of behavioral biology (Tinbergen 1968, p. 79). Most of the discussion about sociobiology focuses on a narrower domain. Narrow sociobiology tackles questions of evolution and of function
(the two are linked because, in the pertinent sense, the
attribution of function consists in the identification of the
selection pressure that maintains the behavior).
So far, I have characterized sociobiology as a field (or
fields) of study. But we can also consider sociobiology as a
theory that supplies answers to the questions that constitute the field. I argue that, insofar as there is a theory
within narrow sociobiology, it is general evolutionary
theory (Ambition, Chapter 4). Theoretical sociobiology is
thus irresistible - at least for anyone who accepts contemporary evolutionary theory.
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To appreciate the significance of this point we need a
clear view of the character of evolutionary theory. Chapter 2 of Ambition attempts to provide this. I suggest that
evolutionary theory, in all its versions from Darwin to the
present, is best thought of as having three parts. Any
version of the theory focuses on a set of questions (the
questions it takes to fall within its domain), offers a set of
strategies or schemata for answering these questions, and
sets forth some general claims about the evolutionary
process. Evolutionary questions are answered by developing structured narratives that exemplify the schemata
furnished by the theory. Thus, to take one simple exampIe, Darwin's original version of the theory proposes that
questions of biogeographical distribution are to be answered by relating histories of descent with modification,
so that we would explain the current distribution of the
marsupials, for instance, by tracing the history of their
radiation and speciation.
Within the last thirty years there have been some
important developments in evolutionary theory that have
enabled us to take a far more sophisticated view of animal
social behavior. The contributions of Hamilton, Maynard
Smith, Williams, Trivers (Ambition, Chapter 3), and
others can be seen as providing us with more refined
views about the evolutionary process and enriching the
set of strategies available for answering evolutionary
questions. Theoretical sociobiology is irresistible because
of the cogency of Hamilton's claims about the dynamics
of inclusive fitness and Mavnard Smith's theorems about
the existence of evolutiona'rily stable strategies in particular game-theoretic situations [see Maynard Smith:
"Game Theory and the Evolution of Behaviour" BBS
7(1) 1984]. Like the principles of population genetics,
results of this kind are accepted because they follow from
some definitions and some very well confirmed results
about gene transmission (grounded quite independently
of any evolutionary considerations).
This does not mean that the particular answers that
sociobiologists give to questions about the evolution or
the function of a piece of social behavior are either correct
or warranted by the available evidence. We should distinguish the brilliant insights of Hamilton, Maynard
Smith, and others in alerting us to evolutionary possibilities - or, in my preferred terms, in supplying us with
new strategies for explaining particular evolutionary phenomena - from the application of their ideas in specific
instances. Once we have made this distinction, we reach a
point that is, in my judgment, absolutely indispensable
for any serious evaluation of sociobiology. The particular
accounts that sociobiology supplies have to be evaluated
on their individual merits and it is quite possible that
some uses of evolutionary schemata to answer questions
about the evolution of social behavior are as impressive as
anything in evolutionary theory, whereas others fall far
short of the standards that evolutionary theorists routinely and properly demand.
Further distinctions are also important. Sometimes our
evolutionary questions are concerned with the actual
selection pressures that have shaped or maintained a trait
in a population. On other occasions we want to know how
it is possible that a characteristic that appears to reduce
the fitness of its bearers is maintained in the population.
So we may ask how it is possible that worker sterility has
been maintained in the social Hymenoptera or we may
62
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inquire about the actual forces that have been at work.
Since we may have a good answer to the question about
possibility without having strong evidence in favor of any
actual scenario, we should make distinctions among sociobiological proposals that tackle these different kinds of
problems.
Moreover, sociobiological research will also vary according to the traits whose presence it seeks to account for
and the sizes of the groups within which those traits are
manifested. The latter type of variation is particularly
important. Many narrow sociobiologists focus on a particular species (speckled wood butterflies, olive 'baboons);
others try to account for behavior across a very broad
group (all birds, all vertebrates with internal fertilization). Obviously, it is harder to defend broad generalizations than to support local conclusions about a single
species. Furthermore, when the generalization covers
our own species (or any other species in which cultural
transmission might playa major role), there may be good
reason to think that there is no single evolutionary schema that applies to all members of the group.
The main point of Chapters 2-4 of Ambition is to show
how there are all kinds of enterprises that fall under the
rubric of narrow sociobiology. I also try to assemble the
methodological canons that are appropriate for assessing
work in evolutionary theory. Hence these chapters prepare for the work I regard as crucial for the resolution of
the sociobiology controversy: the piecemeal evaluation of
particular sociobiological explanations.

Pop sociobiology
But more is at stake than simply the legitimacy of specific
suggestions about the evolution and function of bits of
behavior in humans and other animals. Sociobiology has
attracted broad interdisciplinary attention because some
of its adherents promise a new theory of human nature.
This is most evident in some of the work ofE. O. Wilson
(see particularly Wilson 1978) and in that of his most
militant supporters (Barash 1979; van den Berghe 1979).
[See also the multiple book review of Lumsden &
Wilson's: Genes, mind and culture, BBS 5(1) 1982.]
However, the same generic idea - namely, that of advancing from evolutionary explanations to claims about
human nature - is present in the writings of Alexander
(1979) and in the joint work of Lumsden and Wilson
(1981; 1983). Despite specific differences among the
various authors, I conceive all of them as practicing a
distinctive kind of sociobiology, which I call "pop sociobiology." (The name was chosen to reflect the fact that
this work is not only what is commonly thought of as
sociobiology but is also designed to command popular
attention. However, the name is less important than the
category. We need some label to mark this body of
research, and readers who prefer to may treat "pop
sociobiology" as a meaningless tag without loss to the
argument.)
Any version of pop sociobiology consists of a collection
of proposals within narrow sociobiology - specifically,
proposals about the evolution of items of human behavior
- together with some extra machinery. The purpose of
the extra machinery is to connect the evolutionary conclusions with doctrines about human nature. The most
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readily comprehensible version of pop sociobiology can
be found in Wilson's early writings (1975;1978).
In his last chapter, Wilson (1975) announces a number
of conclusions about human beings: We are xenophobic,
deceitful, aggressive, and "absurdly easy to indoctrinate." Any evaluation of Wilson's claims about human
nature must address two main questions: What does the
thesis that humans have certain properties "by nature"
mean? How are Wilson's conclusions supposed to follow
from his evolutionary analyses? The initial criticism of
Wilson typically answered the first question by attributing to him a thesis of genetic determinism. Wilson's
assertions that human beings are "by nature" xenophobic
or that men are "naturally" hasty and fickle, whereas
women are "naturally" faithful and coy, have been interpreted as the claim that these traits are caused by the
relevant genotypes. Wilson has responded to the criticism by disavowing any simplistic genetic determinism.
He endorses the commonplace that human phenotypes
(including human behavioral phenotypes) are the joint
result of genotypes and environments. So what do the
assertions about "human nature" mean?
Chapter 1 of Ambition develops an interpretation on
which Wilson's theses about human nature are seen as
claims about the norms of reaction for items of human
behavior. The proposal that "there is a cost, which no one
yet can measure, awaiting the society that moves either
from juridical equality of opportunity between the sexes
to a statistical equality of their performance in the professions" (Wilson 1978, p. 147) should be understood as
contending that the norms of reaction for certain kinds of
human attributes (including both male and female propensities to compete for various kinds of positions in
society) are shaped in such a way that any combination of
environmental variables that would produce statistical
equality of performance would be realized only in a
society that sacrificed some other things that we find
valuable. A simpler illustration is provided by the thesis
that the "ideals of some feminists" - increased male
parental care, increased female sexual freedom - may be
"biologically inconsistent" (Kleiman 1977, p. 62). Here,
what is being suggested is that the norm of reaction for
male parental care (more exactly, for the male propensity
for caring for young) and the norm of reaction for female
sexual freedom have the property that as you adjust the
environmental variables to increase the one you automatically decrease the other.
I argue that this interpretation makes the claims about
human nature advanced by Wilson and his followers
intelligible, and it does not commit them to denying the
commonplace wisdom about the role of both genes and
environment in the determination of behavior. But how
are these claims to be defended by advancing conclusions
about the evolution of human social behavior? Chapter 1
of Ambition suggests a crude line of argument that might
enable Wilson to climb from nature up to human nature.
This line of argument is refined in Chapter 4 as Wilson's
ladder (the revised, standard version):
1. By using the standard methods for confirming
evolutionary histories, we can confirm hypotheses to
the effect that all members of a group G would maximize their fitness by exhibiting a form of behavior B in
the typical environments encountered by members of
G.

2. When we find B in (virtually) all members of
G, we can conclude that B became prevalent and
remains prevalent through natural selection, specifically through the contribution to fitness identified at
step 1.
3. Because selection can only act where there are
genetic differences, we can conclude that there are
genetic diflerences between the current members of G
and their ancestors (and any occasional recent deviants)
who failed to exhibit B.
4. Because there are these genetic differences and
because the behavior is adaptive, we can show that it
will be difficult to modifY the behavior by altering the
social environment, in the sense that there will either
be no combinations of environmental variables that
yield a state in which B is absent, or else such environmental variables can only be realized by abandoning
widely shared desiderata. (pp. 126-27)
Once we have formulated the sociobiological program
in this way, we can see that further claims must be
scrutinized, beyond the proposals to apply schemata from
evolutionary theory. There are various ways in which the
program might go wrong. At the first step of the ladder,
the application of ideas from evolutionary theory may be
carried out unrigorously (see previous section). Moreover, the language used to describe behavior across a
large and diverse group of organisms may itself smuggle
in evolutionary assumptions. When the analysis of fitness-maximizing behavior is compared with what the
animals actually do, there may be too little data to support
the conclusion of form 2. Or there may be discrepancies
between the deliverances of the analysis offitness and the
actual behavior, discrepancies that can only be explained
by introducing extra variables that would subvert the
original analysis. The step from analysis of fitness to a
history of selection also deserves scrutiny, for the thesis
that evolution - even evolution under selection - fixes
the fittest phenotype is not as uncontroversial as it might
appear to be. Finally, even ifwe can reach step 3, it is not
obvious how to attain step 4. The fact that there has been a
history of selection and that there have been genetic
changes in a lineage so that people behave in particular
ways in our typical environments does not obviously
entail anything about the possibility of finding variations
on the behavior in different social environments.
Chapters 5-8 of Ambition attempt to articulate all
these points, and to show that the main claims of pop
sociobiology, as developed in Wilson's early writings, fall
prey to some of the errors just mentioned. My aim is to
identify a surfeit of suspects. Each suspect is guilty some
of the time, no suspect is guilty all of the time, and each
grand conclusion about human nature involves at least
one guilty suspect.

Evolutionary modeling: The good, the bad, and
the ugly
Chapter 5 is concerned with the use of the schemata from
contemporary evolutionary theory - in particular schemata that use the insights of Hamilton and Maynard
Smith - to understand various kinds of animal social
behavior. I begin with two examples that seem to exemplifY the rigor found in the best evolutionary analyses:
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1987) 101
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Parker's study of copulation time in the dung fly (Parker
1978) and the research of Woolfenden (and others) on
helping at the nest in the Florida scrub jay (Woolfenden
1975; Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1978; Emlen 1978;
1984). In both cases, the strength of the conclusions
depends on the possibility of formulating precise mathematical models, of using experiment or observation to
determine the value of crucial parameters, and of making
detailed observations of the behavior. Nonetheless, although both studies are extremely suggestive, I argue
that certain important questions remain unresolved: Indeed, I take it to be a merit of the research I describe that
it structures our ignorance by identifying precise questions that we need to answer ifthe analyses are to be taken
one step further. Thus I endorse Emlen's verdict on the
present state of research into the phenomenon of helping
at the nest (or den): "Considerable advances have been
made both in the development of theory pertaining to
cooperative behavior and in the collection of empirical
field data. We now have before us a preliminary set of
models and testable hypotheses. The decade ahead
should be an exciting one as we begin to see vigorous
testing of these various hypotheses" (1984, pp. 338-39). I
applaud not only the imagination and care with which
Parker, Woolfenden, Emlen, and others in the "behavioral ecology" tradition approach their research, but also
the caution with which they announce their conclusions.
Not all studies of the behavior of nonh uman animals are
as rigorous as these. I continue by examining some
research that is suggestive but that falls short of the
standards that evolutionary analyses ought to meet. Perhaps the most important kind oflapse is that illustrated in
Orians's pioneering study of mating systems in birds and
mammals (Orians 1969). Here, Orians offers a simple
model designed to specify when it will be advantageous
for a female to mate with a male who has already mated.
His model Yields qualitative predictions, which, as he
acknowledges, are not always satisfied. Specifically, the
model predicts that swans, geese, and ducks ought to be
polygynous. Orians proposes to square the prediction
with the observed finding by noting that, among these
birds, monogamy occurs only in high-latitude species,
and he suggests that there is a premium on quick breeding in high-latitude species. In effect, this is to introduce a
new variable, not previously recognized in the model,
and Orians fails to consider whether this introduction
might subvert the conclusions obtained earlier.
The next stage brings us to the kind of example on
which pop sociobiologists like to build. I consider Wilson's analysis of defensive behavior in vertebrates (1975,
pp. 121-22). This, I argue, is flawed in numerous respects. First, it is far from clear that there is any uniform
model that will apply to all the situations that Wilson
intends to cover - situations in which a "dominant" male
exposes himself to danger in defense of a troop. I suggest
that there are a number of different questions about these
situations and that Wilson fails to distinguish among
them. The claims about inclusive fitness are treated very
selectively: Wilson considers inclusive fitness maximization for some of the participants but not for others. Some
of the claims about defensive behavior in ungulates are
belied by the detailed field studies (Kruuk 1972). Discrepancies between the analysis and cases that Wilson recognizes as anomalous are unresolved. Here, I suggest, we
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have at best a promissory note for some possible future
analysis of some of the forms of behavior lumped together
in Wilson's large generalization.
I continue by looking at one of the most notorious
proposals of pop sociobiology, the claim that the difference in gamete size between males and females underwrites an analysis of sexual behavior on which "It pays
males to be aggressive, hasty, fickle, and undiscriminating" and "it is more profitable for females to be coy, to
hold back until they can identify males with the best
genes" (Wilson 1978, p. 125). [See also the multiple book
review of Symons: The Evolution of Human Sexuality,
BBS 3(2) 1980.] I trace the argument to its roots in
Trivers's model of asymmetrical parental investment
(Trivers 1972), and I show that a more careful gametheoretic analysis is compatible with a number of combinations of male and female strategies. In particular, a
simple game-theoretic model reveals the possibility of a
stable polymorphism. In light of this analysis (which, I
admit, is only the beginning of a model for any complicated vertebrate), I consider the relation between
Wilson's claims and the behavioral data. I show that the
"exceptional cases" are typically treated by using Wilson's assumptions about "the optimal male strategy" and
"the optimal female strategy" as a basis, and by introducing special hypotheses ad hoc to explain away deviations,
and I argue that we should have no faith in the gerrymandered generalization that results. Thus, I conclude,
Wilson's analysis of sexual strategies is inadequate.
Chapter 5 concludes with a brief look at some cases in
which the evolutionary analysis seems even more hasty:
the adaptive value of "ecstasy at football games" (Wilson
1975, p. 167), of being "homesick in foreign places"
(Wilson 1975, p. 274), offorebearance in combat (Barash
1979, p. 183), and of dominance displays in men (van den
Berghe 1979, p. 197). My intention is to juxtapose and
compare such pop sociobiological proposals with the work
of Parker, Woolfenden, Emlen, and Orians, and even
with Wilson's own, more serious, efforts. The central
theme of Chapter 5 is that narrow sociobiology covers a
continuum of cases and that, as we understand the merits
of the best examples, we shall see clearly the deficiencies
of the analyses that occur in provocative pop sociobiological discussions.

Anthropomorphism and reductionism
Two of the most common criticisms leveled against pop
sociobiology are that it engages in unwarranted anthropomorphism and that it generates its conclusions by
making false, reductionist assumptions. Chapter 6 endeavors to make these charges precise.
Use of the same terminology to cover the behavior of
humans and of nonhuman animals can easily disguise
undefended assumptions about similarity of structure or
of function. To take a notorious example, if it is proposed
that rape is committed by both mallards and men, and the
proposal serves as the basis for attributing a genetic
predisposition to commit rape (or, in the terms of Barash,
1979, finding the idea of rape "stimulating"), then we
must ask if there is any common mechanism underlying
the behavior of men and of mallard males or if there is
some common function that the behavior fulfills in the
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two cases. I argue that neither assumption can be sustained, and that the entire "scientific case" is borne by the
question-begging terminology.
This sort of anthropomorphism is only the most
egregious instance of conceptual malfunctioning in pop
sociobiology. I also consider two more subtle examples:
our vocabularies for discussing mating systems and power
relations. Consider the family of terms "monogamy,"
"polygyny," "polyandry," and "promiscuity," the stockin-trade not only of pop sociobiology but of many serious
studies of animal behavior. These expressions need to be
handled with enormous care. Even in the relatively
rigorous usage of the behavioral ecologists (see, for example, Krebs & Davies 1981), there are three potential
sources of trouble. First, there are different ways to apply
the concepts to at least some animal groups by choosing
alternative time scales. I illustrate the point by showing
how we could interpret the behavior of chimpanzees as
either promiscuous or polyandrous (more exactly, as
exemplifying an arrangement in which males are successively polygynous, females simultaneously polyandrous). Second, we can vary the construal of the concepts by supposing that mating involves only copulation;
that it involves copulation and reproduction; that it involves copulation, reproduction, and cooperation (of
some specified kind). Third, we need to consider whether
our attribution of a mating system to an animal group is
supposed to represent the actual mating behavior of
members of the group or the underlying dispositions,
which may be compromised in practice by ecological
constraints. Apparently, if the interest is in fathoming the
dispositions of individual animals, then we should be
concerned with the mating patterns that would be exhibited under ideal conditions, in which the ecological constraints are removed. The difference can be illustrated by
considering gibbons, normally classified as "monogamous." Since the most plausible account of the gibbon
mating system is that it results from the distribution of
food, which forces females to disperse and thus prevents
males from trying to monopolize a cluster of females,
there is no reason for thinking that the individual dispositions of individual gibbons are different from the dispositions of some of their close relatives (orangutans, gorillas,
and chimpanzees, none ofwhich are considered "monogamous").
Analogous points can be made about the concept of
dominance, which, I suggest, can best be understood by
thinking from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. Once these points are appreciated we should look on
pop sociobiological theses about "male dominance displays in humans" and the "natural mating system of Homo
sapiens" (Barash 1979; van den Berghe 1979; Wilson
1975) with a more skeptical eye.
One variety of reductionism that occurs in pop sociobiology is related to one of the errors already canvassed. Pop sociobiologists often conflate the pattern of
behavior revealed in a group of animals with the dispositions to behavior of the individual participants. Wilson
(1978) uses an analysis of the behavior of tribes and
nations to conclude that "humans are strongly predisposed to respond with unreasoning hatred to external
threats and to escalate their hostility sufficiently to overwhelm the source of the threat by a wide margin of safety"
(p. 119). I argue that supposing that the behavior of the

group directly reflects the propensities ofthe participants
is a particularly crude type of reductionism.
A more sophisticated reductionist strategy is to dismiss
appeals to the efficacy of social institutions and the history
of a society as invoking illegitimate entities. I contend
that this strategy is also faulty, and that we can appreciate
the importance of historical events and cultural transmission without supposing that Clio herself needs to be
added to the inventory of evolutionary forces. Thus I
show that fitness-maximizing behavior may become prevalent in a group through cultural transmission, without
any changes in the gene pool. In this way, the passage
from step 1 to step 2 of Wilson's ladder is more problematic than it appears.
Chapter 6 concludes with an investigation of the ways
in which unwarranted reductionist assumptions can be
used to help negotiate the final step of Wilson's ladder. I
begin from the straightforward point that even ifwe were
to discover that human genes combine with one range of
environments to issue in a behavioral phenotype, we
would not be entitled to any conclusions about the fixity of
behavior across all environments, unless we have reason
to think that the range of possible human environments is
fully represented in our sample. Pop soci,obiologists may
try to fill the gap in one of three distinct ways: They may
propose that the simplest way for selection to operate is to
favor a disposition to exhibit behavior that is insensitive to
environment; they may suggest that since some human
behavioral propensities are old adaptations, fixed in animals with rudimentary cognitive abilities, we have no
reason to think that they can be modified in ways that
employ our burgeoning mentality; or they may emphasize the constancy of the human phenotype under a
variety of cultural conditions.
My response to the first two suggestions is that we have
no reason to think that selection will favor fixed tendencies to behavior or to dismiss the pOSSibility that an
increase in cognitive powers might radically alter old
behavioral mechanisms. (In fact, we can give a casual
sociobiological argument for thinking that evolution
ought to operate in this way, replacing crude mechanisms
with tricks that can yield subtle responses to environmental conditions, and thus bring an increment in fitness.
This argument is no better - and no worse - than many of
the speculations of pop sociobiology!) The issue of reductionism returns with the last strategy, the appeal to the
universality of certain forms of human behavior.
Consider Wilson's (1978) claim that differences in the
frequency of reflexive smiling between infant boys and
girls signal innate behavioral differences. That claim can
be countered by proposing that parents care for boys and
girls in different ways (Money & Ehrhardt 1972). If
Wilson is to rebut this objection, then he may offer any of
the following reductionist theses: (a) The caring behavior
of parents makes no difference; (b) even if the caring
behavior of parents makes a difference, parental tendencies to respond differently to boys and girls is itself an
indicator of sex differences; (c) even if the caring behavior
of parents makes a difference, and even if it is the
expression of the socialization of the parents, the fact that
the parents have been socialized in these ways reflects
biological differences. I argue that there is no reason to
think that any of these three theses is correct, and, more
generally, that we are not entitled to pursue the reducBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1987) 101
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tionist tactic of ignoring social and historical forces. As a
number of Wilson's critics (Bock 1980; Sahlins 1976) have
argued, and as Wilson has now conceded (Lumsden &
Wilson 1981; 1983), we must recognize the role of society
in human development.

Evolution and optimality
Another common indictment of sociobiology (which is
sometimes directed against research in narrow sociobiology outside pop sociobiology) is that it pursues an
illegitimate adaptationist program, in which the evolutionary process is regarded as generating optimal phenotypes (Gould & Lewontin 1979). Chapter 7 of Ambition
takes up this objection. I argue that when one takes
seriously the genetics of the evolutionary process it is
hard to find a version of the claim that evolution produces
the best available phenotype that is both nontrivial and
true. I consider the ways that optimality arguments are
used in narrow sociobiology generally, and how serious
research on nonhuman animals is frequently attuned to
the possibilities that such arguments may prove misleading. Finally, I review some of the incautious appeals to
optimality that abound in pop sociobiology.
Darwin's central insight is often presented by borrowing a slogan from Spencer. Evolution under selection, it is
said, is the survival of the fittest. The most elementary
ways of formulating this idea precisely lead immediately
to trouble. For example, it is not true that natural selection will lead to the fixation of the optimal available
phenotype. There may be no optimal available phenotype, or the optimal phenotype may be coded by a
heterozygote, or, if there are more than two alleles at a
locus, the fitness relations among the genotypes may
prevent the fixation of the fittest. I illustrate the problems
with examples from Templeton (1982) and from Lewontin
and White (1960). The problems can be overcome by
tinkering with the notion of availability, but the cost of
such tinkering is that the original slogan becomes a
truism.
Moreover, it is wrong to think of selection as the only
evolutionary force. I show that chance effects can playa
large role in the evolution of small populations, and argue
that the effects of stochastic factors can sometimes be
permanent. Arguments to the efI'ect that chance and
selection work harmoniously to guide a population to the
global optimum (see Templeton's 1982 refurbishing of
insights due to Sewall Wright) depend critically on premises to the effect that the adaptive topography remains
relatively constant over time and that selection is not
frequency-dependent. I conclude that a complete adaptive story for everything would be mistaken.
The difficulties of Spencer's slogan are only half of the
challenge to the use of optimality arguments. There are
also methodological troubles, which arise from the possibility of our misidentifYing the optima, even in cases in
which we may assume that evolution has fixed the fittest
available phenotype. The most sensitive proponents of
optimality analyses (for example, Oster & Wilson 1978)
recognize the source of these troubles and admit that such
analyses involve guesswork. I compare their self-criticisms with the points made by Gould and Lewontin
(1979), and argue that we have good reason to rely on
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optimality analyses only when we have some knowledge
of the developmental connections between that aspect ~f
the phenotype in which we are primarily interested and
other traits of the organism. The route to the reconstruction of phylogeny may lie - at least in part - through the
study of ontogeny.
Chapter 7 concludes by showing how pop sociobiological arguments frequently cast aside the caution
with which optimality analyses are treated in other narrow sociobiological studies. I consider Barash's (1979)
blanket assumption about the link between optimality
and evolution, Wilson's claims about the effects on fItness
of religious practice (1978) and of adapting to subordinate
status (1975), Alexander's broad claims for the optimiZing
power of evolution (1979), and, finally, an "explanation"
of the adaptive significance of the female orgasm (Bernds
& Barash 1979).

Four major examples
At this stage, the catalog of the foibles exemplifIed in the
most prominent pop sociobiological program is complete.
However, each of the examples so far discussed has been
viewed as illustrating one special kind of mistake. Chapter 8 of Ambition seeks to supplement this piecemeal
approach by looking extensively at four major examples of
pop sociobiology in the tradition of Wilson's early writings. The cases considered are Wilson's treatment of
homosexuality (1978), Barash's attempt to explain racial
hostility (1979), Trivers's claims about conflict between
parents and offspring in adolescence (1974), and van den
Berghe's hypotheses about incest avoidance (1983).
Wilson's argument for thinking that homosexuals
might constitute a vertebrate "caste" (1975) starts with an
unscrutinized assumption to the effect that there is a
single category of homosexual behavior, and that instances of this can be found in a wide variety ofhuman and
nonhuman contexts. He continues by inflating the credentials of studies in behavior genetics and offering some
speculations about ways in which a propensity to have
some homosexual offspring might boost one's inclusive
fitness. I argue that there is no reason to believe in these
alleged advantages.
Barash's treatment of interracial hatred is also flawed in
several ways. First, some precise but limited results
about kin recognition in ground squirrels are interpreted
as showing that selection favors a general tendency for
animals to be "nice" to their kin. Second, Barash (1979)
appeals to the fact that schoolchildren can be divided into
groups that are mutually antagonistic to buttress the
conclusion that there may be "an evolutionary tendency
to racism" (p. 153). Finally, he points out that people of
difI'erent races share fewer genes than people of the same
race, and claims that we can expect "kin-selected altruism" to produce antagonism toward those of different
races. I counter by (a) showing that a proper application of
Hamilton's (1964) ideas about inclusive fitness would, at
best, only support a relatively rare tendency to discriminate people of the same race from those who are racially
different, and by (b) distinguishing the thesis that we have
a propensity to aid those who share our genes from the
thesis that we have a propensity to be hostile to those who
do not.
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Both of these examples occur in popular presentations
of pop sociobiology, and so invite the response that there
are more rigorous arguments in more scholarly discussions. My third and fourth examples are designed to
counter this suggestion. At the end of his seminal paper
on parent-offspring conflict, Trivers claims that his
model provides an account of adolescent resistance to
socialization. The root idea is that there should be some
situations in which it will be in the interests ofthe parents'
inclusive fitness if a child behaves altruistically toward a
sibling. Parents can be expected to encourage more
cooperation than it behooves their children to give, and
Trivers concludes that this explains conflicts between
parents and their adolescent offspring.
I argue that detailed models of the situation can give
virtually any conclusions we want to obtain, depending
on the assumptions we make. The first point to note is that
there have to be some mechanisms that lead to parental
encouragement and adolescent resistance, respectively.
Mechanisms that lead to conflict in all situations are not
promising candidates for fitness-maximization, whereas
those that are selective have to be very finely tuned
indeed. I elaborate these points by constructing a family
of models and showing that, as we vary the parameter
values, we can obtain any combination of strategies for
parent and child. Second, Trivers's model tacitly assumes
that we are treating a one-directional flow of aid. If we
suppose that there is rough symmetry to the situations, so
that the child who is encouraged to give today is likely to
be a beneficiary tomorrow, then the children are effectively engaged in an iterated game of prisoner's dilemma.
The results of Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) tell us that
"tit-for-tat" is an ESS (evolutionarily stable strategy) for
this game (see also Maynard Smith 1982 [and BBS 7(1)
1984]), so that the children should be expected to accede
to parental pressure to cooperate. Finally, I show that in
the particular example Trivers gives (a child resisting
parental demands to do homework) the analysis Trivers
supplies does not fit. Moreover, the illustration draws
attention to a general point. Pop sociobiological models
can easily introduce evolutionary modeling in the wrong
place, focusing not on the adaptive value of the underlying dispositions to behavior but on the particular items of
behavior that are manifested in quite special circumstances. The discussion of Alexander's ideas (see below)
underscores the importance of this error.
Finally, Chapter 8 takes a look at the example that
some aficionados take to be the best application of sociobiology to human behavior - the case of incest avoidance (Ruse 1982; Wilson in Shepher 1983). Van den
Berghe has argued that humans have an adaptive propensity to avoid copulating with those with whom they have
been reared (van den Berghe 1980;1983; van den Berghe
& Mesher 1980). He also suggests that in the rare instances in which sibling incest has been encouraged or
even prescribed, it can be understood as a fitness-maximizing strategy.
I criticize van den Berghe's account of incest on a
number of different grounds. First, there are serious
problems about how to define incest, since there is a
whole range of potentially relevant participants (siblings,
stepsiblings, unrelated children reared together) and a
spectrum of potentially relevant forms of behavior (kissing, fondling, full copulation, homosexual relations, and

so forth). Second, whatever explanation of sibling incest
avoidance is favored, that account should be integrated
with analyses of other forms of sexual relations and avoidance of such relations among close relatives. Third, the
data on occurrence of incest are far less clear-cut than van
den Berghe allows. Anxious to rebut published accounts
of widespread incest as "sensationalistic," he seeks to
minimize the incidence of incest. Instead, van den
Berghe leans heavily on data from the kibbutz, purporting to show that children reared in the same kibbutz
showed little inclination to "marry or make love to each
other" (Shepher 1971; van den Berghe 1983). However,
this is to neglect confounding factors, most obviously the
influence of a program of kibbutz education, during the
relevant period, which stressed the importance of chastity (Kaffman 1977). Another source that van den Berghe
cites is the study of "minor marriages" in Taiwan (Wolf &
Huang 1980). In this case, a close look at the details of the
data reveals that there is a rival sociocultural explanation
for the lowered reproductive success in such marriages.
The evidence about incest avoidance is also clouded by
the existence of a genetic study (Spielman, Neel & Li
1977), unmentioned by van den Berghe, which appears to
show a relatively high amount of inbreeding in past
Amerindian populations. Thus, I claim, we do not have a
clear picture of whether, in the absence of social sanctions, people avoid copulating with those with whom they
have been reared.
Finally, it is not clear that detailed evolutionary models
would deliver the conclusions that van den Berghe wants.
If the attempt to find an unrelated mate brings with
it a high probability of death or serious damage, then
people may do better to stay home and copulate within
the family (Bengtsson 1978; May 1979). Moreover, van
den Berghe's own proposal about the possibility of maximizing fitness in situations of royal sibling incest appears
to be based on confusions about inclusive fitness. When
the confusions are cleared away and the details are elaborated, the conditions required for royal incest to be a
fitness-maximizing strategy seem very unlikely to obtain.

Alexander's program
Richard Alexander (1979) claims that contemporary Darwinism provides "the first simple, general theory of
human nature with a high likelihood ofwidespread acceptance" (p. 12). However, his vision of what a theory of
human nature is differs from that adopted by Wilson.
Chapter 9 of Ambition takes a close look at Alexander's
program and at the work of some anthropologists who
have been influenced by his conception of sociobiology.
Alexander is quite forthright in claiming that his goal is
not that of showing how our genes set limits to our forms
of social behavior and our cultural institutions (1979; see
also Kurland 1979). Indeed, he argues that the enterprise
of discovering the limits of human behavior is self-defeating: The idea is that we could not identify a limit without
simultaneously learning how to transcend it. Unfortunately, this reassuring argument is specious, for the
simple reason that theoretical knowledge does not always
bring practical skill.
Since Alexander disavows the most obvious way of
regarding Darwinism as the key to a theory of human
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nature, the first task must be to achieve an alternative
reading. I consider two possibilities. On the conservative
interpretation, the task of sociobiology is to provide
evolutionary explanations of human behavior that are
consistent with our everyday ideas about the proximate
mechanisms of the behavior. Historians, anthropologists,
and ordinary people use a commonsense account of
human motivation to understand the doings of others.
Call this familiar picture folk psychology. Construed
conservatively, Alexander's proposal is to provide evolutionary explanations for the presence in us of the mechanisms adduced by folk psychology. In short, the task of
sociobiology would be to develop evolutionary folk psychology, or EFP.
Alexander's claims might be more revolutionary. Perhaps recognizing that a form of social behavior maximizes
the inclusive fitnesses of the participants could challenge
our prior conceptions of human motives and human
decision making. The most radical possibility would be to
suppose that there is some general, all-purpose mechanism for calculating the expected payoffs of the available
courses of action and to claim that this always comes into
play in the causation of our social behavior. A less revolutionary alternative would claim that particular propensities, of which we are normally unaware, incline us to
actions that maximize inclusive fitness. For example,
Alexander might suggest that the ways in which we treat
our relatives are so finely attuned to fitness maximization
that we must not simply assume that we have a general
propensity to love our kin, but a capacity for calculating
exact coefficients of relationship and valuing people accordingly. On either version, the pop sociobiological
view of human nature sees us as having hitherto unrecognized mechanisms for directing fitness-maximizing
behavior.
Chapter 9 considers Alexander's claims about the fitness-maximizing character of human social behavior and
their bearing on the conservative and the revolutionary
interpretations of his pop sociobiology. Alexander's general strategy is to assemble a list of "predictions" from his
theory of human nature and to consider two examples in
some detail. I argue that his list of 25 "predictions" does
nothing to support his case. The list consists ofa sequence
of relatively banal facts about ourselves that are only
loosely connected with Alexander's central thesis. The
looseness of fit is especially obvious when we consider
examples that appear to threaten the doctrine that humans behave so as to maximize their inclusive fitness, for,
in these cases, Alexander appeals to complications in
human social situations, complications that are routinely
ignored when there is a rough fit between the behavior
and some simple idea about how inclusive fitness is
maximized.
The most promising case on the list is the institution of
primogeniture. We can easily devise an argument for the
view that bequeathing the family fortune to the eldest
child is likely to be fitness-maximizing. But how does this
show us anything important about human nature? Does it
offer a more refined account of people's behavior, suggesting hitherto unsuspected mechanisms and offering
more precise predictions? I think not. Does it make a
contribution to EFP by increasing our understanding of
the propensities (such as a desire to secure the welfare of
offspring) that a folk psychological account of primogeni-
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ture would use in explaining the institution? Again, I
think not.
To appreciate the last point, we must recognize that
although (other things being equal) relatives enhance
their inclusive fitnesses by helping one another, the
evolutionary explanation of this fact does not involve the
thesis that instituting primogeniture maximizes inclusive
fitness. It would be folly to argue that the disposition to
aid kin has been fixed in us as a proximate mechanism for
leading us to maximize our inclusive fitness through
primogeniture. That argument sets the cart before the
horse. We explain the institution in terms of the proximate mechanisms, and, if we want to pursue EFP, we
must give an evolutionary explanation of the presence of
the proximate mechanisms. We do not achieve it by
supposing that those mechanisms were favored by selection because they led to primogeniture, but by pointing
to the far more general phenomenon that helping kin is
likely to increase inclusive fitness across a broad range of
contexts.
Chapter 9 continues by considering Alexander's discussion of the avunculate (1979; also Kurland 1979). I
develop Alexander's qualitative account and Kurland's
more precise model of why men might maximize their
inclusive fitness by investing in their sisters' children
under conditions of paternity uncertainty. I argue that
there is a game-theoretic extension of the model that
suggests that the avunculate is likely to collapse, for there
are female strategies that can apparently invade the
population and that would allow men a higher expected
payoff if they invested in the children of their wives. I
claim that this simple point reveals the fact that the
Kurland-Alexander analysis rests on undefended constraints, and that it is only by invoking these constraints
that one can generate the conclusion that the avunculate
is a fitness-maximizing institution.
Moreover, the explanation offered by Kurland and
Alexander runs into difficulties with the ethnographic
record (difficulties that both writers acknowledge). The
suggestions for overcoming these difficulties raise further
problems. Thus we have been given a problematic
model, an admittedly incomplete ethnographic record
that does contain enough instances to cause problems for
the model, and, finally, some suggestions for responding
to the difficulties that are apparently in tension with other
favored pieces of sociobiological work.
I claim that folk psychology does better, and that banal '
points about common human aspirations make the practice of the avunculate comprehensible. Moreover, the
conservative interpretation of Alexander's program, on
which the sociobiological study is a contribution to EFP,
fares no better here than it did in the example of primogeniture. Suppose it were true that the avunculate
maximizes the inclusive fitness of those who practice it.
How would that fact bear on the evolution of the dispositions, such as the desire for the welfare of one's close
relatives, which (on the folk psychological story) underlie
the practice of the avunculate? It would be absurd to
propose that the evolutionary explanation of the presence
of these dispositions is that they have been favored by
selection in situations when paternity is uncertain.
The chapter concludes with a detailed look at two
examples from the anthropological literature in which
appeals to inclusive fitness maximization are supposed to
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play an explanatory role. I consider the analysis of an ax
fight among the Yanomamo, in which "kin selection
theory" is alleged to make predictions about the relationships of the participants (Chagnon & Bugos 1979). I
suggest that the data do nothing to support either the
hypothesis that people have some fine-tuned ability to
compute exact coefficients of relationship or to explain
the proximate mechanisms adduced in a folk psychological explanation of the event.
The final example is Dickemann's study of patterns of
infanticide in stratified societies (Dickemann 1979).
Dickemann suggests that research on the adjustment of
sex ratios (Trivers & Willard 1973) shows how female
infanticide among the upper classes can be a fitnessmaximizing strategy in a society with hypergyny and
multiple polygyny at the top. I claim that the TriversWillard model is misapplied and that the actual accounting is extremely complex. In my elaboration of Dickemann's proposal, the conditions under which infimticide
enhances reproductive success turn out to be very unlikely to occur. Once again, I argue, folk psychology
proves superior to the pop sociobiological account. As
with the work of Chagnon and Bugos, Dickemann's study
reveals some fascinating anthropology, cluttered up with
irrelevant incantations about inclusive fitness.
The general moral of Chapter 9 is that there is no
evidence to favor the revolutionary interpretation of
Alexander's program, and that the conservative interpretation brings in evolutionary considerations in the
wrong way. By studying the details of three major examples (the avunculate, the ax fight, and female infanticide),
I try to show that we have been given no reason to think
that the springs of human action that we normally identify
are simply a facade hiding the operations of some finetuned inclusive-fitness calculator. Moreover, in each of
these cases, as well as in other instances that are reviewed
in less detail, I argue that the dubious thesis that certain
items of context-specific behavior maximize inclusive
fitness sheds no light on the presence ofwhat really stands
in need of evolutionary explanation - namely, the proximate mechanisms of the behavior.

Gene-culture coevolution
Chapter 10 of Ambition scrutinizes the theory of geneculture coevolution advanced by Lumsden and Wilson
(1981;1983). This theory is explicitly designed to meet
some of the objections to Wilson's earlier work in pop
sociobiology. Specifically, Lumsden and Wilson aim to
answer the charge that the human capacity for complex
representations and complex decision making might combine with an existing collection of social institutions to
defeat or divert the dictates of natural selection. They
hope to ~Iaborate Wilson's earlier metaphor to the effect
that our genes hold culture on a leash.
There is an obvious picture of human evolution that
identifies the general ways in which genes and culture can
be expected to coevolve. According to this uncontroversial account, the cultural environment and the gene pool
change in each generation under the joint influence of the
forces of biological evolution (natural selection, mutation,
drift, and so forth) and the system of cultural transmission. If they are to generate pop sociobiological conclu-

sions, Lumsden and Wilson need more than this bland
idea. Thus, in their (1981) study they articulate the
uncontroversial picture in a very specific way.
The main theme of Chapter 10 is that the particular
development offered by Lumsden and Wilson rests on
arbitrary and implausible assumptions, that their discussion of patterns of human behavior is frequently confused, and that there are superior methods for analyzing
the phenomena to which they hope to apply their ideas.
In short, their theory of gene-culture coevolution provides no basis for the idea that our genes playa major role
in shaping human social behavior.
Central to the theory is the notion of a culturgen.
Culturgens are "transmissible behaviors, mentifacts, and
artifacts" (Lumsden & Wilson 1981, p. 7): Tools, taboos,
food items, forms of behavior, dreams, works of art,
scientific theories all count as culturgens. I argue that
Lumsden and Wilson encounter a major problem because they place two different constraints on the notion of
a culturgen. Culturgens are to be things to which particular human beings can have attitudes, things that can be
chosen, adopted, or used by individuals. But the state of a
culture is also to be identified with a pattern of culturgen
usage. I argue that if the first condition is honored, then
Lumsden and Wilson sell culture short and fail to answer
the very challenge that inspired them to develop their
theory.
Chapter 10 offers an exposition ofthe main points ofthe
theory. Lumsden and Wilson introduce the notion of an
epigenetic rule, conceived as a process that maps a genotype and an environment onto a phenotype. The primary epigenetic rules are those that direct the formation of
our basic perceptual system. Secondary epigenetic rules
are processes that take us from genotypes and environmental stimuli (perceptions of the environment) to more
complex behavioral dispositions. Lumsden and Wilson
try to show that the primary rules are more inflexible and
that there are at least some secondary rules that are
"relatively rigid." I argue that the second thesis rests on
misguided arguments of the same kinds that figure in
Wilson's earlier ventures in pop sociobiology.
Lumsden and Wilson continue by offering some mathematically formulated hypotheses about what they call
"gene-culture translation." The problem here is to relate
the epigenetic rules of the individuals who make up a
society to the pattern of behavior that emerges in the
society as the result of individual decisions. The final part
of the theory consists of an attempt to show how the
propensities for culturgen choice and the relative fitnesses of the use of different culturgens lead to changes in
gene frequencies within populations. Lumsden and
Wilson derive a general coevolutionary equation that is
supposed to relate the mean frequency of use of a culturgen to the epigenetic rules associated with various genotypes. On the basis of this equation, we are to compute
the probabilities of switching between culturgens for
people with different genotypes. This enables us to use
the reward equation to generate values for the economic
returns for people with different genotypes. On the basis
of an equation that links returns with fertility we arrive at
fitness values, and from these we can compute the
changes in gene frequencies.
If this theory is to be useful, then it must shed some
light on aspects of human social behavior. There are two
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kinds of illumination for which we might hope. The
simpler treatment of gene-culture translation might be
tested against ethnographic data. Or the coevolutionary
equations might be supplemented with extra hypotheses
and put to work to explain some facet of hominid evolution. In either of these ways, we might anticipate confirmation for hypotheses about the forms of epigenetic
rules, and even support for the conclusion that some rules
are "relatively rigid."
I argue that none of these potential benefits is forthcoming. In their discussion of gene-culture translation,
Lumsden and Wilson consider three examples: patterns
ofincest behavior, patterns ofvillage fissioning among the
Yanomamo, and changes in female formal fashion between 1788 and 1936. My diagnosis is the same in each
case. The formal tools yield nothing that could not have
been obtained by applying the ordinary theory of probability to some hypotheses about human preferences and
computing the pattern of behavior that is likely to result.
In the first and last examples, the unnecessary mathematics actually stands in the way ofoffering better analyses of
the situation. In the second example, Lumsden and
Wilson not only give a conclusion that we can reach by
qualitative argument from the data already available, but
their treatment introduces assumptions about the society
under study that are known to be false. Finally, no link is
forged between hypothetical genes for specific forms of
human behavior and the resulting behavioral dispositions. The entire analysis rests on claims about the responses in probability of culturgen choice to frequencies
of culturgen use in the surrounding society, claims that
are uninformed by any insights from contemporary
psychology.
Lumsden and Wilson are in no position to display a
human population evolving in a way that would conform
to their coevolutionary equations. Instead, they describe
certain types of coevolutionary scenarios that they regard
as to be expected. Their findings are summarized in five
main conclusions: (A) Selection will favor biased epigenetic rules, (B) sensitivity to usage patterns increases
the rate of genetic assimilation, (C) culture slows the rate
of genetic evolution, (D) changes during the coevolutionary process can nevertheless be rapid, and (E) ge~e
culture coevolution can promote genetic diversity. BUIlding on the penetrating study by Maynard Smith and
Warren (1982), I argue that two of these conclusions, (A)
and (C), are easily obtained by simple arguments from the
general, pretheoretical picture of gene-culture coevolution. Conclusion (B) turns out to be based on mistakes. At
first sight, it is a provocative result, apparently at odds
with (C), but I show how it can be elaborated in a way that
answers' to Lumsden and Wilson's intentions. U nfortunately, however, (B) is derived by using a reward equation that is gerrymandered to yield it, and the gerrymandering has the implausible consequence that the total
cost of building and maintaining a brain is made to figure
in a situation where there is a choice between a single pair
of culturgens! Conclusion (D), which allows Lumsden
and Wilson to revive the notorious "thousand year rule,"
is obtained by artifice, specifically by proposing that the
fitness differences between rival culturgens are large and
that the users are not clever enough to make significant
alterations of their behavior in response to the differences. Finally, (E) is also an artifact of a special as-
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sumption, and I argue that, in this case, it is hard to
provide any realistic interpretation of the ad hoc hypothesis that Lumsden and Wilson invoke.
Thus Chapter 10 concludes that the Lumsden-Wilson
theory of gene-culture coevolution is inadequate, and
that it does nothing to buttress pop sociobiological claims
to the effect that our genes "hold culture on a leash."

Excursions in philosophy
The last chapter of Ambition looks at some forays into
philosophy, specifically at pop sociobiological attempts to
debunk the idea of human altruism, to offer insight into
human freedom, and to explore the basis of morality. As
with the Alexander program, there are two ways of
reading the neo-Hobbesian challenge to human altruism.
One construal of the pop sociobiological thesis is that an
apparent intention to promote the well-being of another
is a screen that hides some deeper motive. Alternatively,
it may be suggested that people do sometimes intend the
well-being of others and act on the intention, but that
there is an evolutionary explanation for the presence of
such intentions and for their efficacy in moving us to
action. I argue that there is no reason to believe the
thesis, given the first interpretation, and that on the
second reading the thesis does not threaten our ordinary
assessment of the possibility of genuine human altruism.
I continue by investigating the bearing of biology on
the doctrine that people sometimes act freely. I outline
various descendants of Hume's attempt to resolve the
problem of human freedom. Although each of these must
still overcome certain problems, I claim that the crucial
issues are quite independent of the deliverances ofbiology. Considerable philosophical work is needed to elaborate the general theoretical view of our freedom. At
present, there is no indication from biology that if con~i
tions for freedom can be successfully elaborated, they wIll
turn out to be unsatisfiable.
The chapter concludes with an extensive investigation
of Wilson's claim that ethics should be "removed temporarily from the hands of the philosophers and biologicized" (Wilson 1975, p. 562). I maintain that the idea of
"biologicizing" ethics subsumes four distinct tasks: the
project of giving evolutionary explanations of our abi~ity
to formulate norms; the project of using informatIOn
about ourselves in conjunction with normative principles
to infer lower-level normative principles; the project of
using evolutionary theory to explain the content of ethics;
and the project of deriving new fundamental norms from
biology. The first two tasks are legitimate. I argue that, at
least in Wilson's preferred ways of articulating them, the
latter two are not. Pop sociobiological ethics is no improvement over the attempts at evolutionary ethics that
were made in the decades after Darwin - and that T. H.
Huxley criticized nearly a century ago.

Conclusions

Ambition is concerned with distinctions and arguments.
The important distinctions divide the varieties of sociobiology. I attempt to explain what makes for good
scientific argumentation in narrow sociobiology (the analysis of the research of Parker and of Woolfenden), and I
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try to catalog the errors and fallacies of pop sociobiology.
The extensive criticism is intended to serve two positive
purposes: first, to show clearly that there is a body of
exciting work on the evolution of animal behavior and to
identify what makes it valuable; second, to prepare the
way for serious study of the evolution of human social
behavior.
The second point can be brought into focus by using a
familiar metaphor from Locke. Philosophers sometimes
serve as underlaborers, clearing the ground on which
scientists can subsequently build. But if a ramshackle
structure, hastily thrown together with inadequate materials, has already been erected, then it mav be instructive
to take it apart slowly and carefully. For, by doing so, we
may be able to see more clearly what would be better
suited to the terrain.
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I used to cherish the thought that even the cleverest of philosophers would never be in a position to teach biologists about how
to think clearly in their own subject. Philip Kitcher has convinced me that I was wrong. I read his book with enormous
interest and learned a lot. I also derived considerable amusement from his deliciously sharp wit. Others may regard his
mocking style as unfair, but the narrow pop sociobiological
literature, which he criticizes, laid itself wide open to such an
attack. Many of the arguments were deeply muddled and,
because they reached so many people, damagingly misleading.
The self-advertisers dressed themselves up with such pride in
their invisible finery that they can hardly complain now when
somebody with a clear mind comes along and rudely says: "You
are naked!"
Despite its important debunking role, I think that Kitcher's
book is also a serious contribution to the ways in which historical
arguments about evolution can enrich the understanding of
social behaviour. Reading it that way, I had two small doubts
about the way he views the thinking in evolutionary biology.
The first has to do with his seeming approval of Hamilton's
concept of inclusive fitness when applied to whole organisms.
Grafen (1982), who has probably thought about the issue more
critically than most, concluded that the appropriate measure is
simply the organism's reproductive success, in which case
Hamilton's formal rule is not used. Furthermore, Haldane's
famous calculation made in a London pub was more amusing
than it was sensible (Maynard Smith 1975), Why on earth should
Haldane have laid down his life for two brothers or eight first
cousins unless he wanted to perpetuate the habit of self-sacrifice? Even ifhe had wanted to do that, he would have needed to
be sure that the difference between the presence and the
absence of the self-sacrificial tendency was associated with a
difference in a single gene. If it was two genes, presumably he

would have needed to save at least four brothers or 64 first
cousins (and also assume that they would all breed as much as he
would have done himself). In general, the concept of the
inclusive fitness of an organism merely seems to have muddled
thought.
My second doubt is about the way Kitcher downplays attempts to answer functional questions. He writes that broad
sociobiology (of which he approves) is "the systematic study of
the biological basis of all social behavior, including not only
questions about the evolution of social behavior but questions
about the mechanisms of social behavior, about the development of social behavior, about the genetics of social behavior,
and perhaps even about the function of social behavior" (p, 114,
my italics). Since direct evidence from history is usually lacking
for behaviour, biologists typically begin with attempts to distinguish between hypotheses about current use (see Caro 1986,
for an interesting modern example). vVhether or not an answer
will tell us anything about history is a moot point, since a
behavioural system adapted to some other use might be coopted
for its present function (see Gould & Vrba 1982; Tinbergen
1963). Nevertheless, deductions about current use probably
provide the best basis we have for drawing conclusions about the
shaping role of Darwinian evolutionary processes on behaviour
in the past.
Kitcher is clearly sympathetic to projects that are genuinely
synthetic in the sense that they bring together the insights of
social scientists, psychologists, ethologists, and evolutionary
biologists. The crucial step in such operations will be to take
specific cases rather than waffle in gencral terms about altruism
and evolutionary ethics. In this spirit the favourite example of
the pop sociobiologists is worth another look. The evidence for
preferring mates who are a little bit different, but not too
different, from very familiar members of the opposite sex is
much better than I think Kitcher properly acknowledges. Admittedly, Shepher's (1971) well-known study of Israeli kibbutzniks did not have a comparison group. However, Talmon's
(1964) less well known study did have such a group and the
conclusion was the same. Wolf and his colleagues have a very
large data base for their studies of the Taiwanese major and
minor marriages and are able to examine the statistical effects of
various sociocultural factors (Wolf & Huang 1980). It seems that
even when these factors are taken into account, the age at which
the partners first met is still an important source of variation in
the success of the marriages (Wolf, personal communication).
Finally, Weinberg's (1956) study of actual cases of incest provides evidence for the opposite side of the same coin. Whereas
most incestuous relationships were unstable and short-lived, six
involved strong and lasting attachments between the partners.
In each of the six cases, the siblings concerned had been
separated from each other when they were babies.
In all these examples people seem to have made decisions
about mates in part on the basis of relative novelty - decisions
that ran counter to social pressure. The evidence for the inhibitory effects of familiarity is matched by a growing body of
evidence from animal studies (Hepper 1986). It is important to
emphasise, though, that in the animal studies the effects of
familiarity combine with those of other factors and are not
necessarily overriding (Halliday 1983). The same must surely be
true for humans. [See van den Berghe: "Human Inbreeding
Avoidance" BBS 6(1) 1983.]
I think the current evidence suggests rather strongly that
humans, like many other animals, have behavioural systems
that could well have favoured a moderate amount of outbreeding. These mechanisms would have functioned well even if
humans lived in relatively inbred groups at certain stages in
their history (see Bateson 1983a, p. 272). As Kitcher rightly
notes, though, a crucial question remains: How does an inhibition beget a culturally transmitted prohibition? Westermarck
(1891) offered one conjecture that still bears careful examination
(Bateson 1983b; 1986). Prohibitions may have arisen from the
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social pressure directed against unorthodox behavior. As language evolved, prescriptions about mating might then have
been transmitted verbally from generation to generation. In this
way taboos and marriage rules characteristic of a culture might
have come into existence.
It is clearly the case that people often strongly disapprove of
others who behave in unusual ways. The most obvious example
is the moral repugnance that many people show for homosexuality between consenting adults. Why should they mind? They
are not harmed by the homosexuality. But the conventional
response is often a violent one - in some societies homosexuality
may be punished by death. A similar argument can be mounted
for the social disapproval that has commonly been directed
against left-handers. If fear of nonconformity and the unusual
has driven the cultural evolution of incest taboos, then a comparable argument should apply to taboos on marriages with
strangers or members of other castes and races. Such taboos
certainly exist and a notorious modern example of it is found in
the immorality laws of South Africa, which forbid sexual relations between blacks and whites.
It does not follow from this argument that the conformism that
generated prohibitions is an adaptive response that evolved in
the service of maintaining a balance between inbreeding and
outbreeding. The conformism might have arisen for quite different reasons, which had to do with the benefits of social cohesion,
and among its other consequences it may have happened incidentally to amplify the effects of the inhibitions. The interesting
implication of the Westermarck conjecture is that we should
expect to find some correlation between child-rearing practices
and taboos. Cultural differences in prohibitions should be related to the categories of persons who are familiar from early life.
The biological-cum-psychological explanation does not exclude the role of other factors, such as power and property, in
influencing marriage rules, but it does open up some neat ways
of explaining cultural variation. Above all, though, historical
explanations tell us nothing about whether the observed social
behaviour is inevitable, unchangeable, or even desirable in a
modern context. This is a point that Kitcher makes strongly and
eloquently. It clearly needs to be said again and again until
members of the lay public (and the scientific community!) no
longer fall into the old traps. In general, I found Kitcher's book a
major contribution to the long process of public education.

Criticism and realism
Jon Beckwith
Department of Microbiology and Molecular Genetics, Harvard Medical
School. Boston, Mass. 02115

I have often wondered what science might be like if it were
practiced either by philosophers of sci~nce or by scientists
thoroughly grounded in the philosophy of science. Incorporating into scientific research an understanding of the structure of
scientific reasoning, the role and nature of assumptions and
biases in scientific progress, and the ways in which new ideas
arise might have a significant effect on the way science is done.
From what I've read of Philip Kitcher (Abusing Science, 1982,
and the book under review), I would most like to see someone
with his perspective actually involved in the day-to-day doing of
science. His writings represent some ofthc clearest insights into
these questions I have encountered. His view of science lies
somewhere between that of Karl Popper, who takes a more
positivist view of the scientific method, and Paul Feyerabend,
who believes, according to some of his essays, that science
differs little from "witchcraft" or the legislative process in its
method.
In Vaulting Ambition Kitcher analyzes in great detail a
number of studies in the fields of evolutionary biology and what
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he calls "narrow" sociobiology and "pop" sociobiology. Narrow
sociobiologists limit themselves to questions of the "actual
workings of evolution," whereas pop sociobiologists "advance
grand claims about human nature and human social institutions"
(p. 15). He comes down very hard on pop sociobiology, listing
numerous transgressions of normal scientific method, including
lack of sufficient data, invoking confounding variables when
they are needed and ignoring them in other cases, misreporting
of the "findings of students of animal behavior," failure to
consider alternative competing explanations, mystification by
use of inapplicable mathematical formulations, misuse of anthropomorphic language in comparing the behavior of humans
and other animals, and a host more.
Kitcher cites such examples as the failure to truly explore
whether male dominance is correlated with reproductive suc'
cess. In the cases where such an examination has taken place,
the correlation often does not exist. He criticizes the extreme
adaptationism often found in pop sociobiological reasoning and
makes a very convincing case that arguments of Barash (1979) on
rape and Chagnon and Irons (1979) on the relationship between
kinship and aggression in the Yanomamo Indians are ill-founded. Barash's analysis of the evolutionary foundation of racial
distrust, according to Kitcher, deserves "derisive laughter." He
describes the "ladder" of Wilson's reasoning, which allows
Wilson to "ascend from studies of nature up to controversial
claims about human nature" (p. 17) as "rotten at every rung"
(p. 131). He charges pop sociobiologists with "verbal tricks,"
"spur-of-the-moment thoughts," and an excess of "ideological
passion."
This is strong stum Reading one after another of Kitcher's
thorough critiques, I was reminded of my experiences teaching
an advanced graduate course. During the semester, Ioccasionally hand out journal articles whose conclusions are wrong and
ask the students to find the errors. I also include a paper that is
generally aecepted to be correct, but tell the students that the
paper is also wrong. They return to the next class having
demolished this paper, finding holes in the reasoning, missing
controls, and unfounded assumptions. The point here is that
seience is not the truly objective pursuit it is made out to be.
Intuition, assumptions, and choice among controls are essential
features of much suceessful science. Thus, it is possible to go
through most journal articles and eome up with apparently
serious errors.
Has Kitcher gone through pop sociobiology studies. merely
digging out the errors that can inevitably be found in even the
best scientific work? I think not. First, I believe that many ofhis
criticisms are not so much ofdetail as a description offundamental flaws. But perhaps the most impressive aspect of this work is
the way Kitcher counterpoises pop sociobiology studies with
other, more solid and careful, studies in both narrow sociobiology and evolution. Although this book is predominantly a
critique, there also shines through a tremendously positive view
ofall that is exemplary in the broad field ofevolutionary biology.
The book is as much a how-to book as it is a critique. Specific
requirements for satisfactory evolutionary studies are pointed
out. He describes in detail Kettlewell's (1973) extensive accumulation of support for his theory of the evolution of coloration in the British moth. This study is used as a model for how
serious documentation and falsification can be used in establishing solid support for a theory. He praises the "marriage of
precise analysis and detailed field research" in the work of
Woolfenden (1975) and others on the explanation of helping
behavior in the Florida scrub jay. Other examples abound in
which he contrasts the narrow sociobiologists' greater awareness
of the pitfalls of evolutionary styles of analysis.
Kitcher speaks of "potential triumphs" of sociobiology and
warns that "sociobiology cannot be indicted for the oversights
and simplifications of pop sociobiology" (p. 173). Strikingly,
sometimes the same scientists who publish careful work in a
narrow sociobiological framework are also ardent pop so-

Commentary/Kitcher: Problems of human sociobiology
ciobiologists, throwing away their previous caution when it
comes to questions that relate to human social behavior. With a
swipe at Wilson he points out that "speculation that would be
rejected in the attempt to understand the bchavior of ants
flourishes freely when the animal under study is Homo .lapiens"
(p. 124).
Kitcher must be moved in his choice of subjects to some
extent by his social concerns. His critique of creation science,
which is also a fascinating lesson in the philosophy of science,
was almost certainly motivated by the impact creationists were
having on the teaching of evolution, among other things. In
Vaulting Ambition Kitcher is open about his worry that unfettered sociobiological speculation based on poor science is being
used to support social injustice. He makes a very important
point here. Whereas, in general, "bold overgeneralization" and
a "lack of rigor" are accepted in science in the promulgation and
evolution of scientific theories, "when the hypotheses in question bear on human concerns, the exchange cannot be quite so
cavalier" (p. 9). Since any claims for new insights into human
social arrangements can have immediate social consequences,
the standards of evidence must be higher than in other, less
relevant, areas of science. The tragedy, as Kiteher clearly
demonstrates, is that the standards in pop sociobiology have
been abysmally low.

Saving sociobiology: The use and abuse
of logic
Irwin S. Bernstein
Department of Psychology, University of Georgia, Athens, Ga. 30602

I wish Kitcher's book were easier to read, because then more of
us would do so and profit from it. Whereas some of us have
expressed vague intuitive discomfort with the logic of sociobiological explanations of altruism, Kitcher specifies exactly
where the problems lie. His facility with mathematics and his
love ofgame theory allow him to tease apart sense and nonsense.
As a philosopher he can, and does, articulate the implications,
hidden premises, and logical flaws in some of the glossier
sociobiological writings. His knowledge of population genetics
allows him to appreciate the key issues and to recognize the
baby in all that bathwater.
Although Kitcher is primarily concerned with sociobiological
theory as applied to human behavior, the problems he identifies
are general, albeit perhaps most extreme, blatant, and even
dangerous when the subject is human society. Common practices, such as citing the conclusions rather than the data of other
authors as "evidence," or simply asserting something to be so,
have moved sociobiological arguments from scien~e to the
debating halls. Statistical analyses are often shunned, or ignored. Kiteher might be embarrassed ifhe were to examine the
data to support the statement he derives from Packer (1979) and
Pusey (1980): "Resisting copulations with kin is very common in
the higher primates" (p. 270). Such writings concerning animal
behavior seem based more on belief systems than data analyses.
Any inductive process depends on the adequacy of the data
leading to a conclusion. [See also van den Berghe: "Human
Inbreeding'Avoidance" BBS 6(1) 198.3.]
Kitcher favors the method of enumerating all possible alternatives and then eliminating all but one, as a means to obtain
knowledge. This is a respectable approach, but all of us who
have ever been accused of failing to control for yet one more
possible alternative explanation are aware of the problems. The
list of potential confounding variables is limited only by the
imagination. Decisions concerning experimental controls are
based on plausibility. The less we like the alternative suggested,
the more plausible competing explanations appear to be.
Falsification may not be the red herring Kitcher suggests it is.

When a theory predicts all possible outcomes, we can say it is
not falsifiable. Of course no theory is falsifiable, but a scientific
theory can be used in a deductive chain to make a specific
prediction in a specific situation. A failure does not prove the
null hypothesis, nor does a success prove the theory. If Socrates
dies, that does not prove he was a man (other things are also
mortal). If he does not die (in a finite time period), it might be
because he is not a man, or our measure of death or immortality
was inappropriate. What is important is that there is a possible
outcome that is incompatible with the original theory. Stating
that "I am always right, except when I'm wrong" tells us
nothing.
I do have some disagreements or misunderstandings concerning three points. I do not understand Kiteher's argument concerning gibbon monogamy (pp. 174 and 195). Individual dispersal because of sparse, patchy food distribution is not a sufficient
(or necessary) cause for groups of paired males and females with
offspring. Orangutans, galagos, and some lemurs face similar
situations and are not monogamous. The proximate mechanism
is certainly crucial here. The fact that adult gibbons rarely
tolerate other adults of the same sex in their vicinity for any
prolonged period of time seems an adequate explanation for
gibbon societies (given that gibbons are otherwise positively
social).
I do not understand Kitcher's view of "function." Perhaps he
believes that evolutionary questions cover not just the past but
also the future. It is useful to separate the future consequences
of an action when considering evolutionary explanations for
behavior precisely because the world is not static. What was
adaptive in the past may no longer be so. Preadaptation clearly
separates evolution from function. Teleological errors would be
easy here, as well as false assumptions that present function
equals past selection. His example of my nose functioning to
support my eyeglasses is certainly apt.
Finally, Kiteher defines dominant animals as "those who are
able to displace other[s] ... from valuable resources" (p. 197).
The key word is "able." A failure to do something is not evidence
of an inability. Dominanec is often discussed in terms of functional outcomes or consequences. Hinde says that this is because dominance is an intervening variable (1978). I view
dominance as a learned relationship, which accounts for why an
individual shows immediate submission to the aggression of a
particular other, regardless of geographic location (territoriality). Merely losing a contest is not enough. Submitting to
everyone also fails to demonstrate a specific learned relationship; this is a generalized loser. Motivational confounds are
possible when considering outcomes, but a subordinate "winner" of a contested resource should nonetheless win without
showing a reversal in the directionality of aggressive and submissive signals. Dismissing dominance as a general concept and
considering only the winners and losers of specific competitive
conflicts does indeed throw out the baby with the bathwater
(Hinde 1981).

Leapfrog over the brain
Patricia Smith Church land
Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of
California, San Diego, La Jolla, Calif. 92093

Philip Kitcher has performed a valuable service for all of us who
want to know how to size up the assorted claims made by
sociobiologists and who want a guide to the logical geography of
the field. Vaulting Ambition is a model of clarity, thoroughness,
and well-designed structure, and Kitcher's analysis of a wide
range of sociobiological hypotheses not only lets us see how to
assess the merits of the cases discussed, but provides the critical
framework to be applied to future hypotheses. Kitcher is not
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intimidated by the mathematics, the biology, or the surrounding social hullabaloo, and because his criticism often cuts to the
very quick, it is important to those of us who are not specialists in
the field to hear the response of sociobiologists.
One important element in Kitcher's critical formula consists
of comparing sociobiological explanations with those of folk
psychology and showing that the latter are as good as or better
than their sociobiological competitors. He points out that explanations in terms of what people want, fear, believe, expect, and
so forth are, in the analyzed cases, superior to explanations in
terms of genes and maximizing fitness.
In the particular cases Kitcher analyzes, this may actually be
so, insofar as the sociobiological explanations are on independent grounds unconvincing. As a general strategy, however, the
appeal to folk psychological explanations is decidedly problematic. The trouble is that folk psychological explanations are
in general incomplete, superficial, and unsatisfactory in a host of
dimensions, and often they are merely ritualized confabulations
(Churchland 1986; Nisbett & Ross 1980). It is precisely because
we seek a more satisfactory, deeper, comprehensive, and penetrating explanation of human behavior than what is available
through folk psychology that it makes sense to look to neurobiology and evolutionary biology. But perhaps Kitcher will
agree here, and his real point in appealing to folk psychological
explanations may be to underscore the importance of taking into
account that massive mound of computational wonder tissue
that intervenes between genes and behavior: the brain.
The leapfrogging in sociobiology that worries me is the leap
over the brain. If genes have a role in behavior, it must be
through the auspices of the brain, ,and when the brain is
complex, I doubt very much that we can draw specific conclusions about the genetic bases for behavior unless we know how
genes affect brain organization and how the brain yields behavior. Trying to go directly from genes to behavior is perhaps
reasonable in nervous systems where the neuronal organization
seems quite rigidly determined by DNA - for example, in
invertebrates. But in complex nervous systems, where there
appears to be considerable if constrained plasticity and where
learning appears rampant, all but the most general gene-behavior inferences are highly tenuous.
On one reckoning (Bantle & Hahn 1976) there is more DNA
devoted to the nervous system than to any other organ. On the
other hand, it is also quite clear that not all of the organization
features, not all of the 101~ or so synapses, are programmed by
tbe genetic code. If we do not know in what ways our brain's
organization is governed by DNA, we will have only vague and
suggestive guesses about the genetic basis for our behavior.
Thus, we may be pretty sure there is a genetic basis for human
sexual behavior, but unable to say anything specific about that
connection until we know more about how the genes control the
development of the neurons that produce the behavior.
For example, in special circumstances there can be a divergence between gender defined in terms of chromosomes (XX,
XY), gender defined in terms of externally observable genitalia,
and brain gender, presumptively defined in terms of behavior.
Cattlemen have long been familiar with the freemartin phenomenon, where a female calf is masculinized as a result of
sharing the uterine environment with her male twin. Although
freemartins have female genitalia, invariably they are infertile,
and in the pasture they tend to behave more like males than
females, insofar as displaying mounting behavior and avoiding
being mounted are an index. In humans, androgen insensitivity
in males and androgenization in lItero of females also produce
complex dissociations of gender criteria. Recently there has
been quite a lot of work in neuroscience devoted to determining
the exact effect of peptides on brain structure, and in the cases
studied - for example, rat, canary, zebra finch, and oyster
toadfish - exposure to testosterone during critical developmental periods yields definite structural effects, which are in turn
related to specified kinds of behavior. And there are certain to
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be more items in the range of factors affecting neuronal organization than just peptide titers.
All this suggests that even for something as clearly genetically
based as human reproductive behavior, we will not be able to
address the exact nature of the genetic effects without knowing
quite a lot about the parameters of plasticity in the brain and the
relation between specific kinds of neural organization and
behavior.
Although very little is now understood about the relation
between brain organization and DNA or about the relation
between brain organization and behavior, I expect that joint
research will eventually yield a theoretical framework for understanding human and other behavior that is far superior to folk
psychology or, at the very least, will explain the basis for such
desires, beliefs, and so on that are referred to in folk psychology
(Churchland 1986). Sociobiology undoubtedly has an important
role in such research, but so must ncurobiology, neuroembryology, cognitive psychology, ethology, and molecular
biology.
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Testing sociobiological hypotheses
ethnographically
Patricia Draper
Department of Individual and Family Studies, College of Human
Development, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pa. 16802

A characteristic of new theory is that it allows old questions to be
recast. This poses difficulties for the use ofprevious information,
gathered when different theoretical assumptions guided data
collection. The use of ethnographic data by scholars wishing to
test the generality of the predictions of evolutionary theory runs
precisely into this problem. A good example appears in Kitcher's discussion (p. 296) of ethnographic cases in which people
appear to be acting against their fitness ·interests by directing
resources to adopted children. Cultural norms in some societies
(in the cases discussed) apparently dictate that sociological
fathers accept their wife's offspring by other men. Yet sociobiologists predict that men will resist investing in unrelated
offspring. [See also Hartung: "Matrilineal Inheritance" BBS 8(4)
1985.]
The problem lies in the nature of the data. For many decades
cultural anthropologists have explained the social forms of a
given society in terms of established norms for behavior. Although ethnographers recognized that actual behavior was more
variable, they believed that social rules generally were upheld
and that agreements about how to behave were the necessary
basis for the integration of a social system, Conflict, competition, and outright cheating among actors within a social system
received appreciably less attention. In recent years many cultural anthropologists have shifted away from functionalist assumptions and have focused in a systematic way on individual
behavior. From this perspective it is clear that individuals
perform many actions, only some of which in fact conform to
social norms. However, when people go against prevailing
standards they generally try to justifY what they do (argue that
what they are doing is not really antisocial; Bledsoe 1980). Such
people also attempt to muster support for their actions in some
subsection of the population, and to the extent they are successful, they can eventually challenge existing standards (Barth
1969).
In the case of the apparently anomalous finding that men
willingly foster unrelated offspring, the problem revolves
around the level of generality of the cultural rule. There mayor
mav not be such a cultural value, and it mayor may not be
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widely honored. Resolution of the issue would require that the
ethnographer undertake a stratified sample of the population
when interviewing and observing about the matter. These
niceties were rare in early anthropological research. Similarly,
one would need to know how fostered offspring actually fared in
comparison with natural children of the same household. Data
ofthe latter sort are only recently beginning to be collected, and
the findings indicate that, in general, children receive better
treatment from close kin (especially one or both biological
parents) than they do from more distant or unrelated sponsors
(Isiugo-Abanihe 1985).
In sum, satisfactory tests of sociobiological theory using data
on humans suffer from many problems, many of which are
cogently argued by Kitcher. Other obstacles derive from the fact
that cultural anthropology itself is undergoing a paradigm shift,
in which people are no longer considered to be influenced by
the normative environment with a high degree ofpredictability.
Information about human behavior guided by this new set of
assumptions is far more likely to yield the type of data necessary
to test sociobiological ideas. Once the construct of culture is
abandoned (or at least not assumed to have much power for
predicting behavior), social scientists will approach the study of
humans in ways that are increasingly similar to the approaches of
biologists to nonhuman animals.
A particularly interesting example of the discrepancy between culture and behavior is male-female relations in the New
Guinea highlands (Meggitt 1964). Throughout the highlands
men agree that women are dangerous and liable to sap their
strength or worse. Heider (1976) reports, for example, that the
Dani have no interest at all in sex. The demography of another
group, the Gainj, has been well studied by Wood et al. (1985)
and Johnson (1981). They find that, after accounting for lactational effects, fertility is like that of young sexually active couples
- that is, biology denies the supposed lack of sexual activity.
Earlier ethnographers would probably have accepted the reported norms as data, whereas those with an evolutionary bent
may suspect that values about malelfemale relations serve
institutionalized male-male competition and that most men
ignore or, at least, overcome inhibitions as they age (Draper &
Harpending 1982). These cultural norms, from the evolutionary
perspective, are perhaps best regarded as deceitful messages to
be overcome rather than as guidelines to correct behavior. Right
or wrong, the evolutionary view generates testable hypotheses
for fieldworkers to resolve.
Good paradigm shifts do not throw out the baby with the bath.
For example, the finding that people do not follow cultural rules
does not mean that acquaintances do not develop shared understandings. They do, but these understandings constitute the
framework within which social negotiations take place and they
do not reflect behavior in any simple fashion.

Sociobiology and the problem of culture
John Dupre
Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 94305

Vaulting Ambition should surely be recognized as setting the
standard for philosophically and biologically sophisticated discussion of sociobiology. Particularly praiseworthy is its analytic
thoroughness. Kitcher succeeds in providing a detailed taxonomy of the different kinds of scientific (and pseudoscientific)
enterprises being undertaken in both human and nonhuman
sociobiology, distinguishing the various assumptions, pitfalls,
and possible achievements that these may involve. No one
should talk anymore as ifexplaining the origin ofcaste systems in
social insects and speculating about the inclusive-fitness consequences of human homosexuality were basically just different
parts ofthe same grand enterprise, and that we must take it all or
leave it.

Indeed, it is in considerable part Kitcher's careful exposition
of genuinely valuable work on the adaptation of animal behavior
that makes the inadequacies of the casual optimality arguments
characteristic of much "pop sociobiology" so evident. Anyone
who was still inclined to suppose that a vague speculation about
adaptive significance would add much weight to a hypothesized
interpretation of some aspect of animal behavior should be
disabused by Kitcher's presentation of Parker's (1978) work on
dung flies or Woolfenden's (1975) on nest-helping in scrub jays.
His lucid and detailed exposition of what such studies can
achieve makes it clear what the costs ofsuch achievements really
are, and what, even in such cases, the limitations and difficulties
are. The contrast between theft and honest toil could hardly be
made more perspicuous. In these and numerous other case
studies, Kitcher provides an excellent model for the philosophically well-motivated investigation of scientific practice.
Readers familiar with the history of criticism of sociobiology
will perhaps be surprised at how little discussion there is in this
book about the role ofculture in determining human behavior. I
do not, ofcourse, mean there is none: Kitcher raises the issue at
several appropriate points, and he frequently indicates alternative explanations in cultural terms for inadequately motivated
sociobiological hypotheses about human behavior. He also devotes a chapter to the demolition of the Lumsden and Wilson
(1981) theory of gene-culture coevolution, a major aspect of
which is the fully substantiated accusation that their conception
of culture is grossly inadequate. What Kitcher does not do,
however, is attempt to evaluate the extent to which cultural
determination of behavior is a general obstacle to even a hypothetical version of human sociobiology that avoids the errors he
catalogues. [See also multiple book review of Lumsden &
Wilson's Genes, Mind and Culture, BBS 5(1) 1982.]
In one sense, this omission points to one ofthe great strengths
of Kitcher's book. The internal flaws in the sociobiological
enterprises that Kitcher dissects are sufficiently egregious and
pervasive that the question of understanding the significance of
interactions with cultural forces is largely redundant. And since
the confrontation between sociobiologists and defenders of the
absolute primacy ofculture has tended to be a rather sterile one,
or at least one with little real communication achieved, this is a
great virtue. Kitcher's main objections to sociobiology are of a
kind that sociobiologists are committed to taking seriously, and
cannot be dismissed as the Wishful thinking of insufficiently
hardheaded cultural anthropologists.
On the other hand, there were moments in reading this book
when I felt that a more direct attack on the nature/nurture issue
would have been useful. Although I admit that our understanding of how cultural forces act on behavior may be little better
developed than our parallel understanding of genetic forces, I
do think that one can make some fairly general statements about
the limitations that cultural facts place even on ideal possible
sociobiological investigations. And where Kitcher does appeal
to problems raised by cultural forces, a more general account of
their significance would have been useful in countering a
number of often rather vague arguments in current circulation
to the effect that ultimately evolution of cognitive mechanisms
will ensure the convergence of cultural forces on genetically
optimal results. One way, I suggest, in which such a line of
argument might be developed is the following.
In discussing the atomistic conception ofculture presupposed
in Lumsden and Wilson's theory, Kitcher correctly points out
that selecting a cultural variant may have effects on other such
decisions. What he primarily emphasizes is the causal connections between cultural choices. The choice I make now might be
motivated by further choices that will thereby be made possible
for me in the future; or an earlier choice may exclude various
later possibilities (see pp. 348-49). Whereas this is undeniably
true, I think it may not be the most interesting or fundamental
way in which cultural atomism breaks down. A more radical
objection can be grounded on the idea that cultures, like
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organisms, are highly integrated structures. Deciding to become, say, a born-again Christian has ramifications that reach
out into a great many areas ofbehavior, perhaps most. If cultural
choices or circumstances were seen as integrated packages
rather than atoms, or even causal nets of atoms, then something
very like the classic Gould and Lewontin critique (1979) of
adaptationism would apply to adaptationist analyses of human
behavior for this reason. Such a conception can be made more
concrete in relation to some of the important recent work on
cultural evolution, such as that of Boyd and Richerson (1980";):
Presumably, if we take cultural evolution seriously as a force in
human evolution, it is quite conceivable, and I think very
plausible, that it should give rise to something similar to speciation. This is, at least, one way of developing a more positive
account of the significance of culture to human evolution.
No doubt in common with many philosophers who have been
frustrated by E. O. Wilson's cavalier and even ignorant excursions into moral philosophy, I greatly enjoyed the final chapter
of Kitcher's book. This is a very capable and pertinent discussion
of the issues in which Wilson is so inclined to mire himself.
There are, of course, a number of points in this chapter with
which I would be inclined to take issue. I think, for instance,
that there is more to be said about the relevance of indeterminism to the question of free will than Kitcher allows. Although he is surely right that nothing is to be gained by
portraying humans as random-action generators, the significance ofthe extent to which humans can determine their actions
in terms oflong-term goals and projects looks rather different if
set against a radically indeterministic conception of the external
environment. However, the fact that there are points in this
chapter that could be seriously argued about mainly reflects
that, in contrast with the frequently embarrassing ventures into
this domain by sociobiologists, this is a clear and philosophically
sophisticated presentation of the relevant issues. And, at any
rate, Kitcher is surely right in concluding that these questions
have very little to do with sociobiology.

Putting sociobiology in its place
Andrew Futterman and Garland E. Allen
Department of Biology, Washington University, Saint Louis, Mo. 63110

Kitcher's Vaulting Ambition is a thorough and searching analysis
of a recent form of biological determinism, the pseudoscience
known as "sociobiology." Kitcher, a professor of the philosophy
of science, has tried to show that the form of sociobiology that
attempts to explain human behavior - which he terms "pop
sociobiology" - is faulty on two basic grounds: First, pop
sociobiologists (Wilson, Lumsden, Barash, Alexander, and others) tend to "apply evolutionary ideas in an unrigorous fashion,"
and second, they "use dubious assumptions to connect their
evolutionary analyses with their conclusions." Kitcher attempts
to distance pop sociobiology from better-controlled sociobiological studies of nonhuman animal behavior (e.g., Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick 1978), which, he concludes, are potentiallyable to yield valid conclusions about the influence of genes
on behavior.
In general, his comparison of human and nonhuman sociobiological research gives one a clear understanding of the
kind of experimental controls, precise mathematical models,
and detailed observation required to evaluate genetic influences
on social behavior. The reader of Vaulting Ambition soon realizes that pop sociobiological research falls far short of the level of
experimental control involved in the "good" nonhuman sociobiological research. In addition, it becomes clear that achieving such control and precision in human sociobiological research
will be nearly impossible unless the present ethical standards for
experimentation on humans are dramatically changed.
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Kitcher's discussion of the lack of rigor in pop sociobiology is
extremely persuasive. He demonstrates that although anthropologists have long agonized how best to define behaviors so
as to reduce anthropomorphism and not become overly reductionistic, these long-standing difficulties do not seem to bother
pop sociobiologists. They readily use terms derived from the
present-day human social context (e,g., "rape") when describing animal behavior, and they freely generalize from animals to
humans. Evolutionary differences between humans and nonhuman species (e. g., the development of the human cerebral
cortex and the extensive use of language and tools in humans)
and 5,000 years of recorded human history have not hindered
pop sociobiologists from forming conclusions about the genetic
origins of complex human social behaviors, based on observations of similar behaviors in animals.
Although Kitcher's clear and comprehensive logical analysis
makes one feel that, once and for all, pop sociobiology may be
put away, never to be heard from again, this hardly seems likely.
Simply understanding what is logically required for a scientific
study of human social behavior (and consequently what is wrong
with existing research) has never prevented the dissemination of
pseudoscientific findings about the genetics of human social
behavior. Nor has it prevented such findings from being used to
justify social policies.
In the case of pop sociobiology, notions of genetic bases of
human social behaviors, from math skills to aggression, have
been given uncritical attention throughout the mass media. For
example, articles presenting uncritically the views of those
scientists who propose that gender behavior is biologically
programmed appeared in 42 magazines from July 1981 to July
1982 (Beckwith 1984). Magazines covering the entire spectrum
of readership devoted extensive space to these ideas: from
Mademoiselle ("Men vs. women: What Difference Do the Differences Really Make?" July 1981) to Science Digest ("Sociobiology: Rethinking Human Nature," July 1982). Clearly, the
debate over sociobiology extends far beyond the confines of
acadcmic science.
Any appraisal of sociobiology must therefore examine the
impact of such ideas in society, in addition to the experimental
logic (or illogic, in this case) involved. Although no single book
can do all things, lacking any historical or political analysis,
Kitcher leaves the reader perplexed as to what is so interesting
about these ideas that they should deserve such immediate and
uncritical dissemination.
Pop sociobiology is only a more recent justification of the
biological determinist argument that social behavior is individually based and more or less genetically determined. Hereditarian arguments of this type have been used extensively in the
past to justify all sorts of social programs. Eugenic ideas in the
United States in the 1920s, just as faulty as soeiobiology from an
empirical and methodological standpoint, were nonetheless
used in the social and political arena as the justification for
legislation to limit immigration (1924) and for state sterilization
laws (by 1930, 35 states had passcd such laws), In Nazi Germany, eugenic theories of race differences led to the infamous
Nuremberg laws (1935), banning Jewish-Gentile marriages,
and to the holocaust itself. Sociobiology is dangerous in a similar
way, not merely for its faulty logic, but for its potential destructive power to justify "blaming the victims" of social and economic oppression by claiming the problem is "in their genes."
Sociobiology will not be the final version of biological determinism either. With the publication of Crime and Human
Nature, by J. Q. Wilson and R. Herrnstein (1985), a new form of
the biological determinist argument has already appeared. The
view that crime is "in the genes" has received widespread
attention; it has been promoted in at least six major publications,
including Time (October 21, 1985), and in a cover article in the
New York Times Magazine (August 4, 198.5). Once again, the
evidence supporting this newest hereditarian view appears to
be shaky at best (Kamin 1986). Yet, lack of empirical evidence
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has not stopped Mayor Edward Koch of New York City from
beginning to formulate a policy of social isolation for communities of criminals owing to their unchangeable genetic predispositions for antisocial behavior (Policy Review, Winter
1986).
Kitcher's Vaulting Ambition lays bare the fallacious conclusions that are masquerading under the mantle of legitimate
biology. Although this is essential, analysis of the science involved in sociobiology is not enough. Similar ideas have bccome
the backbone of racist social programs in the past and may
continue to serve this function in the future. Academics must
lead the fight against hereditarian ideas, whatever form they
may take, recognizing that evidence alone has never prompted
their acceptance.

Species are individuals: Therefore human
nature is a metaphysical delusion
Michael 1. Ghiselin
California Academy of Sciences, Golden Gate Park, San Francisco, Calif.
94118

I find myself deeply sympathetic with Kitcher's basic position,
especially with the ethical pronouncements given in the preface. Pop sociobiology can do a lot of harm. The logical and
methodological criticisms can hardly bc faulted. However,
Kitcher seems to have missed the boat with respect to certain
metaphysical issues that might have immensely strengthencd
his case. He is deeply involved in these matters at the present
time, but nowhere in Vaulting Ambition does he even allude to
them.
To explain what is going on it is necessary to provide a certain
amount of background material. It has been noted (Hull 1980)
that a year before Wilson's Sociobiology (1975) was published I
brought out a book attacking the views of Wilson and his school
(Ghiselin 1974a). The criticisms - methodological, conceptual,
factual, and ideological - were the sort of which Kitcher would
no doubt approve. It is also noteworthy (Segerstrale 1986) that
in the very same year Lewontin (1974) did much the same.
What is not so notable is that many of the protagonists in the
ensuing debate were fully aware of what was taking shape. A
draft of my manuscript was submitted to Harvard University
Press in 1971, and reviewed by Mayr, Gould, Alexander,
Trivers, and Wilson. The sociobiologists' reactions may best be
left to the imagination. Mayr objected to my claims that the
synthetic theory of evolution had been strongly distorted by
teleology. Gould was my only enthusiastic supporter, and in
• retrospect it makes sense that he approved of my criticisms of
both geneticism and Panglossian adaptationism.
Matters are much more complicated than that, however. Also
in 1971 both Gould and I delivered papers at the meetings ofthe
Geological Society of America (Ghiselin 1972; Eldredge &
Gould 1972). The paper by Eldredge and Gould is the locus
classicus of the theory of punctuated equilibria.
Subsequently, the theory of punctuated equilibria has beCome intimately connected with the thesis that species are
individuals (see Ghiselin, 1981, and references and commentary
therein). Although I had been arguing for that thesis for some
years, it was a later paper (Ghiselin 1974b) that led Eldredge to
see the relevance of the thesis to his theory (see Eldredge 1985).
If, and only if, species are individuals is it possible for them to
evolve. Were they classes, not only could species not evolve,
they could not do anything whatsoever. The different ontological levels are decoupled, so that individuals ranked at
different levels play very different roles. Genes replicate, organisms copulate, species speciate - and pcrhaps do all sorts of
othcr things. Hcnce species are important in ways that are apt to
be overlooked by those who interprct them as classes.

It turns out that Kitcher is one ofthe philosophers who refuses
to accept the thesis that species are individuals. Eldredge (1985)
has lately brought out a book explaining how the thesis relates to
his theory, evoking a book review from Kitcher (1986) that is
really an attack on Ghiselin and Hull. A forthcoming issue of
Biology and Philosophy will contain a BBS-format presentation
of articles on this topic by Mayr and Ghiselin, with commentaries by Hull, Kitcher, and others.
What does the individuality of species have to do with sociobiology? Philosophers do not seem to agree. Caplan (1981)
has opposed the thesis bccause it seems to favor sociobiology;
Ruse (1981), because it seems to have the opposite effect. "Pick
your poison," as Caplan puts it.
For taxonomy, one obvious implication of the individuality of
species is that they have no defining properties. Their names are
proper names, and the best one can hope to do is provide an
ostensive definition. Statements about the properties of a species are merely descriptions ofcontingent historical facts - facts
that could have been otherwise and might change at some future
time. Another way to put it is to say that species do not have
"essences," or "natures." The same is true of higher taxa such as
genera, and likewise of things like individual languages and
national states. Whether classes have essences or natures is
another issue - individuals have nothing of the sort. Classes are
invariable, eternal, and unchanging. Thcy are stuck with their
"essential characteristics."
There is a long tradition of attributing more to essences than
just dcfining properties. It is assumed that what is essential is
not just necessary or inevitable, but good. This, even when the
traditional theological rationale is no longer invoked. Hence the
word "natural" becomes an honorific epithet, the basis of much
pop ecology as well as po!) sociobiology. Because virtually
everybody is raised so as to take such a metaphysical position for
granted, it stands to reason that sociobiologists and their critics
alike are apt to confound a scientific theory about the way things
are with an ethical doctrine about the way things ought to be.
There is no difficulty in finding the cloven hoofprint of
essentialist metaphysics in Wilson's writings. Kitcher (1985, p.
431) cites the notion of a "mammalian plan" in our society. In
which archetypal world is this plan supposed to exist? Why, in
the genetic material, ofcourse! And because we poor mortals are
but transient and imperfect copies ofthe ideal form that endures
in a Higher Realm, it behooves us to sacrifice ourselves for the
good of the gene pool, and to act so as to further our inclusive
fitness. To anybody who follows this out to its logical conclusion,
it implies that killing one's brother's enemy is an act of virtue.
Sociobiology looks to me like Christianity minus the Sermon on
the Mount.
That seems to be one root of the problem. Segerstrale (1986)
has shown how Wilson's Christian upbringing has affected his
metascientific position. Evidently something was lacking, since
he converted to materialism, and he seems to have turned to
nucleotide polymers as objects of religious veneration. Perhaps
I exaggerate. Likewise, I may read too much into the attempt by
Mayr (1982, pp. 56, 824) to equate DNA with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. After all, Mayr doesn't state explicitly that DNA
is God, he just implies it. Such behavior nonetheless makes a
great deal of sense, if we realize that religious impulses are very
common and can be adaptive. One doesn't have to be a sociobiologist to believe that. "False prophet," after all, is just a
phenotype - there doesn't have to be a gene for it.
This is not the only metaphysical problem that deserves our
attention. Kitcher (p. 18) accepts the notion that "Genes are
segments of chromosomes." Well, some are, and some are not,
the term "gene" being highly equivocal (Ghiselin 1981). Inversions and translocations are something else, and "selfish chromosomal deletions" are an even more obvious category mistake
(Ghiselin 1986). I wonder if the reason why such philosophers as
Kitcher miss such mctaphysical points is that the metaphysics
they were taught as students treats metaphysics as if it were just

BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1987) 101

77

Commentary/Kitcher: Problems of human sociobiology
a matter of keeping one's syntax pure. This denial of metaphysics is itself a supremely metaphysical doctrine, and ought to
be recognized for what it is.

say that X did Y because of culture is worse than any of the
tautologies exposed in Vaulting Ambition. I wish that Kitcher
had given us a straightforward, unbiased critique of semantic
problems, for he would have done an excellent job.

NOTE

Faulting ambition: A double standard?
Henry Harpending
Department of Anthropology, Pennsylvania State University. University
Park, Pa. 16802

Vaulting Ambition is erudite mischief. A political tract, it masquerades as science and succeeds to the extent that it merits
collective review in this journal.
Kitcher's central point is that sociobiology fosters incorrect
political thought. His solution is painstaking criticism of the
literature, exposing error, bias, and sloppy thinking. He knows
the theory and he knows the literature and he writes well, but I
don't believe that the product is very interesting. The criticisms
he gives have been made before, whereas the political claims are
matters of subjective judgment. As with any good author of
persuasive prose, subtle and not so subtle distortions are present. These are effective if the reader does not know the field,
annoying if he does.
For example, early on, sociobiology is associated with ability
testing. This linkage is a creation of political critics of human
sociobiology who have tried to tar Wilson with Jensen's brush,
yet professionals will realize that thcse two domains of research
are diametrically different. [See multiple book reviews of
Lumsden & Wilson's Genes, Mind, and Culture BBS 5(1) 1982;
also of Jensen's Bias in Mental Testing BBS 3(3) 1980; and
Jensen: "The Nature of the Black-White Difference on Various
Psychometric Tests" BBS 8(2) 1985.] Ability testing (what uscd
to be called IQ testing before it was hidden under a new name) is
technology that works. It persists because its economic benefits
to employers are great, but there is little theory worthy of the
name associated with it. Sociobiology is the opposite. The
theory is relatively coherent, it is linked to the rest of biology
and the other sciences, but no one knows how to apply it to data,
especially data about humans. Kitcher knows this, and it seems a
doubtful ploy to introduce a book on sociobiology with reference
to standardized ability tests that terrified him when he was a
schoolchild (p. 1).
Kitcher demands that loose or heuristic speculation about
humans be suppressed because of the political implications it
may have. Presumably he does not object to analogous discussion about life in the universe, ecological competition, artificial
intelligence, or any dom'lin that seems less threatening. But he
doesn't acknowledge the obvious corollaries: First, absolutely
any insight into or success at manipulating human behavior will
be politically objectionable to someone and, second, the "one
thing and another" theory (e.g., p. 268: "decisions are the
products of many factors: our basic predispositions, our representations and reasonings, our interactions with the society in
which we live") of human behavior that he espouses has its own
set of political implications and consequences. Van den Berghe
(1983) shouldn't talk about incest, 1 according to Kitcher, but
journalists have a "legitimate interest of dramatizing the plight
of the many children who are victims" (p. 272).
If we strip the politics from the book, we are left with another
troublesome weakness. There are a number of words in sociobiology and in the social sciences that, under close examination, don't really mean anything anymore. The relevant test is to
ask whether they can be used in an unambiguous sentence or as
terms in an equation. Any list of such words would include
"adaptation," "aggression," and "culture"; and "rape," "environment," and "inclusive fitness" are drifting toward that
category. Kitcher has a field day with adaptation, whereas he
complains many times that sociobiologists ignore culture. But to
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1. A minor technical error is Kitcher's use of Spielman et al. (1977) to
infer high levels of inbreeding in tribal societies. Inbreeding has a
number of meanings in population genetics: Those authors are referring
to the normalized gene frequency variance among groups, whereas
pedigree relationship is relevant to the fitness effects of incest. Furthermore, Spielman et aI.'s suggestion about normalized-variance inbreeding being high in tribal societies is contradicted by most of the comparative evidence now available (see Jorde 1980).

Amplifying sociobiology's hollow ring
Timothy D. Johnston
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro,
Greensboro, N.C. 27412

Kitcher's Vaulting Ambition should go a long way toward convincing skeptics that philosophers of science have important
things to say to practitioners of science. His careful dissection of
the "ramshackle structure" that is sociobiology is thoroughly
instructive, not only for revealing the errors and inadequacies of
this dubious branch of behavioral biology, but also as an object
lesson in the critical evaluation of a scientific endeavor. Kitcher
has taken on a large task and his succcss in its execution is
impressive. Rather than focusing his criticisms on a few easy
targets among the pop sociobiologists, he evaluates the entire
sociobiological enterprise, laying out its theoretical found".tions
in useful detail and working through numerous examples of its
products, both good and bad.
In outline, Kitcher's conclusion is that, although there exist a
number of important sociobiological studies that have made
useful contributions to our understanding of animal behavior,
the broad explanatory power often claimed for sociobiological
theory is thoroughly suspect. He shows convincingly that most
of the theoretical generalizations do not stand up well under
careful scrutiny and that, in their rush to explain human behavior, sociobiologists have served mainly to obscure some difficult
and important issues.
An important strength of Kitcher's critique is that it does not
stand or fall on the identification of any single fatal flaw at the
heart of sociobiological theory. As he points out early in the
book, sociobiology is not a single, monolithic theory and each of
its various explanatory schemes requires a separate consideration. By examining most of the major theorists within soCiobiology separately, Kitcher not only strengthens his critique
substantially, but he is also able to extract the good and useful
contributions of sociobiology (sparse though they may be) from
the surrounding dross. Kitcher's arguments are careful and
precise, but it would not be surprising if some of them turned
out to contain minor inaccuracies. (Indeed, it would be most
unusual if a book of this length and complexity contained no
errors offact or interpretation.) Defenders of sociobiology will
ho doubt point out such errors with great delight, and of course
the details of Kitcher's arguments will need to be revised to
accommodate their criticisms. I hope, however, that readers of
this multiple review will recognize that Kitcher's contribution
has been to identify fundamental flaws in the conceptual structure of sociobiology. They should demand from the discipline's
defenders something more substantial than the enumeration of
scattered errors.
Kitcher's conclusions will be galling to those who see sociobiology as the ultimate solution to all problems of understanding human nature, but his critique will be most welcome to
the majority of behavioral scientists, who have become tired of
sociobiology's loud and irritating pretensions. I found the book
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lucid, witty, and thoroughly enjoyable. It is obviously aimed at a
fairly broad audience, not only those already familiar with the
sociobiological literature. It would make an excellent critical
introduction to the field for students with one course in animal
behavior or evolutionary biology, and should be required reading for all first-year graduate students in any branch of behavioral biology.

Useful distinctions in human sociobiology
Michael E. Lamb
Departments of Psychology, Psychiatry, and Pediatrics, University of Utah,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

As a social scientist committed to the judicious application of an
evolutionary perspective to the study of human behavior, I
share Kitcher's concerns about the bad press sociobiology has
generated, in large part thanks to the popularizations attempted
by some self-styled sociobiologists. Unfortunately, the popular
profiles of these zealots are often more prominent than scholarly
evaluations of the relevant work warrant. Kitcher's distinctions
between "narrow," "broad," and "pop" sociobiology are helpful, therefore, and some further distinctions may be useful as
well. Among social scientists three are particularly important.
First, it is helpful to distinguish between behavioral ecologists and those who implicitly or explicitly postulate that specific
behavior patterns are hard-wired as a result of selection. The
latter position gives rise to claims that sociobiologists - critics
have yet to acknowledge the distinctions that I would deem
essential- are deterministic and mechanistic, and that they fail
to acknowledge the tremendous behavioral flexibility available
especially to primates, but probably to most vertebrates as wcll.
Arguments framcd in terms of this orientation lead to spccious
claims that male abandonment or child abuse, say, are "natural." The behavioral ecologists, by contrast, place much greater
emphasis on the environmental shaping of behavior as organisms seek to maximize inclusive reproductive fitness - the
common currency par excellcnce (Krebs & Davics 1981). Instead of arguing that human males are biologically destined to
avoid extensive involvement in child care, for example, behavioral ecologists show that a varicty of environmental factors
(including societal and spouses' attitudes, employers' expectations and prohibitions, and restricted socialization expericnces)
may limit the involvement of males, but that increased male
involvement in child care can and does occur when thesc
limitations are lifted (Lamb, Pleck, Charnov & Levine 1985; in
press). Behavioral ecologists stress that organisms seek to serve
a general goal (reproductive fitness) by adapting their behavior
• in light of their social and physical ecologies; as such, the
approach not only contrasts sharply with the hard-wired determinism of much of pop sociobiology, but it is also a more
appropriate framework for addressing the behavior of so highly
social, self-reflective, and self-conscious a species as ours. Although both the behavioral ecologists and hard-wire psychobiologists consider themselves to be "sociobiologists," only the
former seem likely to provide a perspective that truly advances
the development of a multidisciplinary science ofhuman behavior. Ironically, the harshest critics of sociobiological determinism have been scholars such as Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin
(1984), whose Marxist orientation implies a societally based
determinism that equally understates the range of behavioral
options that humans enjoy.
Second, there is the related problem of distinguishing between individual behavior and population tendencies. Exponents of hard-wiring, not surprisingly, seem willing to make
universal predictions about the behavior of individuals that
behavioral ecologists would avoid. Although natural selection
operates at the level of the individual, there is no reason to
believe that evolution equipped all members of our species with

identical, specific hard-wired behavioral tendencies of the types
discussed by pop sociobiologists, and it is thus inappropriate for
scholars to make claims like Ghiselin's facetious comment "scratch an 'altruist' and watch a 'hypocrite' bleed" (1974, p.
247). Individuals do vary in their attitudes, their behavior, and
their social circumstances - the challenge for social science is to
explain this individual variation, not to deny its existence.
Certainly, there is nothing in Darwin's (1859) seminal writings
to suggest that we should ever expect to find universal, hardWired, specific behavior patterns in the absence of individual
variation and environmental scnsitivity; indeed, environmental
sensitivity is the sine qua non of evolution itself.
Third, there is the distinction between theories and approaches. With the exception of some elegant work on foraging
behavior by Hill and his colleagues (1984), most of human
sociobiology involves the application of a perspective or approach rather than the rigorous testing of a theory. Theories
involvc the a priori specification of falsifiable hypotheses; pcrhaps because the data base rcmains so meager, most of human
sociobiology involves the post hoc invocation ofmechanisms and
functions to explain the patterns of results. The rigorous testing
of mathematical models that dominatcs the work of population
biologists and behavioral ecologists such as Parker and MacNair
(1978), Charnov (1982), and Maynard Smith (1982) is simply
absent in human sociobiology. That does not mean that sociobiological thinking should be proscribed, only that sociobiologists - and especially pop sociobiologists - should be
wary of confusing the hypotheses they generate with defensible
conclusions. We are a long way from developing a science of
human sociobiology, but the distinctions raised here and in
Kitcher's book should go a long way toward facilitating the
development of this area.

Enough of polemics - let's look at data!
W. C. McGrew
Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland

There is a quarterly scientific journal called Ethology and
Sociobiology. It has been published since 1979, by Elsevier. It is
the main place of publication for articles dealing with the
empirical testing ofhypothcses arising from evolutionary biology, as applied to the behavior of Homo sapiens. That is, scientific
human sociobiology. By the end of 1984, after 5 volumes of
publication, 31 such articles had appeared.
How can one take seriously Kitcher's treatment of the subject
of human sociobiology when he ignores this obvious source of
data? It cannot be that he is unaware of it, as he does cite one
article from the journal. In ignoring scientific (as opposed to
polemical) human sociobiology, he is just another in a long string
of provocative advocates.

Rising out of the ashes
H. C. Plotkin
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1 E 6BT,
England

Sociobiologists (pop, vulgar, or other) havc all subscribed to a
neo-Darwinian orthodoxy. The problems that Kitcher points to
may in part arise from incompetent application of that theory not an incorrect theory, not one that is fundamentally flawed,
but one that requires some additions if it is to account for the
multiplicity of phenomena in the living world that orthodox
evolutionary theory cannot yet reach. Culture is one of these.
An alternative to the sociobiology that Kitcher condemns is
provided by Boyd and Richerson (1985). Theirs is a first attempt
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at formalizing the incorporation of culture into evolutionary
theory by postulating a "dual inheritance" notion. In a nutshell,
dual inheritance savs that the behaviour of creatures that have
culture is detennin~d both by a complex ofgenetieally inherited
predispositions and by a system of culturally inherited dispositions; and that under certain explicitly stated circumstances,
such creatures may behave in ways that are contrary to their
individual fitness.
Dual inheritance succeeds, or at least shows strong promise of
doing so, where sociobiology has failed precisely because it
considers what happens in the heads of creatures of culture
causally coequal with what happens in their gonads (with apologies and acknowledgment to Lewontin [198.5, p. 68,3], who
commented that if biology is to be relevant to social and cultural
issues "it must be the biology of what is in our heads, not what is
in our gonads"). It shifts the focus of cause in the theory.
Although I count myself an admirer both of Boyd and Richerson's work and of Kitcher's book, it is only fair to point out that
although the former formalize the concept of dual inheritance
and systematically work through many of its implications in a
way that no one has done before, there are forerunners to their
kind of thinking. Campbell (e.g., 196.5) has for decades been
arguing for the existence of evolutionary processes of variation
and selection at levels other than the genetic. And Waddington
(e. g., 19.59) long promoted the idea of ''the exploitive system" as
one of four major systems causing evolution - the others being
the genetic, the developmental, and the natural selective systems. \Vaddington was much less explicit than subsequent
theorists, but what the notion of the exploitive system did was
similar to that of dual inheritance. That is, the devices by which
animals, ineluding humans, make choices about their behaviour
are elevated to a causal status equal to that ofthe processes in the
other "systems."
Lumsden and Wilson (1981) likewise recognized that brains
and minds need to be brought into any evolutionary theory that
is to account successfullv for culture and the cultural determination of behaviour. Alth~ugh I do not think that they succeeded,
the conceptual shift from Wilson (197.5) to Lumsden and Wilson
(1981) was surely substantial and significant, and might have
been thus acknowledged by Kiteher.
The changing formulation from "gonads alone" to "gonads +
brains" is a movement that, in a very general sense, has been
paralleled in other areas of biology. There is a growing realization that the edges of evolutionary theory have to be lifted and
shifted so that it encompasses more of what living things do
(Eldredge & Salthe 198.5). The sociobiologists might have got it
wrong as far as humans are concerned, but they taught us much
more than did the biological determinists of the turn of the
century, when the debate over the determinants of culture was
resolved in a less satisfactory manner - indeed, it wasn't resolved at all. And that, of course, is why Kitcher was able to
write his book about Wilson's books. Of course, 60 and 70 years
ago, evolution was much less understood and cognitive psychology did not exist. But now there really is the possibility of a
further synthesis, this time between cognitive science and
evolutionary science; and Wilson and others, even in failure,
will have contributed to it.

Is there really "juggling," "artifice," and
"trickery" in Genes, Mind, and Culture?
Alexander Rosenberg
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, Calif. 925210201

Kitcher's motivation in writing Vaulting Amhition (hereafter
Amhition) includes his fears that sociobiology may help restore
the status quo ante or, at any rate, retard such reductions in class
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structure, aggression, and sexual inequality as are possible.
These fears are exaggerated. Sociobiological theory will have no
impact on implementable social policy, except perhaps to the
extent of rationalizing programs that would have gone forward in
any case.
Kitcher's motivation also includes the belief that much Current work in human sociobiology is of poor quality and needs to
be set aside if the subject is to show real progress. Yet the
rhetorical strength of Kitcher's arguments outruns his conclusions. For if the arguments are correct, they come close to an
impossibility-proof for sociobiology. The difficulties in establishing initial conditions, exeluding interfering forces, and calibrating test outcomes that Kitcher erects against the subject
should reduce human sociobiology to permanent despair, for its
subject matter simply does not admit of the kinds of methodological improvements Kitcher demands of a truly respectable human sociobiology. The trouble is that these standards
cannot be met by infrahuman sociobiology, and indeed much
evolutionary biology fails them as well. The life sciences simply
could not proceed at all if they were required to exclude all the
alternative hypotheses that Kitcher demands responsible
human sociobiology dispose of.
In Chapter 10 of Ambition Kitcher turns from accusations of
bad science to those of deceit. In his treatment of Lumsden and
Wilson's Genes, Mind, and Culture (1981; hereafter Genes) the
tone shifts from bemusement to abuse as Kitcher turns his
formidable mathematical talents to an "expose" of juggling,
gerrymandering, artifice, and trickery in the formalism of geneculture coevolutionary theory.
Some of this criticism I do not understand. Some I find
exaggerated. Some I find well founded but less serious than
Kitcher does. In what follows I examine first Kitcher's discussion ofthe three case studies Lumsden and Wilson present, and
then Kitcher's treatment offive conclusions of Genes. [See also
multiple book review of Genes, BBS .5(1) 1982.]
Kitcher's chief complaint against the application of geneculture theory to incest, Yanomamo village fission, and dress
styles brings to mind the kind ofattack that greeted Samuelson's
Foundations ofEconomic Anal!i.:\·is (1947) forty years ago. In that
work Samuelson called upon mathematical sophistication
known only in theoretical physics in order to express highly
unrealistic assumptions from which he could derive generalizations about the economic commonplaces that were themselves
at best only weakly confirmed by unreliably gathered data.
Samuelson's highly sophisticated formal system implied little
more than mathematical functions already familiar in microeconomic idealizations of perfect competiti'on under conditions
of certainty in markets of small numbers of commodities. Despite criticism much like the kind that Kitcher directs at
Lumsden and Wilson, Samuelson's book is now viewed as
having made a major contribution to economic theory: not
because it ever received any striking confirmation or advanced
any really novel hypothesis, but because it formalized a discipline in a way that was minimally consistent with some of the
available data, and identified the parameters, coefficients, and
variables economists of his persuasion needed to quantify if
there was to be progress in his discipline. The fact that there has
been little progress in these matters since Samuelson's time is
testimony to the difficulties of understanding economic behavior, not the irrelevance of his mathematically demanding and
professionally inaccessible work. We did not need twice-differentiable functions of indefinitely many variables in preferences
and commodities, together with error-free maximizing by consumers, simply to derive the downward-sloping demand curves
of consumer behavior. Indeed, these curves can be derived
from the assumption that consumers' choices are entirely random or irrationally insensitive to changes in relevant economic
factor (see Becker 1976). But this is hardly any reason to dismiss
Foundations of Economic Analysis.
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But compare Kitcher's critique of Lumsden and Wilson's
treatment of incest: We can derive their binomial distribution of
probabilities that n people in a society of N members engage in
incest from assumptions much simpler than Lumsden and
Wilson's: "Suppose that by the age of six.. children have
acquired, by whatever means, a strong inclination not to engage
in incest ... [and suppose] that all the members of a society
make their decisions independently." The result is Lumsden
and Wilson's equation, without the "need to introduce epigenetic rules, updating functions, complicated equations, or
any of the rest of the machinery" (Ambition, pp. 366-67,
emphasis added). Wilson and Lumsden's aims were not to
derive this distribution, but to incorporate it into a theory, one
that attempts to explain the assumptions Kitcher himself makes,
accounting for "the strong inclination of children" in terms of
epigenetic rules, and the independence of decisions in terms of
updating functions approaching P = 1. We have no need of
these assumptions to formulate the probability distribution, but
we do need them, or some substitute, to explain it. It is no
criticism of an explanation that we have independent evidence
that its explanandum obtains. As with the attempts to dismiss
Samuelson's arcana, the aims of the exercise are ignored. They
are not merely "the solution to a rather easy mathematical
problem" (Ambition, p. 368).
Much the same is to be said of Kitcher's dismissal ofthe geneculture approach to the fissioning ofYanomamo villages: "In the
first place, there are no detailed data with which [Lumsden and
Wilson's] ethnographic curves can be compared. Second, there
is no need to invoke hypotheses about genes. As in the case of
incest, the theory does no more than estahlish a connection
between the dispositions of individuals and the pattern of
behavior in society" (Ambition, p. 371, emphasis added). But
the theory is not meant to establish more than this. It is an
attempt to incorporate the obvious assumptions that Kitcher
himself uses to derive Lumsden and Wilson's probability function (Amhition, p. 370) in a framework that can in principle
explain and unify them. I am sure that Lumsden and Wilson will
agree that "there is no reason to invoke epigenetic rules ... to
generate their conclusions [about the probability of village
fissioning]" (Amhition, p. 370). They hold only that such rules
can explain them.
I find Kitcher's general doubts about the likelihood ofa gencculture explanation ofYanomamo village fissioning reasonable,
and 1 consider the attempt to explain changes in women's dress
in these terms quite ill-advised. Unlike incest avoidance, the
factors that make for village splitting and changes in style just
seem to be poor candidates for designation as "culturgens."
Much the same can be said for the occurrent and expressed
attitudes and the social institutions that distinguish Kitcher's
hypothetical incest-avoiders the "Shunsib," the "Moralmaj,"
and the "Tabuit." Kitcher uses differences between attitudes
and institutions in these three groups to argue that eulturgen
categories cannot distinguish between important social differences nor reduce institutional facts to individual ones (as a
selection-over-individuals theory requires). It is unlikely that
attitudes, their expressions, or institutions (under their participants' descriptions, at any rate) can figure as culturgens (see
Rosenberg 1980). So, any attempt to absorb them into geneculture theory is bound to give hostages to critics. There are, as
Kitcher notes, no data with which to compare ethnographic
Curves. Indeed, there are no data of almost any kind that would
subject gene-culture coevolutionary theory to any very stringent test. It is the absence of such data, for which the nonevolutionary social sciences must take the blame, that makes sociobiological theory an attractive alternative guide to the
collection of new data; but the same absence of data gravely
limits human sociobiology's short-term prospects for test. For
(outside kinship structures) it not only narrows the field of
application to those relatively controversial ones Lumsden and

Wilson tackle, it precludes the provision of data that will calibrate or test their explanatory hypotheses. Thus, Kitcher's
charge should not be that the theory is "idle," but that it is at
best premature. There are not yet enough systematized data to
make explanatory hypothesizing worthwhile. We might be
tempted to make the same charge in economics, but to do so
would hardly justify the conclusion that mathematical economics is sheer obfuscation or trickery.
Yet this is the conclusion Kitcher derives from his examination of five conclusions Lumsden and Wilson come to. Despite
his tone, Kitcher actually endorses three of these. In regard to
the remaining two, he refutes a version of one stronger than
Lumsden and Wilson's and fails to take important factors into
account in his attack on the last. Let us consider whether his
treatment of (A)-(E) justifies the conclusion that Lumsden and
Wilson's theory is "juggling ... artifice ... and trickery" (Ambition, p. 392).
First, the three principles with which Kitcher agrees: These
principles, Kitcher (and before him Lumsden and Wilson) tells
us, are derivable from general considerations on the interaction
of genes and behavior. As such, deriving them is an adequacy
condition on any formalization ofthe theory. And the constraints
on coefficients and parameters required by the theory in order
to imply these three principles constitute an implicit test of its
plausibility. If Lumsden and Wilson are obliged to attach unreasonable values to the variables of their formalism to derive these
results, then so far from artifice and trickery, the result would be
a very obvious defect. The derivation of what Kitcher calls
principle A, that selection favors biased epigenetic rules, Kitcher describes as "dress[ed] up in complicated terminology" (p.
378). Lumsden and Wilson describe this modestly as confirming
the separately derived demonstration of Chapter 1 (the introduction to Genes). The same can be said for principle C, that
culture slows the rate of genetic evolution. Kitcher tells us
"There is no need of a complicated theory to obtain it" (Ambition, p. 387). What Kitcher describes as Lumsden and Wilson's
"obscur[ing] the commonplace character of the result" (p. 387)
reads in Genes simply as an exercise in showing that the
principle obtains in a wide range ofcases. It would be a defect in
any theory of gene-culture coevolution were it not to incorporate A and C, or were it able to do so only at some high price in
implausible values assigned to variables. Neither ofthese things
is the case.
Principle D states that changes during the coevolutionary
process can be rapid. Its "general possibility is apparent in our
pretheoretical model," writes Kitcher. But its associated "thousand-year rule" is allegedly "the result of some careful number
juggling" (Ambition, p. 392). Now, as Kitcher notes, this is an
order-of-magnitude claim: Lumsden and Wilson will consider
their views about the rate of gene-culture evolution to be
vindicated if it takes 9,999 years or 499 generations for a highly
efficient new culturgen to become prevalent in a population.
Kitcher shows that if a competing inferior culturgen is only
slightly less efficient, then, other things (including transition
rates between culturgens) being equal, the time required for the
more efficient culturgen to become prevalent is only 20,000
years, roughly double the order-of-magnitudc maximum. This
seems a relatively short period by evolutionary standards, and
hardly the basis for an accusation ofjuggling. The other assumption, from which the I,OOO-year rule follows and which Kitcher
thinks was rigged to get Lumsden and Wilson's result, is the
setting of "transition rates" from one culturgen to another as
very low. Yet for early hominids, and for societies we have
described as "traditional" since the time of Weber (1904), this
assumption seems by far the most reasonable one to make. From
the wheel to capitalism, people have always resisted adopting a
new and far more efficient mode of production. Only in our
Andy Warhol society are transition rates high enough to swamp
gene-culture evolution.
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Principle E states that gene-culture coevolution can promote
genetic diversity. Kitcher reads the "can" as "does," and he
objects that gene-culture coevolution does promote diversity
(only?) if culturgcns are subject to some sort of "fitness suppression." But this is no objection to the claim that there are
circumstances under which gene-culture evolution can do so;
indeed, it is a specification of one of the conditions under which
it will. Kitcher lampoons the notion that culturgens or their
users might be subject to fitness suppression and concludes that
the whole notion was introduced just to "juggl[e] the numbers"
(p. 391). But these "fitness suppression" effects are far from
uncommon, and under the name "decreasing returns to scale"
are well known to economists and managers. As the number of
culturgens in use increases, interaction effects among them will
sometimes increase marginal efficiency and eventually decrease
it drastically (sometimes even reducing total production). The
result will be that alternative bundles of culturgens with the
same levels ofoutput efficiency are likely to coexist with the sort
of variation that principle E allows for. Whereas Kitcher sees
"contrivance so strained as to defy any realistic interpretation"
(p. 392), I find a cautious statement of possibility sustained by a
reasonable appeal to widely accepted results.
Which brings us to principle B: Sensitivity to usage patterns
increase the rate of assimilation of epigenetic rules with high
fitness levels. Kitcher says that this "is the only principle that
distinguishes Lumsden and Wilson's theory from the simple
story of gene-culture coevolution [and it] turns out to be based
on numerous errors" (Ambition, p. 386). To begin with, principle B seems to be easily accommodated to "the simple story."
Furthermore, claims of Lumsden and Wilson that Kitcher
identifies as simple mistakes are conclusions for which Lumsden
and Wilson specifically argue, in parts of their work that go
unexamined in Ambition.
Suppose population G I is composed of individuals insensitive
to the use of fitter culturgens by other members of G I , whereas
members ofG 2 are sensitive to such use and likely to adopt it. (In
the formalism of Lumsden and Wilson, alpha> 0, beta < 1.)
Now suppose that an epigenetic rule favoring an adaptive
culturgen c I enters the two populations by immigration, mutation, or recombination. As a shorthand device, call this the
"gene" for c I (of course there are probably no single genes for
epigenetic rules, as Lumsden and Wilson recognize). Principle
B says that the epigenetic rule's genetic base will spread more
quickly in G 2 than in G I . This may seem incompatible with "the
simple story," since members of G 2 without the "gene" will
acquire the phenotypic behavior c I through imitation, thereby
acquiring the advantage that the "gene" for c I provides its
bearers. But a little breeding and family structure dispel the
incompatibility: Initial bearers of the new adaptive epigenetic
rule in G 2 arc likely to skew their offspring most strongly to
adopting c I , since these are the individuals who will observe the
use of c I most frequently in their siblings and in their parents.
Since these offspring bear the "gene" for C I and are sensitive to
new adaptive culturgens as well, their fitness will be enhanced
relative to other members of G 2 , who are equally sensitive to
adaptive culturgens but do not observe the use of c I as frequently. So, the "gene" for C I spreads more rapidly in G 2 than it
would in G 1.
Though Kitcher concludes that B is based on mistakes, his
argument leads one to conclude that it is really based on more
number juggling, for he takes great pains to show that the
principle does in fact follow from the Lumsden and Wilson
formalism, if a certain inequality holds. The trouble is, according to Kitcher, that the only way it can hold is by assigning
implausible values to its variables. The inequality relates the
rewards for using a fitter culturgen to the costs ofdeveloping the
cognitive equipment to recognize its use by others and to
imitate them. Let ric = the reward to members of a usagesensitive population of using the fitter culturgen c I ; r2 c = the
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reward to members of that population who use the less fit
culturgen C2 ; r IN = the reward to individuals who do not have
the cognitive equipment to recognize and adopt a fitter culturgen but who use c I nevertheless; r2N = the rewards to these
insensitive individuals who employ less fit culturgen C2 ; and k =
the cost of acquiring and maintaining the recognition/imitation
equipment. Then the inequality that must obtain is:

he -

k) I (r2C - k) > "IN I "2N

Kitcher notes that when the rewards r IN and rIC are close in
value, and the cost k is relatively small, the inequality fails and
selection will not favor the acquisition of cognitive recognition/
imitation equipment - that is, the development of a brain.
Under these circumstances "Lumsden and Wilson will not
achieve the result they want" (Ambition, p. 386). Which result?
One result they want very much is an explanation ofwhy culture
has emerged so rarely among biological species. This is a central
topic of Genes, Chapter 7. There Lumsden and Wilson offer an
explanation of this fact in terms of the great costs involved in
acquiring a brain, which make its appearance improbable, given
its costs and benefits. They conclude: "We view Homo as an
evolving genus that beat the odds. It overcame the resistance to
advanced evolution by the cosmic good fortune of being in the
right place at the right time" (Genes, p. 330).
So principle B comes into operation only when the threshold
to culture has at last been crossed. This conSiderably mitigates
Kitcher's objection that on Lumsden and Wilson's theory "the
entire costs of building a brain are being levied with respect to a
choice involving a pair of culturgens" (Ambition, p. 385). At
least with respect to the earliest culturgens, or bundles of them,
and the apparatus to recognize and imitate the adaptive ones,
this may turn out to be more of an insight than an objection.
Now, for subsequent culturgens, the costs k are much reduced: They are the maintenance costs only, not the "construction" costs. But if the gross rewards for using c I are much greater
than C2 ' independent of the costs of cognitive recognition/imitation equipment, then even when these costs are, say,
about as large as the rewards for using c2 ' Lumsden and Wilson's
equality holds, and with it principle B. Only when the rewards
for using c I do not much exceed those of using c 2 ' while the costs
k approach those of using c2 ' will the inequality fail in a way that
undermines principle B. (And if the rewards to c I are much
greater than the rewards to c 2 it does not seem correct that the
inequality fails when rIC - r IN - r 2N - k = r 2C - r 2N - k, as
Kitcher claims.) What values are to be assigned to cI's rewards and c2 ' s are clearly factual questions, but it is surely not
unreasonable to suppose that some culturgens are orders of
magnitude more efficient than competing ones. Lumsden and
Wilson need not resort to "careful number juggling" to underwrite claims about the autocatalysis of gene-culture coevolution. As the relative costs, k, drop and the relative rewards to
more efficient culturgens increase, this is exactly what can be
expected to happen. Whether "the proliferation of equations"
with this consequence can explain detailed features of cultural
change after prehistory is something I for one doubt, because of
the difficulty of identifying culturgens. But that principle B is
just a mass of errors and artificiality I cannot accept.
I conclude that Kitcher has let his fears about the nefarious
consequences of taking human sociobiology seriously get the
better of his judgment. I am inclined to agree with Kitcher,
though for different reasons, that gene-culture theory cannot
shed much light on the details of contemporary ongoing human
behavior under ordinary descriptions of it. Given the difficulty
of identifying any culturgens and estimating the theory's variables and parameters, it may not even shed much light on the
formative period of human evolution or the most basic behavioral dispositions of Homo sapiens. But Kitcher's suggestion that
this is not even an honest attempt to propound a formal framework for human sociobiology is one with which I cannot agree.
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Pop sociobiology and meta-ethics
Merrilee H. Salmon
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260

Kitcher has shown us in his carcfully argued critique what is
wrong with pop sociobiology: almost everything. One of the
great virtues of the book is the author's care to distinguish his
targets (pop sociobiology is itself pluralistic) from sociobiological
studies that deal with the evolutionary basis of nonhuman
behavior. Kitcher thus forestalls critics who could cite numerous examples of sound scientific work in this area. Still, many
readers will notice that Kitcher's cautions and criticisms are
applicable to some sociobiological studies of nonhuman animals
as well.
Particularly notable in his quintessentially pop sociobiological
claims that evolutionary biological studies of animal behavior
can offer great insights into the nature of human behavior is E.
O. Wilson. Especially provocative to philosophers is his exhortation to consider "the possibility that the time has come for
ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of philosophers and biologicized" (Wilson 1975, p. 562). I believe that
Wilson has a point. Ethics is too important to be left solely in the
hands of philosophers, just as biology is too important to be left
solely in the hands of biologists. Kitcher himself allows as much
for two interpretations of Wilson's claim: (a) that evolutionary
biology has something to tell us about the history of the development of ethical systems, and (b) that evolutionary biology can
prOVide us with facts about human be~vior that, when conjoined with already accepted moral principles, can lead to the
development of new (or "not yet appreciated") normative moral
principles. But Kitcher rcjects Wilson's attempts to use evolutionary biology for two other purposes: (c) to prOVide a basis for
meta-ethics by answering traditional questions about the objectivity of ethics, and (d) to provide all by itself a source of new
normative principles. I will focus on a disagreement concerning
(c).
Contrary to Kitcher, J. G. Murphy (1982, Chapter 4) argues
that despite Wilson's defective arguments for, and confused
account of, a new sociobiologically based meta-ethics, the program embodied in (c) has some merit. He tries to show that
Wilson, following the lead of Darwin in The Descent ofMan and
Selection in Relation to Sex, is not totally misguided in his
attempts to bring forth biological considerations in an account of
the foundations of human systems of value. Moreover, Murphy
believes that Wilson has gone beyond Darwin's contribution in
two respects: (1) Human morality is not identified with simple
altruism or group-beneficial behavior, and (2) there is a concern
for justice and rights absent in Darwin's simple utilitarian view
of ethics (Murphy 1982, 104-5).
Kitcher presents a plausible reading of Wilson as a crude
reductionist and relativist: NkJther Theresa's apparent altruism
is simply, given her belief in the teachings of the Church, a
result of following the biological urge to improve her own
situation. However, as Murphy tries to show, a more sympathetic reading is possible. We can interpret \Vilson's claims as
a more sophisticated '.' relativism at the level of theory or proof'
(p. 100). Sociobiologists need not attempt to derive particular
moral judgments from biology; these judgments may well be
Supported by culture, religion, or moral theory. However, the
deeper question of the source of moral theories may be partly
answerable by facts of biology. Such an account would show that
Our fundamental values are relative to the kinds of beings we
are, but would not thereby show the values to be any less real or
important than our preanalytic views held them to be.
A sociobiological account of meta-ethics would be a causal
account rather than one given in terms of reasons, and so
perhaps Kitcher would want to categorize the investigation

under (a) above (i. e., as a historical account of the sources of
ethics). But the problem is not entirely historical; it is a problem
in meta-ethics as well. It is a meta-ethical project to ask proponents of any moral theory why the theory's fundamental principles and deepest convictions are held superior to those of other
moral theories. Kitcher rccognizes the legitimacy of this challenge (1985, p. 426), but he believes that Wilson has done
nothing to provide a new perspective for the skeptical attack on
ethical objectivity, largely because he does not understand the
results ofrecent attempts by philosophers, such as Rawls (1971),
to grapple with these questions. Although Wilson's account of
Rawls's views is garbled, it would be overly sanguine to suppose
that the problem has been solved by Rawls - or anyone else. It is
not just, as Kitcher suggests, that there is no "broadly accessible
discussion of the problem" available to scientists; there is no
broadly accepted solution to it either. Sociobiologists are far
from offering any proof that our value systems are based on
biological facts, and they have not established that our values are
relative in the sense dcscribed above. At the same time, no
philosopher of ethics has come up with proof that they arc not.
In light of this, I do not think that we should ignore the possible
contribution to meta-ethics of a careful study of the biological
basis of this aspect of human behavior.
Pop sociobiology, with its overblown claims, shaky empirical
underpinnings, and sloppy reasoning is distressing to contemplate. Despite all this, if valuable insights are there as flecks of
gold among the dross, we are not so rich as to be able to pass over
them without taking notice. In his preface, Kitcher says he
hopes his book "may even help us to envisage the future
development of an approach to human behavior that makes
genuine use of biological insights." It is in that spirit that I offer
minor criticism of this major and most valuable work.

"Scotch'd the snake, not killed it"
Peter T. Saundersa and Mae-Wan HOb
"Department of Mathematics, King's College, London WC2R 2LS, England
and bDevelopmental Dynamics Research Group, The Open UniverSity,
Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, England

According to E. O. Wilson (1975), sociobiology is intended to be
a branch of cvolutionary biology, and particularly of modern
population biology. In other words, it is a part of the neoDarwinist, or "synthetic," theory of evolution. Kitcher agrees,
at least so far as what he calls narrow sociobiology is concerned.
He is also convinced that neo-Darwinism provides a solid
foundation for such an enterprise, he approves of its application
to the study of the social behaviour of animals, and he has no
objection in principle to its extension to humans as well.
Along with many others, however, he strongly disapproves of
pop sociobiology, his term for the present state of human
sociobiology. In Vaulting Ambition he demonstrates the poverty of the subject. He points out some serious defects, and he
expertly demolishes a number of typical accounts, including the
frcquently cited prize example of the incest taboo. Anyone who
is impressed by the work of Wilson, Chagnon, Barash, Alexander, and the rest would do well to read this book and see how
poorly their arguments stand up to Kitcher's careful analysis.
Yet, despite this, and even though Kitcher gives no indication
that there is even one single example ofhuman sociobiology that
he finds acceptable, he steadfastly maintains that there is nothing wrong in principle with the program. It's just that somehow
none of the particular instances of it are any good.
Given the degree of failure that he sees in human sociobiology, it would be surprising if Kitcher were right that it is
essentially sound. Besides, if the errors were due solely to the
shortcomings of the practitioners, we would expect them to be
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peculiar to human sociobiology. In fact, they are not. Anthropomorphism, unwarranted reduction, and adaptationism
are characteristic of all ofneo-Darwinist evolution theory. Their
effects may be exacerbated by the complexity of the subject
matter and the cavalier attitude of so many sociobiologists, but
they are not aberrations; they are inherent in the synthetic
theory and abound in the other branches of it as well.
To see this we need look no further than the pages of Vaulting
Ambition itself. Kitcher tells us that he aims to "expose the
deficiencies of pop sociobiology by contrasting the claims of pop
sociobiologists with the work of those who study the behavior of
nonhuman animals" (p. 131). But he concedes that anthropomorphism is a problem in nonhuman sociobiology too (citing Krebs
& Davies 1981). In discussing reductionism (p. 203) he uses as
an example the account ofthe behaviour ofthe Florida scrub jay,
and he also mentions Barash's story of the mountain bluebirds,
which is an example of adaptationism at its worst.
Reductionism and adaptationism are also prevalent in the
neo-Darwinist approach to physiological evolution. Kitcher is
aware of this, and cites the paper of Gould and Lewontin (1979),
in which examples of both are discussed. He therefore sees a
need for biologists to "undertake the investigations necessary
for articulating claims about allometry, pleiotropy, and so forth"
(p. 232). He quotes with approval Beatty (1985), who suggests
that adaptationism could be countered either by all biologists
developing alternative forms of evolutionary explanation, or by
the existence of a pluralistic community, in which different
biologists adopted different approaches.
We too agree with Beatty. Evolution is a process that occurs at
many levels, from the prebiotic to the sociocultural. Each of
these levels, and the interconnections among levels as well,
must be investigated using concepts and methods appropriate to
it. Such a pluralism - a genuine pluralism based on solid
science, not some sort ofvague relativism and above all not mere
lip service - is precisely what we were trying to stimulate with
our volume Beyond Neo-Darwinism (Ho & Saunders 1984). But
it is unlikely to gain general acceptance so long as the majority of
evolutionists adhere to the neo-Darwinian paradigm.
To understand why this is so we need to know what neoDarwinism is. Unfortunately, Kitcher takes the synthetic theory
of evolution so much for granted that he has not bothered to
define it. Curiously, few if any neo-Darwinists ever actually
define their theory (the reader may find this significant), but in
the introduction to his textbook Evolutionary Biology, Futuyma
(1979) writes of "[the] neo-Darwinian view, in which the joint
action of mutation, whereby variation arises, and selection,
whereby it is shaped into coherent adaptive form, is considered
sufficient explanation of the evolutionary process" (p. 13). This
seems a fair description, and it tallies well with what other neoDarwinists assume in their research, whether they say so explicitly or not.
The word "sufficient" is crucial, because without it, as Maynard Smith (1969) points out, neo-Darwinism is not a theory at
all. It does mean, however, that for neo-Darwinists no other
form of explanation is needed in evolution. There is therefore no
place for a pluralistic approach. Nor, indeed, do we see any
evidence of one within the paradigm.
Once we have defined the synthetic theory we can understand why it and therefore also pop sociobiology suffer from the
defects that Kitcher highlights. Ifselection is the "only directing
force in evolution" (Mayr 1980), explanation must be chiefly in
terms of selective advantage, occasionally measured, more often
surmised. One can hardly avoid adaptationism if one insists that
adaptive significance is the only really important factor in
evolution. Because development is held to be largely irrelevant
(e. g., Maynard Smith & Halliday 1979), it is natural to decompose an organism into traits - that is, to adopt a reductionist
approach. Finally, because the decomposition is frequently
arbitrary and therefore subjective, it is easy to fall into anthropomorphism.
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It is not as if these shortcomings were compensated for by
major successes. Kitcher writes ofexciting and important developments in the application of evolutionary theory to animal
behavior, but what he chooses as exemplars are, by his own
account, modest enough; he even compliments the authors for
(among other things) the caution with which they present their
results. In physiological evolution, too, neo-Darwinism is far
less successful than is generally claimed; it is better at accounting for the change in coloration of moths than in explaining how
there came to be such things as moths in the first place. Kitcher
himself acknowledges (p. 70), "For almost all traits of almost all
animals, we lack the knowledge of genetic, physiological, and
developmental differences that brings system to Kettlewell's
work" - and even that classical example has been criticized by a
number of workers (see Lambert et aI., 1986, and references
given there). There is no reason for social scientists to be in awe
of neo-Darwinism.
Kitcher tells us that his aim in writing Vaulting Ambition was
to end a debate that has gone on for the past ten years. This was
an ambitious aim indeed (though that is presumably not what he
means by his title) and he has not achieved it. He identifies some
of the defects of sociobiology but he fails to recognize that they
arise from the very structure of the theory. As a result, although
his critique may prevent some workers from being led astray by
the claims of pop sociobiology and may even curb some of its
worst excesses, it contributes little toward the fundamental
change in approach that is needed if there is ever to be a
worthwhile human sociobiology. Kitchcr took his title from
Macbeth; if we may borrow another phrase from the same play,
he has "scotch'd the snake, not killed it."

The hypothalamus and the impartial
perspective
Peter Singer
Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3168,
Australia

In the final chapter of his clear and closely reasoned book,
Kitcher (1985) touches on the grandiose claims made by what he
calls pop sociobiology - and E. O. Wilson in particular - to
advance our understanding of ethics. Kitcher has little difficulty
in showing that the claims Wilson makes (1975; 1978) are based
on misunderstandings about ethics. I share these conclusions
(1981) and will not repeat Kitcher's reasons, or my own, for
reaching them. But, as Kitcher acknowledges, Wilson has
raised, albeit awkwardly, some basic questions about ethics. I
shall try here to take the discussion further.
Kitcher's book closes with the observation that "A central task
for any system of ethics is the construction of the impartial
perspective" (p. 433). But, Kitcher goes on, pop sociobiology
lacks any impartial perspective: "There is no higher standpoint
than the dictates of the hypothalamus" (p. 434). Hence the
inability of the pop sociobiological perspective to tell us anything important about ethics.
Yes - ifthere really is an impartial perspective. But if there is
no impartial perspective, then pop sociobiology might be right
about ethics, after all. It will have demonstrated that ethics is an
illusion, because ethics requires an impartial perspective,
whereas in reality there is no higher standpoint than the dictates
ofthe hypothalamus. So the task is to show that such an impartial
perspective exists.
I do not for a moment blame Kitcher for failing to show this.
One can only write one book at a time. What he does is to refer to
John Rawls's work on justice and, more briefly, to my own book
(1981) as illustrating different possible approaches to the existence of an impartial perspective. Pop sociobiology has not
given such approaches even the most elementary consideration.
In a sentence, I believe that we can take an impartial perspec-
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tive by putting ourselves in the situation of others affected by
what we do. In thus putting ourselves in the place of others, we
must not think of them as having our desires. (Recall George
Bernard Shaw's "refutation" of the Golden Rule: "Do not do
unto others as you would have them do unto you - they may
have different tastes.") Instead we must imagine ourselves in
their situation, with their desires, and ask ourselves what it
would be like to feel like that. When we can do this - not
perfectly, but to a degree that is of some practical assistance with all those who are affected by our actions, then we can say
truly that we have made an effort to judge impartially.
If, as Wilson suggests in the opening sentence ofthe notorious
final chapter of Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), we
"consider man in the free spirit of natural history, as though we
were zoologists from another planet completing a catalog of
social species on Earth," we would surely note that one characteristic of this social species is the development of elaborate
systems of good or approved conduct, called "morality." If we
were particularly acute, we might even note the tendency of
these systems of morality - especially those that have a long
history of elaboration, development, and critical reflection - to
work toward an overarching principle that sets a standard of
impartiality. Some form of the principle "Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you" is to be found in the ethics of
Judaism, ofConfucius, of Hinduism, ofthe Roman Stoics, and of
Christianity, to name only the most prominent examples. In at
least some cases, the development appears to have been parallel
and independent.
This suggests, although it certainly does not prove, that there
may be a rational basis to such a rule. And it is not hard to see
what such a basis could be. Once I can reflect on what I am and
what others are, I can see that they are like me in fundamental
respects. Like me, they have wants and needs. Like me, they
can love. Like me, they can be hurt. From this alone, nothing
follows for ethics. I may know that others can be hurt, as I can be
hurt, but still care only about my own pains. But reflection can
be carried a stage further. I can come to see that the perspective
from which only my hurts are a matter of copcern to me is a
limited perspective. For there is nothing special about my
pains, except that they are mine. The pains of others are still
pains. If! can see my pains as a bad thing, why are your pains not
also a bad thing? Why do "good" and "bad" always have to have
the implied qualifier "to me"?
Ethical thought leads to such questions because in ethics we
are always trying to break away from the individual perspective.
We are, precisely, trying to rise above "the dictates of the
hypothalamus." We start down this track, perhaps, only because our tribe can get along better if it has a means of resolving
conflicts among individuals. But once we step on the escalator of
reasoning about conduct, it is not easy to get off. The same
arguments that lead us to put the good of others in the tribe
above our own good can lead us to put the good of strangers
above that of members of the tribe. There may be no ultimate
resting place short of the impartial standard. But we cannot
expect sociobiologists to tell us whether this is so. Here there is
no substitute for the argument and reasoning of philosophy.

Folk psychology versus pop sociobiology
Eric Alden Smith
Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
98195

The controversy over the potential and actual achievements of
human sociobiology that began over ten years ago has recently
qUieted down, and most (though not all) antagonists on both
sides have gone back to quieter and, one hopes, more productive work. I think most biologists and social scientists sym-

pathetic to the application of evolutionary theory to human
social behavior are now more wary of the grand pronouncements once common in what Kitcher calls pop sociobiology. So,
at first, the thought of a book-length critique of this field by a
philosopher, focused on its popularizers, was far from appealing. However, after reading Kitcher's book (1985) I think Kitcher has performed a useful task. This is by far the most balanced
and detailed evaluation of human sociobiology to date - though
it is not without its problems.
Let me begin, then, with praise and with a delineation ofwhat
I see as the main strengths of the work. First, it is written by
someone who has a very good grasp of thc fundamental theory
and of many of the extant applications of this theory to humans.
It is amazing how much of the critical literature on sociobiology
betrays a complete misunderstanding of the basic arguments or
engages in (willful?) misrepresentation of sociobiology (some
prominent evolutionary biologists come to mind). Kitcher
knows his stuff, and generally writes fairly and accurately in
summarizing the arguments he wishes to criticize. Second, I am
in strong agreement with Kitcher's criticism of much of human
sociobiology for relying on plausibility arguments and casual
assertions about human behavior or natural selection, rather
than on deductive models and rigorous hypothesis-testing.
Although there is some careful work that Kitcher appears to
have overlooked, especially in the more ecologically inclined
research - and at times I think he overstates the failures of the
Alexandrian school - by and large the criticisms are thoughtful
and useful. Finally, I applaud Kitcher's attempts to formulate
deductive models to substitute for existing plausibility arguments (e.g., Dickemann's [1979] hypergamy/infanticide scenario) or to expand the possibility space of existing models (e. g.,
the Alexander [1974]1Kurland [1979] hypothesis on the avunculate). These are not the last words in model-building, and they
require evaluation and empirical testing, but they are useful and
salu tary efforts.
What are the weaknesses? First, the frequent sarcasm and
ridicule that enters into Kiteher's critique is distracting and
ultimately self-defeating. We have no shortage of self-righteous
fulminations about the evils and absurdities (>fsociobiology, so
those already opposed (often for mistaken reasons) need no
further cheerleading, while believers will only be hardened in
their loyalties by sneers and cute word play. The sarcastic tone
that can be found far too often in Vaulting Ambition serves only
to prolong the emotional and ideological aspects of the debate
(which Kitcher usually is at pains to disavow), and to obscure the
usually sound logic of his criticisms. Second, I believe some of
Kiteher's criticisms are overstated and his analysis of human
sociobiology's failings occasionally exaggerated. This is especially the ease in Chapter 9, which treats Alexander and his
congeners, Third, despite Kitcher's claim that we have serviceable alternatives to sociobiological explanation in the form of
"folk psychology" or common sense, I am troubled by his failure
to develop these alternatives in any but the most casual way, and
I see this as a serious lacuna. It is easy to criticize a young field
for its excesses, but much harder to develop an alternative
conception or synthesis; what do we have that is any better?
Let me expand on the second and third criticisms of Kitcher
with some specific examples from Chapter 9. Kitcher criticizes
the sociobiological explanation of primogeniture by countering
that it is better explained by certain "banal" facts offolk psychology, "unaugmented by any evolutionary ideas": that parents
desire their children's welfare, that siblings aid each other
preferentially, "and so forth" (p. 297). Grantl~d that Alexander's
particular arguments on the adaptiveness of primogeniture are
sketchy, loosely derived, and untested, I don't know what to
make of Kitcher's counterclaim, except to demolish it. First,
primogeniture is a norm or practice that is far from universal
(alternative solutions include partible inhcritance, common in
Euramerican society for centuries), so we can hardly explain a
variable with a set of proposed constants, banal or not. Second,
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even in societies with such a norm, it is often violated - children
are disinherited, younger siblings commit fratricide or lesser
crimes, and so on. Kitcher could respond by multiplying his list
of banal dispositions, but then in what way is he playing a
different game than the most vulgar of genetic determinists? He
further claims that the sociobiological explanation for primogeniture is faulty because it would lead us to reason that kin
altruism evolved to create fitness-maximizing institutions like
primogeniture, whereas it is obvious (?) that kin altruism has
evolved "because of other factors" (unspecified) and that primogeniture is a fortuitous byproduct arising in a novel situation,
whose possible adaptiveness is irrelevant (p. 298). These assertions, rather casually made, are puzzling at best. In any case,
what Kitcher does not see here is that an adaptationist (or
selectionist) account of primogeniture should tie it to specific
socioecological conditions (such as accelerating rather than diminishing fitness returns to wealth or land, shortage of capital
relative to labor, etc.); the fact that Alexander has not done so
does not mean it cannot or should not be attempted.
The avunculate - itself an alternative to primogeniture in
some ways - has been subjected to much sociobiological analysis, though most of it speculative rather than empirical. After
making some useful and provocative points about the possible
evolutionary instability of this institution, Kitcher again argues
that "banal points about common human aspirations make the
practice comprehensible" and thus make the adaptationist
model-building irrelevant (p. 305). The banal aspirations again
are given simply as a disposition to help kin, coupled in this case
with a condition of low paternity certainty. Here Kitcher's
critique is no critique at all, for his common-sense alternative is
simply an imprecise version of the paternity-certainty model he
criticizes. He seems to feel that such imprecision (which elsewhere he lambastes) is a virtue, in that it is a more realistic
description of how people actually evaluate choices than is
Kurland's more precise fitness-maximizing model. But besides
contradicting his more general view of the need for precisely
formulated hypotheses and careful tests, Kitcher's commonsense view leaves us wondering just how much paternity uncertainty it takes before a fella's had enough and starts favoring his
sister's kids. [See also Hartung: "Nlatrilineal Inheritance," BBS
8(4) 1985.] As for Kitcher's earlier point about the pOSSible
invadability of the avunculate by the "Calpurnia strategy," it is
susceptible to countercritique for ignoring complicating factors
such as matrilocal residence (a usual concomitant of the avunculate) and impartible inheritance coupled with high divorce rates
(which could favor the avunculate even if actual paternity
certainty were quite high, a point Kurland [1979] mentions).
The specific cases here can - and should, once we have more
empirical data - be the subject of argument for years. I raise
them only to illustrate general points about certain failures in
Vaulting Ambition. First, appeals to the explanatory sufllciency
or the superiority of banal facts offolk psychology are misleading
in the extreme. Although such dispositions may indeed be
"facts" (though I won't take Kitcher's word for it any more than I
will take E. O. Wilson's), they must compete with other such
dispositions and tendencies, some of them perhaps of biological
heritage and others surely culturally transmitted. For our examples, these include such factors as Sibling rivalry for wealth and
attention; conflicting loyalties to mates, offspring, and other kin;
and so on. The main problem with the "folk psychology" approach is that it lacks any theoretical guidance on how to weight
these conflicting desires and tendenCies, no common currency
(other than the mysterious ether of "utility") we can use to
derive a solution, and hence an adequate explanation. In addition, this approach fails to explain why such dispositions exist, if
they do exist. Hence, it is logically inferior to an evolutionary
explanation, and given the inherent imprecision, it is also
inferior by the criterion of testability.
Second, a central theme of Kitcher's critique of the Alexandrian school is that, by focusing on the fitness consequences of
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specific patterns of behavior, it produces studies that are "irrelevant" and "shed no light on what really needs evolutionary
explanation - to wit, the proximate mechanisms" (the cognitive
rules, dispositions, etc., that underlie such behavior; p. 307). I
must strongly disagree with such boldly made statements. If
(often unknown or poorly understood) proximate mechanisms
have evolved by natural selection - an assumption Kitcher
seems willing to entertain - and continue to be maintained
because of their fitness-erlhancing effects, and if the primary
way such effects are realized is through social behavior, then the
hypotheSiS that such behavioral effects will be fitness enhancing
on average is a reasonable or even necessary logical conclusion.
Tests to determine whether patterns ofbehavior predicted to be
fitness enhancing are in fact so are then legitimate, and hardly
irrelevant. The problem is that we often don't know which
proximate mechanisms are connected to which behavioral outcomes, and here Kitcher's caveats have some coherence, but his
radical conclusions that the entire Alexandrian project is misguided do not follow (further discussion of this point is given in
E. A. Smith, in press).
In sum, Vaulting Ambition is a serious contribution, though it
exhibits a number of flaws, especially in Chapters 7 (see Maynard Smith 1985) and 9. Though Kitcher's accomplishments are
not diminished by his failure to offer much of an alternative, his
claim that common sense is better than sociobiology is one I
have trouble taking seriously. Certainly better than either is an
evolutionary anthropology that includes cultural transmission
and evolution alongside genetic evolution in its models and that
substitutes careful model-building and cautions empirical tests
for grand speculations (see Boyd & Richerson 1985 and Durham, in press, for some beginnings along this more promising
path).

Is human sociobiology a progressive or a
degenerating research programme?
Peter K. Smith
Department of Psychology, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 2TN,
England

Amongst the more unenlightened critiques of human sociobiology has been the unelaborated criticism that it is untestable, therefore unscientific. In fact, human sociobiology, like
animal sociobiology but developing about a decade later, has
structured a domain of enquiry, indicating data of interest to
anthropologists primarily but also to psychologists and other
social scientists, in order to test hypotheses deriving from the
core theory. Many of these hypotheses are testable in the
Popperian sense, and potentially falsifiable (e.g., Hartung
1985). Some predictions have been falsified, at least in certain
studies (e.g., Beall & Goldstein 1981; Barkow & Burley 1980).
But, as Lakatos put it, one falsification does not destroy an active
research programme. In Lakatos's (1970) terminology, human
sociobiology can be seen as a research programme whose core
assumption is that human behaviour is adaptive and fitness
maximising, in a genetic sense. Around this core are a number of
auxiliary hypotheses (e.g., linking matrilineal inheritance to
paternity certainty, or sex-differential infanticide to social status). These hypotheses are testable; but in principle they can be
modified to adjust to apparent falsification without threatening
the central core.
The charge of being "unscientific" can be rephrased in
Lakatos's terms as asking whether human sociobiology is a
"progressive" or a "degenerating" research programme. In a
progressive programme, elaborations or adjustments of auxiliary hypotheses result in a more powerful overall paradigm; any
new hypothesis can explain more than just the phenomenon it
was just brought in to explain (the concept of "reproductive
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value," brought in to explain deviations from kin selection
predictions in primate societies, is a possible example). In a
degenerating programme, assumptions are brought in on an ad
hoc basis to explain discrepancies and accrete without increasing the overall power of the research programme (an example
might be van den Berghe and Mesher's [1980] attempt to
explain royal incest).
Kitcher would seem to be arguing that human sociobiology as
at present practised is degenerating rather than progressive.
There is a case to be made for this, but it is overstated.
Certainly, his Chapter 9 is a brilliantly critical analysis of several
major examples of human sociobiology's applications at the
time. However, some of these targets yield more easily to
Kitcher's criticisms than others; the explanation of royal incest is
easier to discredit than the general human sociobiological explanation of incest avoidance, for example. [See van den Berghe:
"Human Inbreeding Avoidance" BBS 6(1) 1983.]
Although Kitcher argues the contrary, attempts to show that
certain kinds of human behaviour are fitness maximising can
have some value, though of a limited kind. At the least, they
demonstrate that much human behavior may have adaptive
outcome in a genetic sense. In some of the more successful
examples they also suggest that an explanation of such behavior
(e.g., incest avoidance, inheritance systems) must be grounded
in more than just purely cultural mechanisms. These are points
that many social scientists are still unwilling to admit.
As Lakatos also remarked, negative criticism alone does not
destroy a research programme. Some alternative programme is
needed. The most disappointing part of Kitcher's excellent book
is his failure to elaborate his nascent alternative programme of
(evolutionary) folk psychology. Like Harris (1979) before him,
Kitcher argues that a reasonably limited number of dispositions
may make up human nature and may explain most human
behaviour in a particular cultural or historical context. Kitcher
mentions desiring the welfare ofone's children, enjoying sexual
activity, trying to secure oneself against danger, and competing
for wealth, power, and prestige as candidates for such a folk
psychology. Similarly, Harris (1979) proposed needs for love
and affection, food, sexual intercourse, and a principle of minimum encrgy expenditure to achieve these, as four "bio-psychological constants" or predispositions. As Kitcher explicitly
states, such dispositions could indeed have an explanation of
their existence in evolutionary biology as generally fitnessmaximising mechanisms; but as of now, we should take thesc
dispositions as the proximate mechanisms of behavior which
may not maximise fitness in all circumstances.
Insofar as this is a statement that human sociobiologists
should examine the mechanisms of any behavior, as well as the
functional significance it is to be welcomed. The best examples
of human sociobiology do this. For example, the sociobiological
explanation of human incest avoidance embodies a mechanism
(lowered sexual desire in adulthood between those co-reared in
childhood), and indeed this can predict situations in which
fitness is not maximised (as in sim-pua marriage). So far such
examples are few, but this is what is needed to ensure that
human sociobiology is progressive rather than degenerating in
its research development.
However, there are defects to Kitcher's folk psychology.
Even if one combines the lists of Kitcher and Harris (different,
apart froin enjoying sexual activity!), the list is so simple that it
does not specify more than what we might find in a simple
mammal. It does not include dispositions already postulated by
sociobiologists (e. g., sexual disinterest induced by co-rearing) or
invoked by Kitcher himself (e. g., "village loyalty" in his analysis
of Chagnon and Bugos's study of an ax fight, 1979). No predictions are possible when two dispositions compete; what happens
when perception of danger intrudes on a sexual opportunity? At
least a postulate that behavior maximises fitness can in principle
make a prediction here; iffitness maximising is rejected, what is
to be put in its place?

Finally, this approach is static in terms of evolutionary process. It assumes that there is a given list of dispositions or
biopsychological constants that (despite an evolutionary history)
can now be taken as "givens." Yet, it is more accurate to
consider any human dispositions as still evolving, both genetically and in relation to a changing cultural context. Specific
nonbehavioral examples of recent human genetic evolution are
lactose intolerance and sickle-cell anemia. These and other
more behavioral examples are discussed by Durham (1982) and
others in relation to the interacting effects of genetic and
cultural evolution on human behavior. Any static folk psychology will be limited not only in a genetic evolutionary sense, but
it will be decontextualised ifit is not placed in the framework ofa
larger theory, which does not simply explain how such dispositions are expressed in changing cultural contexts, but how they
are constructed by the reciprocal and dynamic interaction of
genetic and cultural processes. This is what gene-culture coevolution theorists are attempting to do. Kitcher's critique of
the particular attempt of Lumsden and Wilson (1981) may well
be justified, but many theorists are working in this area, which
seems a promising way forward.
In summary, an increased attention to proximate mechanisms
as well as function will be important if the human sociobiology
research programme is to be progressive rather than degenerating. To this extent, many of Kitcher's strictures are well taken.
In the longer term, some form of gene-culture coevolutionary
theory (rather than an evolutionary folk psychology) is the most
promising alternative or more embracing research programme
to succeed it.

Optimist/pessimist
Elliott Sober
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wise. 53706

The reception so far of Kitcher's Vaulting Ambition reminds me
of the old saw about the difference between an optimist and a
pessimist. Looking at the same glass of water, the former sees it
as half full while the latter sees it as half empty. Some have seen
Kitcher's book as a vindication of the possibility of an evolutionary science of human behavior; others have seen it as a devastating critique of the most influential efforts to date to construct
such a science. As in the joke about the water glass, both
assessments have their point.
Much previous criticism of sociobiology has aimed to show
that as a discipline it is unscientific. Arguments in this vein use
simplistic Popperian formulations ofwhat it takes to be scientific
and then attempt to show that sociobiology explains nothing
because it explains everything. An equally simplistic defense of
sociobiology has stressed that human beings are the products of
evolution, and so the evolution of human behavior must be just
as much a subject for scientific investigation as behavior in other
species, or as nonbehavioral traits in our own.
Vaulting Ambition shows that criticisms and defenses pitched
at this level of generality are totally without force. Crude
Popperianism earlier attempted to discredit psychoanalysis,
Marxism, and evolutionary biology itself. Many philosophers
have long realized that these wholesale pronouncements about
the scientific status of research programs merely reveal the
inadequacy ofthe philosophy from which such pronouncements
derive. Well-formulated hypotheses may be tested or examined
for the problems of testability they pose. But research programs
and the broad and vague principles that underlie them are
simply not subject to a crisp "falsifiability criterion" that judges
their "scientific status." Kitcher is to be congratulated for
bringing this philosophical lesson fully and intelligibly to the
attention of biologists.
Some people outside evolutionary biology (as well as some
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within it) have been similarly mesmerized by the justification of
sociobiology that appeals to the fact that human beings evolved.
Many biologists have long realized that this truism implies
nothing whatever about the prospects for a nontrivial evolutionary account of human behavior. The reason is that it is entirely
consistent with this truism that the principal innovation of
human evolution was a large brain that made us extremely
adaptable. This placed at our disposal an enormous range of
behaviors, the spatial and temporal variation ofwhich within our
species is to be explained by environmental and, in particular,
by cultural factors. According to this view, the details of human
behavior flow from the fact that we evolved no more than they
flow from the fact that we are made of elementary physical
particles.
By seeing that the truism gets us nowhere, Kitcher has
realized that the truth about sociobiology can be found only by
meticulously examining detailed models and hypotheses. Sociobiology is a research program, not a unified theory. Talking
about "testing sociobiology" is almost as absurd as talking about
"testing psychology." What one can do is test particular hypotheses within this program and see whether they live up to
reasonable standards of rigor and evidence.
This is what Kitcher does, with great energy and care. It will
not be surprising if some specialists find some imperfections in
his detailed analyses of so wide a range of ideas. But in the main,
I have no doubt that Kitcher is right in finding vast quantities of
sociobiology fundamentally flawed by sloppy reasoning and
equivocal data. Those intent on developing the sociobiological
research program can use Kitcher's book as a set of signposts
marking the errors that one should avoid.
Kitcher says that "the chiefaim of Vaulting Ambition is to end
a debate that has occupied biologists, social scientists, and
humanists for the last decade." He has done his share admirably;
whether the discussion now moves forward depends on the
capacity of the participants to learn from the materials he has so
skillfully assembled.

Bridging the sociobiological gap
Nils C. Stenseth
Department of Biology, Division of Zoology, University of Oslo, N-0316 Oslo
3, Norway

Charles Darwin's Origin ofSpecies revolutionized the biological
sciences. His theory also made it possible to study man as an
animal: Man and beast are two of a kind. This is the conceptual
basis for what is called sociobiology. Indeed, Darwin - with The
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animal (1872) - was the
first sociobiologist, even though Edward O. Wilson usually gets
the credit for having founded this field of study. Wilson coined
the term "sociobiology," made the discipline controversial (and
therefore popular), and it all ended up in the mess Philip
Kitcher elegantly reveals in Vaulting Ambition.
Kitcher sets out to scrutinize the mixed bag ofstudies referred
to as sociobiology. He divides sociobiology into two categories:
nonhuman sociobiology (which he to a certain extent finds to
have a reasonable theoretical and empirical foundation) and
human sociobiology (or "pop" sociobiology), which he finds
bankrupt in all respects. Kitcher has a good grasp of modern
evolutionary biology. He is - in general- well acquainted with
both the theoretical and the empirical aspects ofevolution. He is
even familiar with the mathematical basis of modern evolutionary theory and does a good job in explaining the intuitive
meaning of the framework. This puts him in a very good position
to evaluate some of the technically more advanced (at least
superficially) studies within sociobiology. Too many scientists
become either impressed or frightened by mathematical formalism. Kitcher doesn't, and finds that much of the mathemat-
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ics in sociobiology is nothing but "the Emperor's new equations" - it is "abusing mathematics" so as to make people believe
the stuff to be bett~r than it is.
The book as a whole is well written. I particularly enjoyed
Kitcher's short categorical sentences introducing several of the
paragraphs. Vaulting Ambition is undoubtedly the best evaluation of sociobiology written. However, I don't really like the
book.
First, I don't agree that Wilson was the founder of sociobiology. Much sociobiological work was done before Wilson
published Sociobiology in 1975. It is also disturbing that Darwin's 1872 book is not even mentioned; many of the sociobiologists' findings are mere rediscoveries of insights that Darwin attained and documented.
I think Kitcher is unjust in his overall critique of sociobiology
(both nonhuman and human). Readers are left with the impression that all sociobiological work carried out in the seventies and
eighties is unworthy of the paper it is reported on: Concepts
(e.g., culturgens) can't be matched with observed entities.
Often the predictions can't be tested empirically (because they
are framed in terms that are too vague); and if they can be tested,
they are rejected in favor of nonbiological alternatives. I agree
that these are real problems. But there is more to sociobiology
than that.
Kitcher does not seem to realize the importance of studying
the coevolutionary interactions between culture and biology. I
do agree that the study of Lumsden and Wilson (1981) is a
caricature of a scientific study. But Lumsden and Wilson deserve credit for having tried to understand the dynamics of the
interactions. However, Kitcher is right in ridiculing the sweeping conclusions about man drawn by many sociobiologists on a
very weak theoretical basis and from extremely ambiguous data.
The manner and the speed with which several sociobiologists try
to reach the goal is ridiculous. Wilson and a few others have
tried the hardest. Unfortunately, they have been overenthusiastic and have proposed hypotheses and reported tests that,
upon close examination (of the kind that Kitcher reports), don't
hold water. But the aim of sociobiology is not ridiculous. Since
Kitcher obviously understands the studies he discusses, he
ought to have done a better job in pointing out the value of the
goals Wilson and others set out to attain. A paragraph in the
postscript would have been sufficient.
As a field of active study, sociobiology is very young. As such,
it is bound to have many problems. In particular, it is likely to
have several theoretical concepts that do not yet match empirical observations - but possibly will someday. It is appropriate here to remember August Weismann and Gregor Mendel,
who suggested theoretical concepts (germ line and soma line,
and the entities we refer to as genes today) long before they were
linked to empirical observations. What I would like to have seen
in Kitcher's book is a section indicating that most of the statements in sociobiology referring to man are rubbish, but that the
enterprise ofhuman sociobiology may - if properly conducted give us valuable insight. (I think Kitcher believes this, but I am
not sure.) Indeed, since man has a biological history (as Darwin
taught us), it seems a priori reasonable to assume that man's
behavior, for example, cannot be fully understood unless we
also consider his biology.
Until now sociobiology has been a no man's land because
social scientists attack whoever tries to enter it as ignorant
idiots. Kitcher seems to be of the same opinion. We have to
realize, however, that biologists - thanks to Darwin - now
understand quite a bit about the biological aspects of man. We
do understand that genes are the unit of biological evolution and
that the individual is (in most cases) the unit of selection. [See
also Ghiselin: "Categories, Life and Thinking" BBS 4(2) 1986.]
Social scientists have no comparable understanding - in short,
they have no theory comparable to the Darwinian theory for
biological evolution (at least, ifwe disregard Marxism). But if we
are to understand how man - as a biological and cultural
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creature - got to be as he is today, we may need to understand
what the unit ofcultural evolution is and what the unit ofcultural
selection is. And we need to understand the dynamic interactions between biological and cultural evolution.
It is further unfortunate that Kitcher nevcr points out any of
the real difficulties in formulating the interactions bctween
cultural and biological evolution: How are we, for example, to
integrate (Lamarckian) social inhcritance with (Weismannian)
biological inheritance? And what is the cultural analogue of
biologists' natural selection - ifany? And what are the units to bc
studied in cultural evolution? In such an excessively long book
as Vaulting Ambition, there should have been room for such a
discussion.
Altogether, I'm afraid that Kitcher's book will not help bridge
the gap between social scientists and biologists. This is a pity,
particularly since Kitcher, with his detailed knowledge and
understanding, could at least have managed to narrow it.

Darwin and human nature
Donald Symons
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Santa Barbara, Calif.
93106

Vaulting Ambition is by far the most trenchant critique of
sociobiological accounts of human action. The core of Kitcher's
argument is Chapter 9, in which he analyzes the hypothesis that
human action is designed to maximize inclusive fitness. My
commentary is confined to this chapter.
Are human Qeings fitness maximizers? The question can be
met only with another question: compared to what? Human
action is obviously not random with respect to fitness, but no
one ever supposed it was. Kitcher compares the actions of
ethnographic subjects with an imaginary social engineer's ideal
design for fitness-maximizing actions. Given the particular circumstances in which the ethn:ographic subjects find themselves,
how closely do their actions approximate the engineering ideal?
Kitcher's answer: not very.
Does the hypothesis of fitness maximization at least provide
the best available account ofthe ethnographic data? No. Kitcher
shows that a superior account is provided by folk psychology.
But pitting folk psychology against fitness maximization is not
like pitting folk physics or folk physiology against their scientific
counterparts: Folk psychology is the toughest kid on its block.
As Pylyshyn (1980, p. 112) remarked, "Most people implicitly
hold a sophisticated and highly successful cognitive theory; that
is, they can systematize, make sense of, and correctly predict an
enormous range of human behavior. Although textbook authors
are fond of pointing out the errors in folk psychology, it nonetheless far surpasses any current scientific psychology in scope and
general accuracy." If the analytic gifts of a Philip Kitcher were
brought to bear on other social science accounts of the ethnographic data, it's hard to believe that any would fare better
against folk psychology than fitness maximization does; and
there is some reason to believe that they would fare worse.
Darwinists typically contrast their accounts of human action
with other social science accounts, not with folk psychology, and
they seem to have achieved some modest successes along these
lines. For example, Kitcher (1985, p. 315) admits that Chagnon
and Bugos's (1979) data undermine "the anthropological position that ties of biological kinship never matter," although
Chagnon has not demonstrated the existence of some psychological mechanism, undreamed of by folk psychology, for gauging genetic relationships. Given the current state of anthropological theory, Chagnon's is a genuine contribution.
As Kitcher points out, the great failing of most Darwinian
accounts of human action is phenotypic (psychological) agnosticism. The failure to describe or characterize phenotypes

not only prevents most Darwinian accounts from contributing to
the study of human nature, it prevents them from contributing
to the study of adaptation, since analyses of adaptation cannot
bypass the phenotype (Burian 1983). But Darwinists are not
alone in neglecting to frame explicit hypotheses about human
nature; this failing is endemic in the social sciences.
All accounts of human action nonetheless imply a human
nature, and Darwinian accounts probably are grounded more
firmly in folk psychology than other social science accounts are.
For example, the following assumptions about human nature
can be found lurking, unacknowledged, within most Darwinian
and folk psychological accounts: Human nature comprises a
diverse array of complex, specialized brain/mind mechanisms;
each human being has some goals that, by their very nature, can
be achieved only at the expense of other human beings; the
human brain/mind is sexually dimorphic. To the extent that
social scientists reject these assumptions, their accounts of
human affairs arc likely to be inferior to those of Darwinists or
folk psychologists.
Once phenotypic agnosticism is abandoned, and the power of
selectional and phylogenetic thinking is brought to bear on
questions of human psychology, Darwinism can suggest lines of
research to be followed, provide a guide, prevent certain kinds
of errors, and raise suspicions about certain explanations or
observations (Lloyd 1979). For example, in framing hypotheses
about the human psyche the Darwinist's imagination is unlikely
to be limited by the crippling legacy of Lockean environmentalism or by the traditional but misguided "wisdom" that there is
a unity and a harmony in nature; and the Darwinist is unlikely to
forget that the human brain/mind is adapted to environments
that, to some extcnt, no longer exist.
Orians (1980) exemplifies the usefulness of Darwinism for
psychology. He argues that human beings have a species-typical
emotional response to a specific type oflandscape, the savannah:
"We enjoy being in savannah vegetation, prefer to avoid both
closed forests and open plains, will pay more for land giving us
the impression of being a savannah, mold recreational environments to be more like savannahs, and develop varieties of
ornamental plants that converge on the shapes of tropical savannahs" (p. 64). Orians mayor may not turn out to be right. But his
hypothesis is commendably specific, not phenotypically agnostic, testable, and inspired in a straightforward way by habitat-selection theory. If he does turn out to be right, our folk
psychological view ofhuman nature will be improved upon; and
for this we will be indebted not only to Orians but to Darwin's
view of life.

Author's Response
Confessions of a curmudgeon
Philip Kitcher
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla,
Calif. 92093

Like Scrooge, I have been visited by three ghosts, the
Spirit of Sociobiology Past, the Spirit of Sociobiology
Present, and the Spirit of Sociobiology Yet To Come.
Each of the visitors brings a message that is worth
hearing. I shall start by considering the attempts to
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defend pop sociobiology against the charges leveled in
Vaulting Ambition (henceforth Ambition), and then proceed to what most of the commentators (and I) agree to be
the main issue: to wit, the question of how evolutionary
considerations should properly be introduced into historical explanations of human social behavior. I shall try to
use the insights of the commentators - for, with two
exceptions (Harpending and McGrew), I found the responses to Ambition helpful - to define more clearly my
own view of the matter.

.

1. Pop sociobiology's last stand? It is quite reasonable
for Churchland to hope that the delineation in Ambition
of specific criticisms of main proposals by the most prominent advocates of pop sociobiology will elicit a detailed
response to the objections. To the best of my knowledge,
all seven of the authors whose work is most extensively
criticized in Ambition received invitations to write commentaries for the present issue. None of them has chosen
to point out any mistakes or distortions in my discussion of
their claims. Thus the task of defense has been left to
Rosenberg and E. A. Smith, both of whom are more
sympathetic than I to some of the ideas that I criticize but
who are by no means uncritical of the authors they
defend.
Rosenberg makes a gallant attempt to save the theory
of gene-culture coevolution of Lumsden & Wilson [1981;
see also multiple book review, BES 5(1) 1982] from some
of the charges I make in Chapter 10 of Ambition and some
accusations he believes I make there. In the first part of
his commentary, Rosenberg proposes that Lumsden &
Wilson have shown how independently known explananda can be incorporated within "a framework that can in
principle explain and unify them." This is to mistake both
the logic of the situation and of my argument against
Lumsden & Wilson. Chapter 10 of Ambition claims that
the conclusions at which Lumsden & Wilson direct their
complex derivations, conclusions about societal distributions of attitudes toward incest, emigration, or style in
female formal dress, are better explained by showing how
the distributions result from the interaction of individual
propensities. In a series' of instructive and entertaining
examples, Schelling (1978) shows how we can introduce
ideas from probability theory to derive group patterns of
behavior from individual attitudes and dispositions. The
same approach is not only applicable in the cases of geneculture translation that Lumsden & Wilson study, but, I
claim, all that Lumsden & Wilson have done is to add
gratuitous embellishments to the core probabilistic deri~ati(m. Thus, they have added irrelevant detail to independently known explanations. The irrelevance proves
harmful in that (1) it prevents Lumsden & Wilson from
giving a more realistic treatment of the incest-avoidance
case, (2) it leads them to make errors about what exactly
goes on in Yanomamo village-fissioning, and (3) it confuses them into trying to use machinery that is supposed
to account for simultaneous variation about means, in
deriving transtemporal variation of means (the female
fashion case). It is as if someone added to quantum
chemistry some unmotivated assumptions about the
ghosts that accompany elementary particles, imagined
that these phantoms engage in an elaborate dance
governed by complex mathematics, and so befogged the
basic theory that embellished versions of mistaken deri-
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vations were offered in instances that quantum chemistry
(in its original uncluttered form) can solve quite
adequately.
Rosenberg misses the same methodological point in his
discussion of those principles that are supposed to follow
from Lumsden & Wilson's discussion of the coevolutionary circuit. Mathematicians and natural scientists quite
reasonably hope to eliminate arbitrary special assumptions from their derivations so that they will achieve
maximal explanatory generality. Thus Lumsden &
Wilson gain nothing by introducing complex and unnecessary machinery to generate claims that can be garnered
as consequences of a far more general version of geneculture coevolutionary theory. Moreover, Rosenberg's
valiant struggle to defend what Lumsden & Wilson say
about principles (B), (D), and (E) leads him into further
errors.
Principle (D) is the notorious thousand-year rule. As
both Rosenberg and I see it, (D) is derived by supposing
that there are large fitness differences and by making an
assumption about the rates of transition between cultur·
gens. But Rosenberg mistakes the form of this second
assumption. Rates of transition are not low, as he alleges,
but rather are set up so that they remain close to their
"raw" ("innate") values. So if you were worried that
culture can dampen selection then the reassurance you
are given by Lumsden & Wilson is that, if selection is very
strong and the cultural response very weak, then selection can go forward at a rapid rate. Rosenberg tries to
make the conclusion more interesting by appealing to
cultural inertia. People, he suggests, are disinclined to
adopt innovative technology. But this reply is based on
his misunderstanding of the assumption about transition
rates. In the Lumsden-Wilson model people are always
switching between culturgens (in the uncorrected version of the model, they do so about 100 times in the
prereproductive period). The point is that they are supposed to do so in ways that are relatively unaffected by the
patterns ofculturgen usage around them (or by any ability
that they might have for detecting the relative successes
of the different culturgens - the most interesting and
striking human cognitive skills are ignored by Lumsden
& Wilson). So, even if Rosenberg were right about
cultural inertia, his remarks would be inapplicable to the
kinds of situations imagined by Lumsden & Wilson.
Similarly, Rosenberg's discussion of Principle (E) is
flawed by the failure to distinguish the general possibility
of frequency-dependent selection (with consequent promotion of genetic diversity) from the specific and implausible hypothesis that Lumsden & Wilson make about
the form of the fitness function. However, it is the
treatment of (B) that is likely to create most confusion. As
was pointed out by Maynard Smith and Warren (1982)
and by me, (B) seems to controvert the commonplace idea
that culture will dampen the efficacy of selection because
(intuitively) cultural imitation allows selectively inferior
alleles to be masked by a selectively advantageous phenotype. Rosenberg's remarks about relatedness do not
dissolve the mystery. I argued that Lumsden & Wilson
derive (B) by making mistakes and by juggling the numbers. Rosenberg does not cite the section in Ambition
(pp. 380-82) in which the technical mistakes are revealed
and in which the machinery is repaired. Nor does he
explain that the Lumsden-Wilson conclusion depends on
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making a fitness ratio high. You can make a ratio high by
making the denominator very small. In fact, if you make
the denominator zero, the ratio will go to infinity. In
Lumsden & Wilson's special case, this is just what happens. The individuals with the allele to be replaced are
attributed zero fitness at the moment that the replacing
allele enters the population, and they achieve this peculiar state because of very special assumptions Lumsden &
Wilson make about the form of the fitness function. The
number of gametes produced by these unlucky people is
the difference between a number representing their
prowess in harvesting resources and a number representing the costs of their cognitive equipment. Make the
latter number large enough - but not too large - and the
terms cancel.
This example is gerrymandered (not necessarily by
design). Moreover, the general strategy of invoking high
costs of cognitive equipment tells against principle (B) for
reasons I explain (pp. 384-86 of Ambition). Rosenberg
seems to have misread these pages, and he attributes to
me a claim that appears to contradict the principles of real
number arithmetic. I sympathize with his difficulty, for it
is very hard to sort out the contortions of Lumsden &
Wilson's derivation of (B). But the basic point is that,
given Lumsden & Wilson's treatment of the reward
equation (which underlies their claims about fitness functions), (B) rests on an algebraic inequality (as Maynard
Smith and Warren pointed out in 1982). If one makes
certain assumptions, then the inequality is trivially true;
unfortunately, these assumptions seem to ensure that
there will be selection against the development of cognitive equipment. On the other hand, if the costs of
cognitive equipment are low relative to the rewards that
are brought by the possession of that equipment, then the
inequality fails, and with it (B). Thus I conclude that all
the conclusions of the Lumsden-Wilson theory of Geneculture coevolution that might lead us to see it as an
advance on a far more general and uncontroversial picture of how evolution and cultural forces interact are
based on mistakes and number-juggling - by which I do
not mean to accuse Lumsden & Wilson of deliberately
pulling the wool over their readers' eyes: I think it all too
likely that they, like Rosenberg, became so lost in the
formalism that they embraced conclusions they found
congenial without pausing to consider whether the numbers they had substituted made any sense. Chapter 10 is
my attempt to isolate the highly unrealistic assumptions
that were tacitly at work.
As I note in Ambition, Alexander's (1979) version of
human sociobiology has had the greatest influence on
practicing social scientists. E. A. Smith undertakes to
defend the Alexander program against some of the criticisms in Chapter 9. I compared Alexander's account of
primogeniture with a rival approach on which one appeals
to psych610gical capacities and dispositions to explain the
behavior and then offers an evolutionary account of the
underlying psychological states. E. A. Smith proposes to
"demolish" my counterclaim. His first point depends on
construing me as trying to explain the universality of
primogeniture. But the psychological explanation I envisage would trace the distribution of parental resources
among children to underlying concerns (such as the
Concern to maximize the welfare of children) and to

features ofthe environment that determine how different

courses of action are likely to affect the welfare of the
young. Thus I would expect to be able to explain primogeniture where it occurs and to show how deviations
from primogeniture are appropriate in different contexts.
Moreover, individual deviations not only from primogeniture but also from whatever behavior is welfaremaximizing in a given context are to be expected because
the proposed analysis abstracts from all kinds of psychological factors that might prove operative on different
occasions.
Last and most important, E. A. Smith misses the
fundamental point of my criticism of Alexander in failing
to see that the selection pressures on basic psychological
dispositions and capacities are likely to be quite broad, so
that linking the evolutionary explanation to one specific
behavioral context will prove misguided. Assume that we
have a basic disposition to desire the welfare of kin, and
that this is a product of selection. Then it is absurd to
identify the selective pressure with the advantages of
primogeniture, because, obviously, the disposition manifests itself in a broad range of behaviors across 3. broad
range of contexts. The main <:riticism that I level against
Alexandrian sociobiology is that it introduces evolutionary considerations in the wrong way by focusing on
behavior and not on the underlying mechanisms (see
Section 4 below).
Evolution certainly equips us with something, but we
need analysis of the proximate mechanisms of our behavior before we can say what that something is; only then
can we proceed to the evolutionary analysis (a point that is
clearly perceived by Bateson, Bernstein, Churchland,
Dupre, Lamb, Plotkin, P. K. Smith, and Symons). In
order to make clear the contrast between Alexandrian
sociobiology and the style of explanation I recommend, I
appealed to ordinary psychological concepts and offered a
necessarily imprecise rival explanation. E. A. Smith
wants a detailed map where I can supply only a signpost,
and so he criticizes the vagueness of my account of the
avunculate. But my aim was solely to show how Alexander (1979), Kurland (1979), and their followers are
bringing in evolutionary ideas in the wrong way, to
identify the missing discipline (the serious investigation
of psychology and development), and thus to prepare the
way for something better. Moreover, there is no reason to
think that the program I envisage is committed to any of
the forms of genetic determinism distinguished in Ambition. The basic psychological dispositions and capacities
with which evolution has endowed us may be sufficiently
abstract to allow for radically different forms of behavior
to emerge under different developmental environments
and ecological contexts.
E. A. Smith is one of the clearest and most sensitive of
the scholars who have attempted to use evolutionary
ideas in anthropology, and his attempt to defend Alexandrian sociobiology by arguing that we can expect behavioral effects to be fitness-enhancing on average deserves serious attention. I think E. A. Smith fails to see
the importance of human psychological complexity: If a
typical social behavior comes about as the result of a
number of different interacting causal factors, and if each
of the individual factors is implicated in a variety of
different combinations in a spectrum of other behaviors,
then the most we can hope to show is that the spectrum
associated with a given causal factor is fitness-enhancing.
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Only by chance will we be able to fasten on some piece of
behavior that captures our attention and discern it to be
fitness-enhancing. To put the point in its simplest form,
the averaging to which E. A. Smith alludes cannot be
carried out until we have some psychological (or,
perhaps, neurophysiological) insights into connections
among forms ofbehavior, connections that result from the
ways in which the underlying causal factors combine and
interact. This point was made, en passant, by Gould
(1977) in an early discussion of sociobiology, and, as we
shall see (Section 4), it is developed in different ways by
several of the commentators.
There are a few smaller points about the details of some
of my criticisms of pop sociobiology that deserve response. Bateson and Bernstein both raise questions
about my treatment of functional questions. They are
right in finding Ambition to be reticent on this issue: I
hoped to avoid the philosophical tangles surrounding
functional discourse. But this hesitancy was quite unnecessary, and I should have recognized clearly that the
animal behaviorists' attributions offunction are tied to the
selection pressures that currently maintain a trait in a
population - where, of course, these pressures may be
quite different from those that were operative in the
origination of the trait. Thus I agree with the points that
Bateson and Bernstein make in this connection.
I also concur with Bateson's remark that I underestimate the evidence about human preferences for mates
who are slightly unfamiliar. As I shall suggest in Section 4,
it is possible to capture the genuine insights ofthose -like
Bateson - who have taken a clue from Westermarck
(1891), without making the mistakes that I diagnose in the
pop sociobiological treatment of incest-avoidance. 1 Finally, Bernstein's points about the development of more
sophisticated concepts of dominance are well taken [see
Bernstein: 1981], although I continue to think that the
conceptual framework of ethology will be transformed
through the thorough incorporation of the game-theoretic approach to animal interactions [see Maynard
Smith: "Game Theory and the Evolution of Behavior"
BBS 7(1) 1984].
2. In defense of high standards. Because Ambition con-

trasts the rigor of some studies of nonhuman social behavior with the lapses of pop sociobiology, it naturally
arouses protests to the effect that the standards for good
science are being set too high. Rosenberg charges that
the methodological demands I make can never be met by
human sociobiology and that they are not in fact satisfied
by "infrahuman" sociobiology or even by evolutionary
theory (a point of odd coincidence between his position
and that of Saunders & HoI). But, as Beckwith points out,
Ambition shows how certain parts of nonhuman sociobiology (as well as major examples from evolutionary
theory) do show scientists searching to isolate the possible
contending hypotheses and to find observational evidence for distinguishing them. If more examples are
required, then Rosenberg need only consult two recent
monographs (Endler 1986; Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick
1984) or the contributions to Krebs and Davies's (1984)
volume. In the human case, matters will be further
complicated by the probable complexity of the proximate
mechanisms of behavior, so that we have to take very
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seriously the possibility that the operation of selection is
subject to many hidden constraints. That should not be
taken to imply that the task of fathoming those constraints, and thus proceeding to evolutionary analysis on
the basis of information rather than ignorance, is in
principle impossible.
I think that what troubles Rosenberg is the question
why we should be able to confirm hypotheses about
nonhuman behavior without detailed developmental
analysis. The answer is that scientists like Parker (1978)
and Woolfenden and Fitzpatrick (1984) gain evidence for
the hypotheses that the traits they study are evolutionarily simple in the sense that they can be developmentally modified without affecting the selective value of
other aspects of the phenotype. Their evidence comes
from their ability to make precise models, whose predictions can be compared with field observations. Were it
possible to propose serious hypotheses that invoked developmental complications and that offered different explanations of the data, then Parker and Woolfenden &
Fitzpatrick would be forced into the kinds of analyses that
I take to be necessary in human sociobiology. By the same
token, ifhuman sociobiologists could provide evidence to
counter the well-grounded assumption that human behavioral traits are not evolutionarily simple, then, if their
models were precise and their field data extensive, they
could hope to emulate the work in behavioral ecology that
is singled out for praise in Ambition.
The point is well expressed in the final paragraph of
Lamb's commentary. As a field of research develops,
scientists are able to structure the space of competing
hypotheses and so to appreciate which potential explanations should be taken seriously. Behavioral ecology has
already made substantial progress along these lines, but,
as Lamb emphasizes, most ofcurrent human sociobiology
"involves the application of a perspective" rather than
any serious consideration of alternative hypotheses. I
hope that, with enhanced understanding of the psychological and neurophysiological mechanisms that underlie
human behavior, and with some knowledge of their
development, we shall be able to say precisely what kinds
of confounding variables need to be taken seriously, so
that Bernstein's understandable worry that we are
doomed to appraise rivals on the basis of subjective
preferences will be allayed.
Saunders & Ho contend that I have missed the fundamental flaw in sociobiology - namely, the untenability of
neo-Darwinism. They are right to complain that Ambition provides no definition of the synthetic theory of
evolution, and justified in worrying that neo-Darwinism
can mean almost all things to almost all people. But I find
their characterization of neo-Darwinism a caricature,
perhaps well suited to the introduction of Futuyma's
(1979) excellent textbook, but not concordant with his
practice of evolutionary theory or with that of any other
sophisticated evolutionary theorist. There is a liberal
wing of neo-Darwinism (to which I subscribe) that takes
very seriously the need to appreciate the possibility that
natural selection may operate at a number oflevels, that
selection is only one among several evolutionary forces,
that the influence of selection may be subject to various
kinds of constraint, and that it is essential to integrate
developmental considerations into contemporary evolu-
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tionary theory (see Bateson 1982; Ghiselin 1974a; Gould
1982; Gould & Lewontin 1979; Lewontin 1974; Oster &
Alberch 1982; Sober 1984, for a few prominent expressions of liberal neo-Darwinism; Section 4 contains
further discussion of the position). Saunders & Ho err, in
my judgment, when they see the need for a new "paradigm" in phenomena that support the liberalization of
neo-Darwinism. Moreover, in suggesting that the studies
I praise in Ambition are "modest," they exemplify that
excessive ambition that my book finds in pop sociobiology. Rigorous evolutionary studies are always likely to be local, because different ecological variables are
crucial to the lives of different species. Thus to understand the dynamics of dung fly copulation or the phenomenon of helping at the nest in scrub jays - or, if you
like, to be Thane of Glamis - is no mean thing.
Ambition not only tries to identify the methodological
canons that evolutionary studies ought to satisfY, showing
how they are met by parts of nonhuman sociobiology, but
it also urges the need for high standards when those
studies involve politically sensitive issues. The point is
clearly appreciated by Beckwith and by Futterman &
Allen. However, the latter commentators believe that it
is not enough to diagnose methodological flaws: What is
required is a critique of the social institutions that make
pop sociobiology (and other forms of biological determinism) possible. Rosenberg, by contrast, believes that my
fears about the impact of sociobiological ideas are exaggerated. Since pop sociobiological claims about sexual
inequality (to mention only the most obvious topic) have
been widely touted in a variety of newspapers and magazines (Futterman & Allen supply ample documentation),
Rosenberg's remarks provide scant reassurance, but I am
optimistic enough to hope that a thorough discrediting of
pop sociobiology will eliminate one line of inegalitarian
argument. If I knew a more general way to oppose the
tendencies that concern Futterman & Allen I would
happily set to work on a more general book.
Of course, any mention of the political context is
dangerous, in that it can encourage misreadings in the
style of Harpending's commentary. Ambition only links
sociobiology with ability testing insofar as both are areas
in which the costs of error are grave. Harpending misrepresents a plea for caution and methodological selfscrutiny as an exhortation to censorship, and he sees a
political agenda in chapters that analyze the technical
details of sociobiological claims. It is easier to cry "Politics!" than to respond to the technical arguments. It is
also unilluminating to claim that criticisms "have been
made before" without specifying who has made them and
without showing that they have been heeded.
The doubtful tactic of alluding to unidentified treasures, pursued also by McGrew, causes me to wonder
whether it is an essential property of a good study in
human SOCiobiology that it be unexamined-by-Kitchel'. I
take it that there are some 30 articles in Ethology and
Sociobiology that McGrew believes I should have discussed. Either he has failed to read my book or he has not
studied Ethology and Sociobiology very carefully. I offer
detailed analyses of studies - the Alexander- Kurland
(Alexander 1979, Kurland 1979) work on the avunculate,
Chagnon and Bugos (1979) on Yanomamo conflict,
Dickemann (1979) on female infanticide - that are not

only repeatedly cited by the authors of articles in Ethology and Sociobiology but are also the explicit points of
departure for several ofthe studies that fall most centrally
within human SOCiobiology. Nor do I understand how I
can be faulted for spending approximately 30 pages on a
book (Alexander 1979) that was reviewed by one of the
two editors-in-chief of Ethology and Sociobiology and
described as "unquestionably the best book available on
the subject of evolutionary biology and human behavior"
(McGuire 1981).
Perhaps both Harpending and McGrew have been led
astray by the style of Ambition, for those sympathetic to
the doctrines I criticize may view my "witty" (Johnston)
or "deliciously sharp" (Bateson) style to be irritating or
inappropriate. I wonder whether E. A. Smith may be
right when he worries that my stylistic excesses may
"harden believers in their loyalties." The different reactions to the tone of Ambition suggest a conjugation of the
kind reported by Bertrand Russell: I am witty, you are
sarcastic, he/she is downright vituperative.
3. Ethical prospects. Two excellent commentaries (Salmon, Singer) focus on the last chapter of Ambition and the
issue of sociobiology and ethics. As Salmon notes, there
are two interpretations of the project of "sociobiologicizing" ethics that I accept and two that I reject. She
proposes that there may be more promise in a sociobiological meta-ethics than I allow: For, if we combine
the legitimate project of tracing the etiology of our moral
judgments with the thesis that there is no hope for
discovering justifications of those judgments that are
independent of their causal history, then sociobiology
becomes directly relevant to meta-ethics. I have two
qualms about this suggestion. First, even if it were
conceded that there is no justification of our moral beliefs
that is independent of the causal history of those beliefs,
there would still be serious questions about the way
evolutionary considerations should figure in delineating
the causal history (see my replies to E. A. Smith in
Section 1 above, and Section 4 below). Second, I am not
convinced that philosophical projects of seeking the
grounds of moral judgments - such as those pursued by
Rawls (1971; 1980), Darwall (1983), Railton (1986), and
Singer (1981) - are doomed to failure. As I see it, the
position that causal-historical explanation is all the justification we can achieve becomes attractive only when the
justificatory forays of meta-ethics have clearly failed.
Perhaps what divides me from both Salmon and Murphy
(1982) is the belief that some of those forays are promising, but I hope that we would be able to agree that even if
justificatory meta-ethics proves hopeless the tracing of
causal-historical explanations of our moral beliefs will
require the transfiguration of pop sociobiology.
If I understand him correctly, Singer amplifies both
points. A central theme both of his 1981 book and of his
present commentary is that we should expect the justification of moral beliefs to divide into two parts. Initially,
there will be a causal-historical explanation of certain
basic human attitudes or capacities (and, in my version of
the story, these would be quite abstract). Second, for
beings with these attitudes and capacities, there will be a
set of reasons that justifies a system of moral judgments.
Singer's commentary is a lucid presentation of one way of
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developing the strategy. I believe that there are others
(e. g., approaches along Rawlsian lines), and I am grateful
to Singer for making the general strategy explicit, and
thereby enabling me to extend a line of argument that
Ambition left incomplete.
4. The shape of things to come. People are sometimes
"mesmerized by the justification of sociobiology that
appeals to the fact that hu-man beings evolved,;' as Sober
correctly emphasizes. Once we have appreciated the
flaws in the various versions of pop sociobiology (and, as
Salmon recognizes, pop sociobiology is itself a mixture of
programs), it is natural to ask how we ought to pursue the
evolutionary study of human social behavior. The commentaries of Bateson, Bernstein, Churchland, Draper,
Dupre, Lamb, Plotkin, P. K. Smith, Sober, Stenseth,
and Symons all seem to me to contain valuable suggestions about the answer to this question. In this final
section, I shall try to trace a route from pop sociobiology
to a sophisticated evolutionary study of human social
behavior, identifYing points of agreement and disagreement with my commentators along the way.
The starting point must be the recognition that what
has gone on under the name of sociobiology is remarkably
diverse, a point that is central to Ambition and whose
importance is clearly appreciated by Sober, Johnston,
Dupre, Lamb, Bernstein, and Beckwith. P. K. Smith's
invocation of the Lakatosian notion of a research program
not only avoids the common muddles about falsification
(more prevalenJ: in appeals to Popper than in Popper's
own work), but it also formulates the issue in a useful way.
As we shall see, however, what P. K. Smith takes for the
core assumption of human sociobiology - namely, the
claim that human behavior is fitness-maximizing - will be
abandoned as we develop the more general program of
applying evolutionary ideas to human social behavior.
What is the evolutionary theory within which we propose to devise explanations ofhuman social behavior? As I
have already indicated, I believe that neo-Darwinism can
overcome the difficulties that motivate Saunders & Ho to
seek a new "paradigm." The ills of unbridled adaptationism are cured by thinking seriously about constraints
- especially developmental constraints - on the operation of natural selection, not by abandoning appeals to
selection altogether. 2 I am also sympathetic to Ghiselin's
views about the hierarchical expansion of neo-Darwinism, but he and I have a family squabble about how to
put the point. In my view (Kitcher 1984a; 1984b; 1986a;
forthcoming), the metaphysical claim that species are
individuals is devoid of biological significance, and I have
argued that Ghiselin (1974b), Eldredge (1985), and others
have misformulated some of their biological insights by
appealing to it. [See Ghiselin: "Categories, Life and
Thinking" BBS 4(2) 1981.] Nor do I think that the thesis
would have strengthened the argument of Ambition - if
only because individual essences are back in contemporary metaphysics (Kripke, 1972, is a locus classicus), so
that the claim that Homo sapiens is an individual would
not obViate the sociobiological quest for human nature.
I agree with Lamb, Stenseth, and Symons that Darwin
is the founder of genuine human sociobiology - and I am
surprised that Stenseth overlooked the explicit citation
that Wilson's (1975) book is "popularly regarded" as the
beginning ofsociobiology (p. 13 of Ambition) as well as the
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presence in the Postscript ofa paragraph that says what he
seems to want me to have said. But I regard Darwinian
evolutionary theory as theoretically enriched by the contributions of Hamilton (1964) and Maynard Smith (1982),
both of which should be deployed in the development of
precise models of human social behavior. 3
The first step in seeking an evolutionary understanding
of human social behavior is to obtain a clear view of the
evolutionary machinery that is to be put to work. The
second is to recognize, once and for all, that this machinery will not deliver a solution to the nature-nurture
problem, it will not show that the genes "hold culture on a
leash," in short, it will not yield the kinds of conclusions
that made Wilson's pop sociobiology exciting (or threatening) to the public. Ambition argues the point in detail;
it is correctly amplified by Bateson, Futterman & Allen,
and Lamb, and it is not questioned by any ofthe commentators. Indeed, Ambition should have noted that Symons
(1979) and Dawkins (1982, Chapter 2) had already seen
clearly that evolutionary analyses ofsocial behavior do not
imply conclusions about the possibility or impossibility of
modifying the behavior.
The next stage in the transfiguration of human sociobiology is to recognize the moral of the successes of
nonhuman sociobiology. It is no accident that the studies
praised in Ambition (e.g., the work of Parker [1978],
Woolfenden [1975], Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick [1978],
Clutton-Brock, Guinness & Albon [1982], and others)
focus on particular species. If we are to obtain precise
evolutionary models - and so emulate the behavioral
ecologists - then it is foolish to hope that we can cope
simultaneously with all vertebrates, all mammals, all
primates, or even all the great apes. The reason is that, as
we proceed to details, different ecological parameters
become important in different cases, so that the larger
domain fragments into cells that are covered by distinct
models. (Dupre offers a further.caution by suggesting
that, in the case of Homo sapiens, there may be further
fragmentation imposed by differing cultural conditions.)
Moreover, the increase in theoretical precision needs to
be matched by a change in the data collected. Although I
suspect that Draper's conception of the future of human
sociobiology is somewhat different from mine, I think that
she is right to note that the evolutionary approach (as
should be clear, there is no such thing as "the evolutionary view") encourages ethnographers to attend to actions
rather than rationalized reports of actions, and thus to
arrive at conclusions that differ from those obtained by
earlier field workers. I would take the point further, and
suggest that, as we become clearer on the issue of how to
construct sophisticated evolutionary models of human
social behavior, the activity of ethnography will itself be
increasingly illuminated.
Plotkin emphasizes at the beginning of his commentary
the need for a fourth step. Neo-Darwinian evolutionary
theory must be completed in certain respects if it is to
provide the basis for constructing models that apply to
species with a system of cultural transmission (most
prominently, but not only, Homo sapiens). Plotkin modestly omits reference to his own efforts at developing an
account of gene-culture coevolution in BBS (Plotkin &
Odling-Smee 1981), and expresses his admiration for the
recent work of Boyd & Richerson (1985). (He also justly
cites the pioneering efforts of Campbell [1965].) I share
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his view that Boyd and Richerson have advanced our
understanding of the ways in which biological and cultural systems of transmission may interact (see Kitcher
1986b). Not only does their work strike at the core
assumption that P, K, Smith sees in the sociobiological
program (by revealing that there are evolutionarily sustainable conditions under which behavior that is not
fitness-maximizing may be maintained in a population),
but it also increases the resources for model-building.
Plotkin, P, K. Smith, and Stenseth all see great promise for human sociobiology in the development of theories
of gene-culture coevolution, and I share some of their
enthusiasm. Plainly, my assessment of the achievement
of Lumsden & Wilson (1981) diverges from that of Plotkin
and that of Stenseth, for I view Lumsden & Wilson as
having contributed only obfuscation to an important project. However, my principal difference with P. K. Smith,
Plotkin, and Stenseth - and with Boyd & Richerson
(1985) - begins from a point that I share with Dupre.
Without a serious psychological theory onto which the
considerations about cultural transmission can be grafted,
even a human sociobiology transformed through the
incorporation of the valuable ideas of Boyd & Richerson
would be vulnerable to the same errors that I diagnose in
Alexandrian sociobiology. The transition from "gonads
alone" to "gonads plus brains" (Plotkin's derivations from
Lewontin 1985) requires more than the identification of
the effects of systems of cultural transmission. Thus, I
believe that P. K. Smith is wrong to pit the program of
gene-culture coevolutionary theory against my suggested program of evolutionary folk psychology. The
latter is essential to the adequate articulation of the
former. The transformation of human sociobiology requires a fifth step.
Dupre sees the point very clearly and suggests that we
need to abandon the idea of "cultural atomism." In my
judgment, the way to do this is to bring to center stage the
mechanisms, both proximate and developmental, that
underlie human social behavior. Evolutionary analysis,
even sophisticated evolutionary analysis ofthe kind that is
made possible through the work of Boyd & Richerson,
cannot begin until we have identified those properties
that genuinely stand in need of evolutionary explanation.
Symons too recognizes that this is the central issue:
Selectional thinking needs to be "brought to bear on
questions of human psychology." By engaging in this
enterprise, we would also respond to P. K. Smith's worry
that the approach of folk psychology is "static."
I admit that this is a more elusive program than that of
looking for fitness-maximization at the level of the behavioral phenotype. For the sad truth of the matter is that, as
Symons appreciates, the best available account of the
psychol()gical mechanisms relevant to the complex and
interesting forms of behavior that quicken the pulses of
anthropologists is provided by our folk wisdom. But once
we recognize that the traits that most human sociobiologists hope to identifY as fitness-maximizing are no
more likely to be adaptations than the ability to write
iambic pentameter, then we shall see that the appropriate
remedy is to improve - possibly transform - folk psychology, instead of ignoring the psychological level entirely.
(Here I believe that Bateson, Churchland, Dupre,
Lamb, Sober, Symons, and I are all in agreement.)
Consider the avunculate. Alexander (1979), Kurland

(1979), and their followers propose to show that a certain
phenotypic trait - the disposition to support the children
produced by a putative full sister rather than the children
produced by a wife - is fitness-maximizing when confidence of paternity is low. [See also Hartung: "Matrilineal
Inheritance" BBS 8(4) 1985.] My criticism is that this is
unlikely to be true, and, even if true, it is not relevant.
Underlying the behavioral phenotype is a set of proximate mechanisms. Our first, rough identification of them
would pick out a desire for the welfare of kin and beliefs
about what makes for welfare and about who are the kin.
Are these psychological states likely to be fitness-maximizing? No. Lurking behind them are more general
dispositions, the abstract tendencies that underlie our
psychological development, that lead to our adult propensities for forming particular beliefs, desires, plans,
and intentions in particular contexts. Suppose, for the
sake of simplicity and with no claim to realism, that we
can stop at this level of analysis. Then we ought to replace
the Alexander-Kurland claim that the avunculate is fitness-maximizing with the thesis that these underlying
tendencies lead, in a variety of different contexts, to forms
of behavior that on the whole (waiving further unidentified developmental constraints) accord with the predicted optima of a sophisticated gene-culture coevolutionary theory (e.g., that of Boyd & Richerson 1985).
Among the forms of behavior will be the behavioral
disposition that prompts the Alexander-Kurland search
for fitness-maximization: The interesting question is not
whether it maximizes fitness but whether it results from
deep propensities that on average maximize the geneculture analog of fitness. As E. A. Smith sees, it
is a matter ofaveraging, but we cannot discover how to do
the averaging without significant psychological investigations.
I sketched this point in Ambition in terms of a program
of evolutionary folk psychology, and I have continued to
emphasize the need for psychological analysis here.
Churchland sees that folk psychology is only a placeholder, that what is really important is to take "into
account that massive mound of computational wondertissue that intervenes between genes and behavior: the
brain." Her own development of the point emphasizes
neurophysiological description rather than the identification of mechanisms in terms of psychology (whether folk
or sophisticated). I think that-this is a possibility that may
prove frUitful in some - perhaps many - instances. In the
example Churchland describes, we may be able to show
that the possession of certain neurophysiological or neuroanatomical traits causes behaviors that, taken as a
whole, are fitness-enhancing. Ofcourse, as I have emphasized earlier in this section, the neo-Darwinism envisaged here must be emancipated from adaptationism.
The point is not to advance yet another adaptationist
program, but to delineate the level at which the application of sophisticated evolutionary theory should proceed.
My conception ofhow to identifY that level is pluralistic
- and I thus applaud the list of potential contributing
disciplines with which Churchland ends her commentary. The important task is to move beyond the behavioral
phenotype, investigating the proximate mechanisms of
behavior and their development. Different disciplines,
including the main divisions of psychology and of neuroscience, will have a role to play in this investigation, and it
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is quite possible that different sciences will dominate in
different instances.
I have tried to show elsewhere (Kitcher 1987) how the
kinds of considerations shared by Bateson, Churchland,
Dupre, Lamb, Sober, Symons, and me fit together with
the emphasis on studying the interaction between biology and culture that is rightly emphasized by Plotkin, P. K.
Smith, and Stenseth. But it is only fitting to end this
response by using some of the work to which Bateson
alludes in his commentary to illustrate the transformation
of human sociobiology that a number of us appear to
envisage. For Bateson has not only offered one of the
most articulate accounts of the need to integrate evolutionary and developmental studies (1982), but has also
enabled us to see more concretely what the result might
look like.
According to the sobiobiological version of the Westermarck hypothesis, we are supposed to understand the
human propensity to avoid incest with siblings as an
adaptive disposition to refrain from copulating with those
with whom one has been reared. [See van den Berghe:
"Human Inbreeding Avoidance" BBS 6(1) 1983.] It is
important to distinguish the explanation of incest avoidance from the explanation of intrafamilial sanctions
against incest (or against invasions of the privacy of other
family members) and from the explanation of the presence in a society of public taboos against incest. Bateson
makes some interesting remarks about how to connect
the explanation of taboos with the explanation of the
disposition to avoid incest and other psychological dispositions, but I want to focus more narrowly on the
explanation of why incest by consent is rare among
siblings. 4
Bateson has suggested that preference for mates who
are somewhat different - but not too different - might
come about as the interaction of two developmental
processes. One ofthese processes, imprinting, inclines us
to value the familiar over the novel; the other, habituation, disposes us to view the familiar as less attractive.
[See also Rajecki et al.: "Toward a General Theory of
Infantile Attachment" BBS 1(3) 1978.] To use a metaphor
suggested by Bateson (personal communication), we may
think of the resulting preference as "filtered" in two
stages, with familiarity increasing the chances of transmission at the first stage and close familiarity strongly
decreasing the chances of transmission at the second. The
result is a responsiveness curve that peaks at the not-toofamiliar (see Bateson 1983, especially Figure 24.5).
How does the responsiveness curve (assumed to be
psychologically realized in the individual agent) relate to
actual behavior? Think of sexual activity according to a
simple model. The subject encounters a variety of other
people, each of whom has a definite position on the axis
that represents familiarity-novelty. If that position corresponds to a point on the responsiveness curve that lies
above the threshold for initiation of sexual activity, then
the subject will make a sexual advance. Consensual sexual
relations will occur if the situation is symmetrical, and
each makes a sexual advance toward the other. If we take
this model seriously then we have to ask about the factors
that determine the position of the threshold. We shall
expect the position and shape of the threshold to be
modified by all kinds of psychological mechanisms: It will
be lowered by increased tolerance of risks and sexual
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frustration; raised by sexual satiety or fear of sanctions.
From the perspective of the model, consensual incest is
very rare (p2) because the probability that a subject will
make an incestuous advance is small (p), and the latter
probability is small because it is unlikely that the threshold will fall below the responsiveness curve in the region
corresponding to siblings.
To give an evolutionary explanation of the infrequency
of consensual Sibling incest thus requires us to understand the evolutionary pressures that have shaped the
basic psychological mechanisms that combine to produce
sexual behavior: the two developmental processes that
give rise to the responsiveness curve and the transformations that adjust the threshold. Moreover, even if the
model is along the right lines, the psychological decomposition I have indicated may not reach the elements that
should receive evolutionary analysis. However, in the
end, the plausibility of the model is far less important
than the general possibility that it illustrates. The moral is
that evolutionary analysis must be preceded by an understanding of the elementary processes and propensities
that underlie the human behavioral phenomena that
catch our attention.
To recapitulate: The transformation of human sociobiology should proceed in five steps. First is the
clarification of the underlying evolutionary theory, in my
judgment through the thorough incorporation of the
theoretical insights of Hamilton (1964) and Maynard
Smith (1982), together with the elimination of the tendency to form oversimplified conceptions of the evolutionary forces. Second is the relinqUishing of the attempt
to use evolutionary ideas in solving the problem of the
plasticity of human behavior, the abandonment of genetic
determinism. Third is the commitment to focus on welldefined human groups, balancing precise evolutionary
models with sophisticated ethnographic data. Fourth
comes the task of integrating models of biological evolution with explicit recognition of the importance ofcultural
forces. Finally, there is the need for developmental decomposition, the analysis of the mechanisms that underlie
the behavioral phenotype in the terms ofpsychology or of
neuroscience or of both.
Although I have come to bury pop sociobiology, not to
cremate it, I shall adopt Plotkin's metaphor and agree that
we may expect to see a new discipline rising from the
ashes. The differences between sociobiology past and
sociobiology yet to come are, I think, more radical than
Plotkin appreciates. Hence, I do not believe that Wilson's
approach "even in failure," will have contributed much.
If my suggestions about the five stages of transformation
are correct, then there are other, more obvious, architects of the discipline we anticipate: Maynard Smith and
Hamilton, the behavioral ecologists who have drawn
inspiration from their work, Boyd & Richerson, and
Bateson. Such speculative awards are fun to make, but
they are highly vulnerable to refutation. Twenty-firstcentury historians of science will see more clearly how to
trace precursors and to assign the credit. I share with
many of my commentators the hope that they will be able
to write the history of a science that introduces evolutionary ideas into the study of human social behavior - a
science freed from the false idea that a simplistic version
of evolutionary theory can swallow up the social sciences.
Ironically, sociobiology requires a new synthesis, not a
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declared autocracy. I have been arguing that genuinely
scientific human sociobiology should be a union, but I
freely admit that some of the contributors are as yet
unformed. The challenge is to develop them, not to
subjugate them. Le roi est mort. Vive la republique.
NOTES
1. However, I do not accept Harpending's claim that my
discussion of the work of Spielman, Neel, and Li (1978) involves
a ITtechnical error. ~ that work is relevant to discussions of
incest-avoidance, because if Spielman et al. are right, then we
have some evidence that early hominid groups did not follow
one of the primate patterns of having the members of one sex
leave their natal troop when they reach reproductive age. Thus,
contrary to the Westermarck hypothesis, primitive hominids
would have mated with familiar individuals. I am also somewhat
mystified by Bernstein's worries about the work of Packer (1979)
and Pusey (1980). Unless I am missing something, Pusey (1980),
to cite just one study, offers rather compelling evidence for the
disposition of young reproductively capable female chimpanzees to avoid males with whom they have previously been
friendly.
2. Chapter 7 contains a detailed discussion of adaptationism
and attempts to show how neo-Darwinism can be freed from
adaptationisr excesses. E. A. Smith alludes to a criticism by
Maynard Smith (1985) and charges that there are "flaws" in
Chapter 7. In fact, the only quibble I have with Maynard
Smith's extraordinarily comprehending discussion of my book
concerns this very point. I was concerned to distinguish two
ways of developing the slogan that evolution produces the fittest
phenotype, one in terms ofthe properties of individuals and one
in terms of population mean fitness. I think Maynard Smith
interpreted a disjunctive argument for a conjunctive claim, and
rightly objected to the latter. But what I meant (and, I hope,
wrote) was fully consonant with his points. So I believe there to
be no basis for E. A. Smith's charge.
3. Bateson seems to me to overstate the case when he
downplays the significance of the notion of inclusive fitness. It is
quite correct to note that there have been misunderstandings of
the notion (see Dawkins 1979; Grafen 1982; Michod 1982) and
that many studies have supposed that populations will attain
maxima of some curiously defined quantity or another. But the
moral is surely that Hamilton's (1964) ideas should be used
carefully, not that we should abandon them altogether - for
there are situations in which classical fitness and inclusive
fitness (properly defined) do differ.
4. To a first approximation, if each sibling has a probability p
of desiring incest then the probability that two siblings will
engage in consensual incest is p2. The probability that there will
be coercive incest depends on p and on the probabilities ofbeing
willing and able to enforce desires by coercing another. The
explanation of the infrequency of sibling incest must consider
both of these possible ways in which sexual relations between
siblings might arise. Since different psychological mechanisms
are at work in the two cases, this is further grist for my mill.
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